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This thesis examines the construction of forensic medical evidence in penetrative 
sexual assault cases and the procedures that Forensic Medical Examiners (FMEs) 
employ in order to ensure the authority of that evidence.  Drawing upon interviews 
and on the texts and artefacts that FMEs use in their work, the thesis employs the 
concept of “meaning finitism” to analyse how FMEs perform forensic examinations 
for evidential purposes.  The thesis starts with an exploration of how medical 
practitioners are taught to identify and classify injuries of medico-legal significance, 
culminating in their being judged “safe” to provide expert testimony  by other 
members of the clinical forensic medical community.  The thesis next addresses the 
construction of what I call the “morphological account”: a set of judgements about 
the nature of a case based upon a combination of the observed injuries, the FME’s 
training and their previous experience of cases.  While there is considerable 
agreement amongst practitioners about how to interpret injuries (a result of their 
training), because the morphological account involves personal judgement, there is 
also scope for differences of opinion.  The thesis therefore explores the methods that 
FMEs employ to limit the risk of being seen to disagree with one another during 
trials.  The thesis also examines the role that guidelines play in the forensic medical 
examination.  The thesis argues that standardised medical kits and associated 
guidance documents were originally introduced in the early 1980s in response to 
sustained criticism of FMEs’ practices, and further developed in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s with the rise of Evidence-Based Medicine.  Kits and guidance documents 
provide a means for FMEs to legitimate and explain their work to others, particularly 
during trials: they codify collective practice and provide FMEs with an aide memoire 
of the requisite procedures, without overly determining or constraining practice.  
Finally, I will argue that FMEs’ concern to ensure the authority of their evidence 
may sometimes limit the value of that evidence.  Caution over drawing inferences 
that might be challenged in court, and a concern not to be seen as “prosecution-
minded”, commonly leads FME to compose so-called “Neutral Reports” which 
neither confirm nor deny the complainer’s allegations.  As Scottish Procedural Law 
 viii
makes provision for non-contentious evidence to be removed from trial, such neutral 
reports are likely to be dismissed from consideration. 
 ix
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1.1 Constructing Credible Forensic Evidence 
Forensic scientific and medical evidence has considerable authority in contemporary 
society.  Various television series, from the Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) 
franchise to the various documentary style “cop shows” which demonstrate the work 
of the police as they heroically conduct investigations and make arrests, provide the 
public with an insight (albeit heavily edited and constructed) into the way in which 
forensic technologies can result in arrests and secure convictions.  Prainsack and 
Kitzberger (2009), in their interview-based study of convicts in Austria, point out 
that convicts’ knowledge of forensic evidence (particularly DNA technologies) 
derives in part from such television shows, but also from their own experience as 
well as that of other convicts; in general, convicts feel reassured by (but also 
powerless against) forensic technologies.  Likewise, high-profile trials, such as the 
O.J. Simpson trial in America and the successful appeal of the Birmingham Six in 
Britain, have made the public more aware of the uses and drawbacks of certain 
forensic technologies.
1
  The upshot of all this discourse surrounding forensic work is 
that forensic evidence is generally considered to be a highly useful tool in dealing 
with crime (for example, see Prime Minister of Great Britain, Rt. Hon. Gordon 
Brown’s “speech on security and liberty” (Brown 2007)), and is granted considerable 
authority within the courtroom.  It is also the case, however, that as the old adage 
goes, “with great power comes great responsibility”, and in holding such a privileged 
position, forensic practitioners have to control and police themselves in order to 
maintain that status.  One particular group of forensic practitioners, the fingerprint 
analysts, have recently learnt to their cost that it is fairly easy for a single case or a 
collection of cases to undermine the public perception of a forensic practice, and 
                                               
1
 However, recent public awareness of some of the limitations of forensic technologies should not be 
read as a decline in the level of public trust in said technologies.  As Gary Edmond (2002a) claims, 
quite correctly, the appeal case of the Birmingham Six (where one technology originally used to 
convict was found to have limitations and superseded by another technology that was used to acquit) 
did not damage trust in forensic science, but rather served to reinforce the authority (albeit 
“asymmetrically”, i.e. the new technology was accepted uncritically while the old technology was 
undermined) of the new technology. 
 2 
diminish the credibility of fingerprint evidence (see for example the furore and 
fallout surrounding the Shirley McKie perjury case (O’Neill 2006)).  In this thesis, I 
am interested in investigating the ways that forensic practitioners maintain their 
authority (and thereby the authority of forensic evidence), i.e. the ways that 
practitioners and their communities make their work and the evidence that they 
present appear objective and incontrovertible. 
 Such a study has a rich heritage in the field of Science and Technology 
Studies (hereafter “STS”).  Working with the general agenda of challenging the 
belief of scientists and lawyers that there is a “culture clash” between science and the 
law (where science is considered to produce “truth” while the law delivers “justice”), 
STS analysts like Sheila Jasanoff (1995) and Brian Wynne (Smith and Wynne 1989), 
amongst many others, have outlined the manner by which different expert groups 
have not only negotiated the particular difficulties thrown up by the legal system 
(such as cross-examinations, of which more below), but have also demonstrated the 
similarities between the fields of science and law and the ways that they mutually 
constitute each other.  As an example, American judges were criticised in the early 
1990s for allowing so-called “junk science” (Huber 1993, Foster and Huber 1999) 
into the courtroom.  Due to judges’ supposed scientific illiteracy, expertise that was 
not considered to be the “best science” was being considered in the courtroom, 
which, it was claimed, led to dubious legal judgements.
2
  In response to these 
accusations, a set of rules was introduced in order to determine whether a form of 
scientific or technical expertise was “good” enough to be made admissible in court.  
The Daubert Rules provided American judges with a set of criteria by which to 
assess the admissibility of expert evidence; however, STS scholars have been very 
critical of these rules, as they are based upon a set of scientific ideals which fail to 
take account of the contingent, fluid and pragmatic nature of scientific work (Caudill 
2004, Caudill and LaRue 2006, Edmond 2001, 2002b, 2004, Edmond and Mercer 
1998, 2000, 2004a, 2004b, Jasanoff 1995, 2002, Mercer 2002, Solomon and Hackett 
1996).  Jasanoff (1992) has taken this critique a step further and argued that in 
making the judge a gatekeeper who determines the legitimacy (i.e. the admissibility 
                                               
2
 The archetypal cases of this kind were the (in)famous Daubert Trilogy: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, General Electric v. Joiner, and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.  For more on 
all three cases, see Caudill and La Rue (2006). 
 3 
of use in court) of a form of expert knowledge, the introduction of rules, like those 
introduced in Daubert, sets the judge up as an active participant in the construction 
(or deconstruction) of the authority and expertise of a particular 
scientist/technician/discipline.  This could potentially constitute interference in 
possible broader debates involving that expertise (in addition, it could set precedents 
for future trials), and is an example of the way that the law can constitute aspects of 
science. 
 Another area generally discussed with relation to the “culture clash” is cross-
examination within adversarial legal contexts.
3
  It is often argued that in an effort to 
“win” the adversarial battle, defence or prosecution teams will attempt to 
demonstrate partisanship on the part of the expert towards the party for which they 
are providing evidence, or request in minute detail the technical processes that the 
expert employed (wherein the expert has to express the content of their work to an 
extent that would not be required by their peers within the scientific community, 
resulting in a need on the part of the practitioner to confess to aspects of their 
practice being more contingent or uncertain than they would care to admit (Oteri et 
al. 1982, Lynch 1998, Yearley 2005)).  Such deconstructive practices do not occur in 
“normal science” (Kuhn 1996), and some scientists and technologists believe that 
such behaviours do not follow the spirit of discovering the “truth” of the question 
that has been put towards the court, but instead constitute a move in a competitive 
game.  In an imaginary conversation in an editorial in Science, it was described this 
way: 
Science: So the judicial system is not a system to get at the truth as simply as 
possible. 
Noitall:  Finally you understand.  The judicial system is an adversarial system 
in which clever lawyers match wits with one another.  If a lawyer defending a 
mobster murderer can show a technical discrepancy that gets his client free, 
the lawyer is widely admired even though the killer has been freed (Koshland 
cited by Jasanoff 1995: 3/4). 
 
Gary Edmond and David Mercer (developing the earlier work of Sheila Jasanoff 
(Jasanoff 1995)) have paid close attention to this question of deconstruction, and, in 
                                               
3 It should be noted that while cross-examination is only found in adversarial legal systems, Raymond 
Bal’s (2005) study of the “Leiden Ballpoint Pen” case in the inquisitorial legal system of the 
Netherlands found that equally deconstructive strategies were employed by both forensic and legal 
actors in order to undermine conflicting forensic evidence. 
 4 
addition to focusing upon the way that experts are undermined during cross-
examination, have also demonstrated that the cross-examination process serves to 
construct experts as objective in the first place and reconstruct expertise after 
deconstruction (Edmond 1999, 2001, Edmond and Mercer 1998, Mercer 2002).  
Edmond and Mercer’s chief argument is that when an expert is first called, they will 
present themselves as members of a particular scientific community, providing 
evidence of credentials and years of experience working in a particular field, and will 
then explain their evidence, not only in terms of what they found, but also by 
demonstrating the rigorous method they employed to collect said evidence.  In other 
words, they construct their epistemic authority in light of a method discourse (see 
Schuster and Yeo 1986).  The opposing team then have the opportunity to 
deconstruct the expert’s evidence; I have described some of the popular mechanisms 
above.  Essentially, because the work conducted is not likely to have been as 
rigorous as the expert’s method discourse suggests, the defence will emphasise the 
importance of the contingent or craft elements of that work.
4
  Highlighting these craft 
aspects may make it appear that the expert is working outside the constraints of her 
scientific field.  Having set up the idea that expertise is constructed and eventually 
deconstructed, Edmond and Mercer then argue that evidence is reconstructed: courts 
do not only rely on science to aid in their decision-making, but do draw upon ideas of 
the rationality and the objectivity of science to justify their own decision-making (see 
Smith and Wynne 1989).  To this end, in the judge’s summation or in post-trial 
discourse, the scientific evidence will be reconstituted in order to fit with the 
scientific method (even if it has previously been deconstructed under cross-
examination), in order to achieve closure in the case as well as to reinforce the 
authority of the law.  As far as the present study is concerned, this type of STS work 
provides us with the concept of the constructed nature of expertise.  The authority of 
expert knowledge and evidence does not enter the courtroom fully-formed; instead, it 
is highly negotiated and an achievement of the courtroom procedure itself.  That said, 
experts do attempt to make their work (and thereby their evidence) appear objective 
and factual before the trial.  Such pre-trial practices will be the focus of this study. 
                                               
4
 Such a process has led one legal scholar to quip, “[s]cientists are constantly at risk of being hoist by 
their own positivist petard” (Jones 1994: 270).  For a discussion of science as craft-work, see Ravetz 
(1971). 
 5 
 While the STS literature has provided many valuable insights into the 
construction of expertise (discussing both admissibility decisions and courtroom 
construction), it has been very limited in its focus, chiefly investigating the 
intersection between science and law as it plays out in courtrooms.  Very few studies 
have investigated the way that evidence is constructed pre-trial.  Such an omission is 
somewhat interesting given that STS (and the social sciences more broadly) have 
turned towards practice as the focus of their analysis (Bourdieu 2006, Lynch
5
 1992, 
1993, 2006, Pickering 1992, Schatzki 2006, Schatzki et al. 2006), and also because, 
as legal scholars have made abundantly clear, the majority of crimes never make it to 
trial (Duff et al. 2004
6
).  Yet, questions concerning the way that evidence is 
constructed, developed, granted authority and used by the various parties (scientists, 
technicians, prosecutors, etc.) during the pre-trial stages have chiefly been ignored 
(although there are a few recent studies that have begun to address pre-trial evidence 
construction, concerning the way that deoxyribonucleic acid (hereafter “DNA”) 
profiling (otherwise known as DNA fingerprinting) is conducted in particular (see 
Daemmrich 1998, Jordan and Lynch 1998)).  The pre-trial construction of evidence, 
therefore, constitutes a considerable gap in the current science and law literature 
within STS, which this study will go some way towards addressing. 
 Having established that the study will focus upon the pre-trial construction of 
evidence, I will next outline some of the details of the specific area of forensic 
practice that I investigated, including some of the justifications for focusing upon 
that practice.  Attrition rate studies (i.e. studies that investigate how many and where 
cases drop out of the criminal justice process) have demonstrated that only a small 
proportion of rape cases result in a conviction, with the majority of reported cases 
never making it to trial (Harris and Grace 1999, Kelly 2005).  Such findings have 
resulted in much media and popular anger about the investigation of rape and severe 
sexual assaults (see Howie and Brown 2005 and Howie 2007a, 2007b for Scotland 
and BBC 2005, Dyer 2006, 2007, 2008, Norfolk 2006, Campbell 2007, Hall 2008, 
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 Although it should be noted that Lynch is one of the few who does step outside the courtroom to 
perform his analysis, and by all accounts, his (at time of writing) unpublished new book, The Truth 
Machine (Lynch et al. forthcoming), will deal with the pre-trial construction of DNA evidence. 
6
 Although it should be noted that while Duff et al. (2004) are aware of this criticism, they do 
advocate that the criminal trial is indeed in need of reform, and so should be a focus of study, 
notwithstanding its quantitative irrelevance in the vast majority of criminal cases. 
 6 
for England).  Kelly et al.’s study revealed that approximately 70 per cent of reported 
rape cases in England do not continue past the police station, with the cases either 
being withdrawn by complainers, or labelled as “No Crimes” or “No Further 
Actions” by the police.  No similar study has ever actually been conducted in 
Scotland,
7
 and so it is difficult to ascertain whether a similar distribution would exist 
in Scotland (particularly given that in Scotland the procurator fiscal is the “master of 
the instance” (Duff 1999) and therefore makes decisions about dismissing cases).
8
  
While the distribution of attrition throughout the Scottish criminal justice process is 
unknown, it is clear that Scotland has a very low conviction rate.  The journalists 
Howie and Brown (2005) estimated (using police statistics) that 4.2 per cent of rapes, 
reported between April 2002 and March 2003, resulted in a conviction; this figure 
diminished between 2005 and 2006 to 3.9 per cent (Howie 2007a).  Partially spurred 
on by the first statistic, in 2006, the Scottish Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal 
Service (hereafter “COPFS”) published a Review of the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Sexual Offences in Scotland focusing on the way pre-trial decision-
making in Scotland.  One chapter of the COPFS report concerned the use of forensic 
evidence, and how it could be improved in order to attempt to secure more 
convictions.  The COPFS study concluded, in agreement with other clinical forensic 
medical studies that have investigated pre-trial decision-making (McGregor et al. 
1999, McGregor et al. 2002, see also Du Mont and White 2007 for a review of the 
international clinical forensic medical literature), that cases which demonstrate injury 
evidence are more likely to proceed through the criminal process.   
While studies such as the ones mentioned above have demonstrated that 
evidence of injury improves the likelihood of cases continuing through the criminal 
justice process (and potentially securing a conviction), no study has investigated how 
such evidence is generated.  While aspects of the forensic medical examination of 
rape and sexual assault complainers have previously been the object of study (see for 
example the work of Du Mont and Parnis 2000, 2001, and Parnis and Du Mont 2002, 
2006 upon the collection of procedural evidence in Ontario, Canada), the full extent 
                                               
7
 The closest Scotland has to an attrition rate study is the recent review of sexual history evidence in 
sexual offence cases (Burman et al. 2007), a follow-up to a similar study conducted a decade earlier 
Brown et al. (1993). 
8
 As I will explain shortly, the procurator fiscal only makes decisions about cleared up cases; if the 
police in Scotland cannot identify or apprehend a suspect the case is left open. 
 7 
of Forensic Medical Examiner (hereafter “FME”) evidence has yet to be fully 
investigated (certainly in Scotland, let alone Great Britain as a whole).  Such a study 
would not only serve my purpose of exploring the way that a particular type of 
forensic practitioner carries out pre-trial precautions in order to ensure that their 
work is credible to the court and other legal actors, but would also provide a 
background to the studies that I have discussed concerning the relationship between 
injuries and pre-trial decision-making concerning rape cases.  Some scholars argue 
that findings such as the one I have mentioned above (i.e. that cases are more likely 
to succeed if there is evidence of injury) are demonstrative of a series of “rape 
myths” entrenched within society (Harris and Grace 1999, Kelly et al. 2005, Temkin 
2005, Temkin and Krahé 2008, see Chapter Seven for a detailed discussion of “rape 
myths”).  While it is not the intention of this study to address the question of why 
cases drop out of the criminal justice process, a study of the way that FMEs collect, 
interpret and present injury evidence certainly has the potential to engage with such 
discussions, particularly the issue of forensic evidence in relation to myths about 
“real rape” victims. 
To sum up, my aim is to investigate the forensic medical examination of rape 
and other penetrative sexual assault complainers,
9
 with a particular focus upon the 
way that evidence is generated and the strategies employed to make such evidence 
credible.  At the same time the thesis will also engage with questions of popular and 
prosecutorial attitudes towards victims and how FME evidence relates to these 
popular discourses.  To this end, I will be discussing the work of FMEs, and so 
before addressing my actual research questions and the reasoning behind them, it is 
appropriate to first explain the professional role of the FME. 
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 Throughout this thesis, I will use the term “complainer” to signify the victim.  While I am aware that 
the use of the Scottish legal term “complainer”, similar to its English equivalent of “complainant” 
(and I will continue to use the term “complainant” whenever discussing English cases or forensic 
medical artefacts specifically), can connote a disbelieving attitude on the part of the researcher, based 
upon the assumption that the victim does not achieve the ontological status of “victim” until her claim 
has been deemed valid in the courtroom, I still choose to use the term “complainer”, because that is 
the word that the majority of my respondents employed.  While it may be the case that my 
respondents used the language of “complainer” instead of “victim” (and this may be based upon the 
fact that, for them, when they perform the medical examination, the validity of the complainer’s 
account has yet to be established), it is important that I hold no such presumptions.  I consider all 
complainers mentioned in this study to be victims. 
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1.1.1 Who are FMEs? 
FMEs, previously titled “”police surgeons” or “police doctors”, are medical 
practitioners who choose to work either part-time or full-time for the police, carrying 
out forensic examinations of both those making a complaint of rape or sexual assault 
and those identified as the suspect in such a case.  FMEs perform other work in 
addition to carrying out those kinds of procedures, however; they also perform 
“fitness to be interviewed” and “fitness to be detained” examinations of suspects in 
custody, and can be utilised to tend to the therapeutic and legal needs of victims of 
other forms of assault.  As far as medical backgrounds and specialisms are 
concerned, those who choose to become FMEs have generally been (and in some 
cases continue to be) General Practitioners (hereafter “GPs”), pathologists, 
paediatricians, or gynaecologists.  This list is far from exhaustive, and the 
community of FMEs allows anyone to train as long as they hold a general medical 
degree and have been practicing in any specialism for a number of years.  Not all 
doctors who train will become FMEs, however, and as I will discuss in Chapter 
Three, there is a training regime that provides the trainee with experience of FME 
work, but also identifies those who are not fit to perform the job.   
1.2 Research Questions 
As has already been noted, this study is concerned with the generation of clinical 
forensic medical evidence in penetrative sexual assault cases.  Consequently, I am 
chiefly interested in the mechanisms by which physical phenomena (injuries or 
biological trace material, for example) are collected and moulded into authoritative 
evidentiary statements that can be employed in a criminal case.  A major aspect of 
this transition from physical phenomena to evidence is the classificatory practice of 
the FME; the practitioner interprets their observations in order to decide whether or 
not there are injuries present, and diagnoses the type of injuries and the potential 
cause.  Likewise, it is the FME who decides which samples are likely to produce 
beneficial evidence for the criminal case.  Although it is not the FME, in the final 
analysis, who actually converts the forensic biological samples into authoritative 
evidence (that is the job of the forensic scientist working in the scientific laboratory), 
the FME does decide which samples are collected, thus starting a process which 
eventually results in the development of evidential statements.  To this end, because 
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of the importance of maintaining the chain of custody of evidence (Smith 1989, 
Lynch 2004), the FME exists as a node in a network which eventually produces 
evidential statements, and so the authority of their decisions (as with their own 
evidential testimony) has to be maintained for the sake of the credibility of the later 
forensic scientific evidence.  My research questions, therefore, focus upon the ways 
that FMEs learn their craft, including the correct classification of injuries, the way 
they continue to classify cases throughout their independent practice, and the ways in 
which these and other associated practices meet the objective of making clinical 
forensic medical work and evidence credible for use in the criminal justice process.
10
  
It should be noted that although I will separate the research questions into those 
appertaining to injuries and those relating to the procedure of gathering information 
and collecting forensic biological trace material, such a separation is in many ways 
arbitrary.  As I have already suggested, both processes are mechanisms by which 
evidence is produced, and both derive chiefly from the way that FMEs classify cases.  
With this in mind, in the next two sections I will outline the research questions that 
are the focus of this thesis and the justifications behind those questions. 
1.2.1 Constructing Facts 
In ensuring the credibility of evidence, it must be agreed by non-FMEs in the 
criminal justice process (investigators, prosecutors, the judge, jury, etc.) that the 
evidence presented is objective, and that it either constitutes a fact or is an opinion 
that draws heavily upon known facts.  Expert witnesses constitute a special group in 
trials; unlike other witnesses, who are only allowed to testify upon facts (an 
eyewitness, for instance, is only allowed to explain what they actually saw; they are 
                                               
10
 Throughout the thesis, for preference, I will label the criminal justice system (the machinery applied 
to the investigation, detection and prosecution of a suspect in a criminal case) as the “criminal justice 
process”.  My justification for omitting the word “system” is that it connotes a unified structure 
wherein the individual parts all work harmoniously together with a clear purpose and method.  
Conversely 
[t]here now exists a large body of research on the workings of criminal justice that casts 
doubt on whether the term ‘system’ adequately captures the very complex ways in which 
crime is handled.  Rather, the image created by this research is of a number of separate 
organisations, such as the police, the criminal courts or the penal establishments, which are 
loosely related to one another.  The research also suggests that these institutions do not 
always share the same view of matters but, rather, that there are a number of overlapping 
perspectives which may come into conflict.  As with all institutions, there is also a 
competition for scarce resources (Young 1997: 35). 
I prefer to apply the term “process”, as this connotes a group of organisations working together, but 
not necessarily systematically. 
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prohibited from inferring beyond those observations), expert witnesses are allowed to 
draw such inferences, if the inferences relate to the technical skill of a specific 
scientific or medical specialism (in the case of pathologists, for instance, inferring a 
singular cause of death from a potential panoply of probable causes) (Raitt 2001, 
Chalmers 2006).
11
  Scholars working within the field of STS have challenged the 
apparently simple dichotomy between facts and opinions, and have demonstrated 
how facts are actually the achievements of expert communities.  Before outlining my 
three research questions, I will explain how STS analysts who have investigated 
expert witnesses analyse the complex relationship between professional judgements, 
facts and opinions. 
 In a legal sense, facts are phenomena that are not open to interpretation.  
Take, for instance, the example of a body in a murder or a rape case: although 
aspects of it are open to interpretation (the cause of the injury, the question of 
whether or not the observed signs demonstrate that sexual intercourse was 
consensual), the body itself constitutes a material fact of the case.  Experts have 
taken the language of fact and extended it to cover a number of their judgements.  In 
Roger Smith’s interview study of pathologists (1989), he discovered that the 
language of facts was used to describe aspects of their work that could be considered 
to be interpretations: “the number and distribution of bruises, the degree of occlusion 
of an artery, the blood group” (Smith 1989: 66).  The pathologists interviewed did 
not conceive of these classifications as judgements, but rather routine objective 
descriptions that all pathologists would agree upon, and believed that if there was 
any disagreement amongst practitioners, it would be the result of incompetence on 
the part of one of the pathologists.  At the heart of this fact-creation lies the 
community of experts (in Smith’s case, pathologists): what makes an interpretation a 
“fact” is its shared status amongst the community.  A fact is the result of the 
community’s shared way of seeing, or to use Smith’s phrase, its “factual consensus”, 
                                               
11
 Raitt suggests, however, that eyewitnesses do provide opinion evidence as well, particularly in 
cases where the witness is requested to identify whether or not the person that they saw perpetrating 
the crime is the suspect in the dock.  In what I consider to be a highly sophisticated move (and one 
that I will employ in a similar way throughout this thesis), Raitt argues that every act of identification 
includes an element of judgement of the similarity (such a judgement will later be labelled a 
“similarity relation”) between the person in the dock and the witness’ own recall of the perpetrator of 
the crime. 
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and so judgements that other practitioners would concur with are no longer 
interpretive classifications, but rather authoritative facts. 
 How is this “factual consensus” achieved, however?  Smith argues that a 
major part of this shared vision is a community’s “mutual trust”: 
Pathologists report that experts do not disagree about facts; they are 
‘professional’, and hence there is mutual trust and respect precisely because 
they have the competence to make factual reports with which their peers 
would concur (Smith 1989: 66). 
 
Hidden in this quotation are two ways by which, I will suggest, a shared vision is 
constructed: 1) training and the development of competence, and 2) limited 
statements and unanimity; I will expand on each of these in turn.  Smith’s study does 
not explain how pathologists are trained to embrace a shared vision, but in a similar 
study investigating the (now much maligned) latent fingerprint examiner (Cole 1998, 
2002), there is a hint at the importance of training.  While Cole, like Smith, barely 
hints at the importance of training in determining a shared vision, there are cases in 
his historical study that demonstrate this importance.  For instance, Cole identifies 
the American Jennings case of 1912 as one of the first test cases involving 
fingerprint evidence.  Five fingerprint experts testified, and they all agreed on a 
match between a collected latent fingerprint and that of the suspect.  Interestingly, all 
five fingerprint examiners were trained at the same time by the same trainer.  Cole 
does not explicate the importance of training as much as I believe he might; he 
argues, again like Smith, that when experts are considered competent by the relevant 
community (and with a similar training to one another), their fingerprint 
identifications are deemed correct so long as their peers agree with their 
interpretations.  Smith and Cole could both, in my opinion, go further and make 
explicit that the training serves to produce a shared vision amongst practitioners in 
the first place.  Cole, however, instead of focusing upon the way that training could 
produce similar ways of seeing, concentrates upon the limited and consensual nature 
of the statements made by fingerprint examiners, and looks at how they aid in the 
constitution of facts.  In contrast, I will look seriously at training as a manner by 
which FMEs collectively ensure credibility. 
 Fingerprint examiners are an interesting type of forensic expert; unlike most 
other forms of forensic practitioner (particularly in America), no opposing defence 
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fingerprint experts have emerged (Cole 1998).  This is a result of the determination 
on the part of the community of fingerprint experts that in order for their evidence to 
be credible, there must be unanimity amongst the practitioners.  As I have already 
suggested, this is partially a result of the shared vision, but it also develops from the 
kind of statements that practitioners make: they are limited and consistent.  A 
statement’s factual status is undermined if the expert in question over-reaches in their 
interpretation and is then contradicted by another expert.  Both Smith and Cole 
provide examples where forensic practitioners restrain their statements in order to 
ensure that other members of the community do not challenge or contradict them.  In 
the case of fingerprint examiners, the community based its entire fact-producing 
machinery upon the notion that all examiners agreed in their interpretations of 
fingerprints, and so to the community, this consistency meant that what they 
produced was not just opinion, but instead hard facts. 
LFPEs [Latent Fingerprint Examiners] suddenly found themselves in a 
precarious position.  While juries seemed more than willing to believe their 
testimony, LFPEs knew that they could easily undermine their credibility by 
bickering on the stand.  To avoid falling prey to the ignominious fate shared 
by graphologists and psychiatrists, LFPEs developed a novel occupational 
norm: unanimity.  Fingerprint matches, they argued, were not matters of 
opinion because all LFPEs’ opinions agreed; as LFPE Frederick Kuhne 
declared as early as 1917: ‘The testimony of a finger print expert is not 
subject to contradiction by another finger print expert’ (Cole 1998: 699). 
 
Unanimity may be the result of (as Smith mentions) mutual trust and respect, or a 
shared vision, but it is also a result of the limited nature of expert claim-making.  
Smith provides the example of pathologists giving time of death estimations; because 
of uncertainty surrounding differential rates of bodily cooling, the environment in 
which the body was found, etc., pathologists choose not to be overly specific as to 
the time of death, and so place it within a rather large margin.  Likewise, Stefan 
Timmermans’ more recent study of pathologists (2006) found that in high-profile 
cases, or cases where other professionals are involved (for example, deaths in police 
custody or iatrogenic deaths), pathologists are far more circumspect about the cause 
of death than they are in cases of (for example) suspected heart disease.  The 
difficulties that these kinds of cases introduce necessitate that the pathologist limit 
their claims in order to avoid being contradicted in the courtroom.  While these latter 
examples may be considered pathological opinions rather than facts, they do 
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exemplify the way that pathologists (and fingerprint experts, for that matter) make 
limited statements that are acceptable to other members of the community in order to 
maintain the community’s unanimity, and thus the claim that they provide 
incontrovertible, objective and fact-based evidence. 
 The last two examples do introduce opinions into the discussion, and I will 
spend a moment demarcating facts from opinions.  While facts are constituted by 
judgements upon which the community substantially agree upon (those who disagree 
are generally considered incompetent),
12
 opinions are judgements where there is 
legitimate space for disagreement (such as whether a particular knife is the cause of 
the victim’s stab wound, or whether observed injuries signify consent).  Smith 
outlines the pathologists’ belief that there exists the potential for opinions to coalesce 
into facts if those involved in a case (prosecution and defence experts) are able to 
discuss those questions beforehand, and that it is only the separation of experts due to 
the adversarial nature of trials that results in observed differences of opinion.
13
  This 
suggestion of group consensus, even regarding opinions, maintains the idea that the 
work that forensic practitioners do is objective, and that the evidence they produce 
should be considered authoritative and credible.  It does not follow, however, that 
group consensus is always possible; when there is a conflict (such as in Smith’s 
example, where a stabbing was performed in such a way that made it impossible to 
determine the angle from which the blade entered), forensic practitioners either limit 
their claims by arguing that such statements are impossible, or claim that the problem 
lies outside their areas of expertise (in the stabbing case, the claim was limited to 
“impossible to tell” due to the difficulties of observation).  Making such claims 
maintains the authority of any other presented forensic evidence by ensuring that in 
an area where consensus is impossible, it is better for the community if the individual 
practitioner avoids giving an opinion rather than providing contradictory evidence. 
                                               
12 See, for example, how international fingerprint experts have distanced themselves from those 
working on behalf of the Scottish Crime Records Office, in order to maintain the authority of 
fingerprint experts in general (O’Neill 2006).  International fingerprint examiners have labelled the 
McKie case as “the Scotch Botch”, as this label highlights that those fingerprint examiners working in 
Scotland are incompetent and are not representative of the remainder of the fingerprint examiner 
community. 
13
 In effect, the pathologists are requesting a pre-trial science court.  This has been tried before and 
found to fail (Caspar and Wellstone 1982). 
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 The above has demonstrated the importance of the community in maintaining 
the credibility of forensic evidence.  Evidence is considered a fact if other members 
of the forensic community would collectively agree with the judgements of the 
expert.  Such facts are constructed on the basis of a shared vision, as well as the 
limiting of statements in order to ensure that the expert’s testimony does not over-
reach and affirm phenomena in cases where her peers may disagree.  Likewise, 
opinion evidence also reinforces the authority of the forensic community; while 
differences of opinion are sometimes considered legitimate, it is accepted that if the 
experts involved were to collaborate upon their decision-making, there would be no 
disagreement and a fact would be produced, thereby emphasising once more the 
collective vision of the community.  Of course, some differences in opinion cannot 
be resolved, but these are not a problem for the community of forensic practitioners, 
as they fall outside the boundary of their expertise. 
Drawing upon this material, I have constructed three research questions that my 
own study of FMEs will attempt to answer: 
1. How does training serve to reproduce a paradigm?  (This follows on from the 
work of Cole and Smith, and my suggestion that the role of training in the 
development of a shared vision can be further investigated.) 
2. How do FMEs classify injuries, and what processes are employed to ensure 
the authority of the evidence?  (This also relates to the work of Cole, Smith 
and Timmermans, and concerns the way that FMEs make claims which they 
know will be accepted by other members of their community.) 
3. Are there cases when FMEs are unable to make classifications, and what 
processes are employed to maintain the authority of other evidence in cases 
of such uncertainty?  (This follows from the last point and concerns the 
construction of boundaries in order to maintain the authority of the 
community.) 
These three questions are very general, and could relate to the practice and 
classifications of FMEs in any aspect of their medico-legal work.  It is important to 
remember that this study is investigating the way that FMEs conduct forensic 
medical examinations of rape and sexual assault complainers, as this creates a 
particular tension for FME work, particularly with regards to the legal definition of 
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rape (which I will discuss in detail shortly).  To this end, I will include a cluster of 
more focused questions in my list, which fit well with the case study: FME 
examinations of rape and sexual assault complainers. 
4. How do FMEs interpret, record and classify signs of injury in rape and sexual 
assault cases, how do they ensure that their evidence is authoritative and 
credible given the difficulties surrounding the law of rape (matters 
concerning consent in particular), and what effect does this have on the 
perceived relationship between ideas concerning injury evidence and rape?  
(These questions encompass the other three questions, but contextualise them 
within the particular case-study that I investigated (the forensic medical 
examination of rape and sexual assault complainers).  The questions also flag 
up the issue of the relationship between injury evidence and “rape myths”, 
which is explored in Chapter Seven). 
These questions have been constructed in order to investigate the way that FMEs 
judge sexual assault cases (injuries in particular) and construct facts and opinions 
that are considered credible by investigators, prosecutors and the court.  In the next 
section, I will develop more questions based on FMEs’ classifications of cases and 
decisions on the necessary procedures to carry out during the forensic medical 
examination. 
1.2.2 Processing Cases 
The manner in which police doctors perform forensic medical examinations in sexual 
assault cases has been a contentious issue for quite some time.  During the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, extensive criticism was aimed at police doctors from both outside 
(feminist groups and academics, for example) and within.  Using the relatively new 
professional journal, The Police Surgeon,
14
 some police doctors launched scathing 
attacks on the performance of forensic examinations.
15
  One of these criticisms 
concerned the inconsistent way in which examinations were conducted.  This 
criticism was most damningly expressed in the Scottish Office’s study, Investigating 
Sexual Assault, conducted by Gerry Chambers and Anne Millar (1983).  The study 
observed the investigation of sexual assaults in Glasgow and Edinburgh conducted 
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 See Chapter Five for a longer discussion on the The Police Surgeon journal. 
15
 See Smith (1980), Roberts (1984), some of which is quoted at length in Chapter Four. 
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during 1980-1, and, when discussing the forensic medical examination, criticised the 
length of time that the complainer had to wait before a medical examiner would 
attend, the location of the medical examination room, the sex of the examiner (i.e. 
overwhelmingly male) and his “insensitive, unsympathetic and abrupt manner” 
(Chambers and Millar 1983: 101).  The criticism most relevant to the present study 
was the level of inconsistency observed, not only between the two locations 
(Glasgow and Edinburgh), but also between individual practitioners.  The chief 
reason for this inconsistency was the consideration that police doctors were pre-
judging allegations as false, and hence failing to perform examinations as rigorously 
as they could, but Chambers and Millar also noted other reasons for incomplete 
examinations: insufficient training, and the lack of the requisite equipment (syringes, 
phials for storing blood, etc.).  Partially in response to Chambers and Millar’s 
criticisms of police doctors’ decision-making in Scotland, and other charges aimed at 
police doctors in Great Britain more generally, the Association of Police Surgeons 
(hereafter “APS”) advocated the incorporation of a sexual assault examination kit for 
use by police doctors nationwide, which, it was hoped, would lead to more 
routinisation in the medical examination.
16
  While the introduction of the kit (as well 
as other interventions designed to improve the police’s image and limit the harm 
done to complainers going through the criminal justice process) resulted in a number 
of positive effects, Jennifer Temkin (1998), in her interview study of police doctors 
in England, stated that there was still a long way to go in many areas.  One of these 
was the inconsistent performance of examinations. 
Similarly, in their attrition rate studies in constabularies in England, Harris 
and Grace (1999) and Kelly et al. (2005) noted that biological samples were often not 
collected or sent for analysis; in a different report Liz Kelly (and her co-author Linda 
Regan) illustrated the situation in England by drawing upon the work of Weeden and 
Hicks in the United States who commented that in terms of biological trace material 
“little is recovered from crime scenes, less is submitted to crime labs and still less is 
analysed” (Weeden and Hicks, cited in Kelly & Regan 2003: 8).  Even following the 
introduction of routinised kits, some evidence remains uncollected.  Scholars are 
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 I will discuss the sexual assault examination kit, as well as Chambers and Millar’s criticisms, in 
considerably greater detail in Chapter Five. 
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divided, however, on the extent to which this lack of collection should be considered 
negative.  There have only been two studies that have investigated the forensic 
medical examination kits, and they were both conducted in Ontario by Janice Du 
Mont and Deborah Parnis (Du Mont and Parnis, 2000, 2001, Parnis and Du Mont 
2002, 2006).  Parnis and Du Mont
17
 investigated the way that FMEs employed the 
Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (hereafter “SAEK”) and whether or not they followed 
the strict procedures outlined in that protocol.  As with the findings in Harris and 
Grace and Kelly, Parnis and Du Mont discovered that FMEs did not adhere to the 
strict regime of the protocol.  Parnis and Du Mont suggest a very interesting reason 
for non-adherence, which challenges the presumption that failing to gather evidence 
is inappropriate. 
Parnis and Du Mont draw upon the work of Kathleen Kelly et al. (1996, 
1998) and Steven Savage et al. (1997), who both conclude that the police doctor 
exists in a state of role-conflict, represented by their very job title: on the one hand, 
they are a medical doctor, whose chief role is the performance of therapeutic 
functions; on the other, the police doctor also works for the police, and so is required 
to be an “objective” evidence-gatherer.  The police doctor, so Kelly et al. and Savage 
et al. suggest, is conflicted as to the client that they are working for; they could be 
said to work for their patient, as is the case within general medical practice, or 
alternatively for the police.  So in a case where (for example) the doctor will not see 
the complainer again (i.e. she is not one of the FME’s patients in their GP work), 
under what compulsion is the police doctor to be sympathetic to the complainer, 
considering that their other obligations prevent sympathy?  As one of the police 
doctors interviewed by Temkin put it, “You’re never going to see them again and 
you have no on-going commitment to them or responsibility for them” (police doctor 
cited in Temkin 1998: 844).  Conversely, the doctor will, in all likelihood, work for 
the police again; the FME could therefore feel that their police role constitutes their 
first priority.
18
  Due to these complicated relationships and conflicts, the therapeutic 
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 In this thesis, I will use “Parnis and Du Mont” to signify both the Du Mont and Parnis articles and 
those credited to Parnis and Du Mont. 
18 Other critiques have been made regarding the forensic science and forensic pathology services’ 
close relationship with the police, in light of the miscarriages of justice concerning the Birmingham 
Six, the Guildford Four and the Maguire Seven.  The pathologists’ and scientists’ close relationship 
resulted in the forensic practitioners allegedly becoming “prosecution-minded” (Jones 1994, Roberts 
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aspect of the examination (including a sympathetic attitude or at least courtesy 
towards the complainer) may become subsumed to the agenda of evidence collection.  
On the contrary, however, this is not what Harris and Grace, Kelly, or Parnis and Du 
Mont observed; instead of unimaginatively collecting samples from a set protocol in 
the interests of ensuring that all available evidence is gathered, it appears that FMEs 
often choose not to collect samples/gather evidence.  Parnis and Du Mont argue that 
Savage et al. and Kelly et al. are partially correct in suggesting that FMEs exist in a 
state of role-conflict; however, they also claim that FMEs choose not to side with the 
police and the forensic/evidence collection role (which they suggest is itself inscribed 
onto the kit; see Chapter Six) but instead actively renegotiate the kit out of a duty of 
care to the complainer.  Parnis and Du Mont suggest that it is therefore the 
therapeutic aspect that takes priority over the forensic in sexual assault 
investigations, and so when decisions are made not to take samples, it is not a case of 
FMEs distrusting the veracity of the allegation, or performing incompetently, but 
instead an example of FMEs interpreting the meaning of the kit out of a duty of care 
to the complainer. 
 As Parnis and Du Mont have provided the only example of an actual 
evaluative study of FME use of Forensic Medical Examination Kits (hereafter 
“FMEKs”), there is definitely scope for more work in this area.  Furthermore, as has 
clearly been identified from this discussion of the literature, the forensic medical 
examination of rape victims in Scotland has not been critically investigated since the 
early 1980s; as such, given the cultural authority held by the forensic sciences,
19
 as 
well as the groundswell of negative public opinion surrounding the criminal 
investigation of rape complaints, a study of the procedure of forensic medical 
examinations is not only novel, but also timely and necessary.  The previous 
research, coupled with the need for research in this area, prompts me to ask the 
following further questions: 
5. Under what circumstances were FMEKs introduced into forensic medical 
work, what role did they play and how have they developed?  (These 
                                                                                                                                     
1996), which resulted in unsafe convictions.  I will discuss the effect that this has had on FMEs in 
Chapter Seven. 
19
 Again I point the reader to Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown’s “speech on security and liberty” (Brown 
2007) and how Brown draws upon the cultural authority of forensic science to defend his position. 
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questions fit with the broader thesis project of identifying how credibility is 
managed by FMEs and their community.) 
6. How do FMEs make decisions about the evidence that is collected during 
rape and sexual assault examinations, and what role do the FMEK and other 
guidance artefacts play in those decisions?  (These questions are similar to 
those asked by Parnis and Du Mont, and represent both an attempt to inquire 
into the applicability of their analysis to the Scottish context, and a further 
investigation into the role that guidance artefacts play in managing the 
authority of evidence.) 
The thesis, therefore, has six sets of questions to address, and in Section 1.4 I will 
break down the content of the following chapters in order to explain how I intend to 
answer them.  Before addressing this, however, it is appropriate to give a brief 
outline of the legal context in which this study took place: Scottish law and Scottish 
criminal procedure. 
1.3 The Scottish Context 
1.3.1 Corroboration and the Scots Law of Rape 
As has already been made clear, this study will focus upon forensic medical 
examinations of penetrative sexual assault complainers under the Scottish legal 
system.  Before proceeding with the study itself, it is necessary to briefly outline a 
number of the peculiarities of Scots Law, particularly those relating to corroboration 
as well as the law of rape, as doing so places the thesis within its particular legal 
context and introduces some of the legal changes that will be drawn on throughout 
the thesis.  I will commence with corroboration before discussing the law of rape. 
A distinctive feature of the Scottish law of evidence, the corroboration rule 
states: 
No matter how trivial the offence and how high soever the credit and 
character of the witness, still our law is averse to rely on his single word, in 
any inquiry which may affect the person, liberty, or fame of his neighbour, 
and rather than run the risk of such an error, a risk which does not hold when 
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there is a concurrence of testimonies, it is willing that the guilty should 




To this end, all “crucial facts”, i.e. elements of evidence that go towards helping to 
determine the outcome of the trial (the identity of the perpetrator, the cause of injury 
for example) are required to be supported (corroborated) by independent evidence.  
Clinical forensic medicine, therefore, can be a useful tool for corroborating the claim 
that sexual intercourse took place.  While proof of force is no longer required for an 
act of rape to be established, the prosecution must show lack of consent.  Forensic 
evidence can corroborate force; the question remains, however, whether lack of 
consent can be corroborated.  As this distinction between lack of consent and force is 
a vital factor for part of my argument (particularly Chapter Seven), I will spend some 
time discussing the law of rape. 
Gane and Stoddart suggest that a “generally accepted statement of the law [of 
rape] is that a man is guilty of rape if he has sexual intercourse with a woman by 
overcoming her will” (Gane and Stoddart 2003: 346 emphasis added).
21
  While Gane 
and Stoddart’s “generally accepted” definition was not actually the law of rape 
during my fieldwork (it was amended in 2002 by the Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 
1 of 2001, of which more below), it is a good basis to start from, and will help to 
explain some of the later changes to the law made by the Lord Advocate’s Reference 
No. 1 of 2001, which was the working definition of rape while I was conducting my 
fieldwork.  The first point of note about the law is that it is sexually differentiated: 
only a man can be a rapist and only a woman can be a victim.  The reason for such 
differentiation is the determination that rape requires sexual intercourse, which the 
law determines as the insertion (to any degree) of the penis into the vagina (Gane 
1992).
22
  Given this definition, other forced penetrative acts performed by a man 
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 Please note that this David Hume should not be confused with the well-known philosopher David 
Hume, whom I will mention below.  The David Hume cited was the nephew of his namesake and a 
famous Commentator on Scottish law. 
21 The copy of Gane and Stoddart used was published in 2003, but was a reprint of the third edition 
(the most recent) originally published in 2001.  Due to the 2001 publication date, it does not mention 
the Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2001, which I will discuss shortly. 
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 I specifically used the phrase “sexually differentiated” rather than the more commonly used 
“gendered” on the understanding that sex is biologically determined while gender is socially 
negotiated.  As the law (in this case) is clear that it requires a penis and a vagina (i.e. physical 
attributes) to perform sexual intercourse, it is a sexually differentiated crime rather than a gendered 
one. 
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upon a woman do not count as rape, but are instead likely to result in a charge of 
indecent assault (these assaults are, however, subject to the same maximum penalty); 
meanwhile, penetrative acts performed on men could result in charges of sodomy or 
indecent assault, depending upon the nature and circumstances of the act (Gane 
1992).   
 The second point to note is the phrase “overcoming her will”.  This phrase is 
carried over from Hume’s Commentaries, where Hume wrote that rape consisted of 
“[t]he knowledge of the woman’s person… against her will and by force” (Hume 
cited in Gane 1992: 18).  Hume’s definition emphasises the violence assumed to be 
part of rape by early legal commentators (Gane 1992).
23
  A woman’s will (i.e. her 
resistance) would have to be physically (forcefully) overcome in order to have 
“carnal knowledge” of her.  While Hume’s definition does emphasise violence, he 
was aware that it was not always the case; as Tadros (1999) explains, Hume 
analogised rape to robbery: “rape is at once a crime of sexual violence and a crime 
against a woman's proprietary interest in her sexual integrity” (Tadros 1999: 319 
emphasis in original).  Extending the metaphor, Hume claimed that as the victim 
hands over their wallet as a result of a threat of violence in some robberies, so it is 
also the case that a woman’s will could be overcome by a threat of force (Tadros 
1999).  It could likewise be overcome if she were rendered insensible by the suspect 
with the use of drugs or alcohol.  A woman’s resistance (her will) could thus be 
overcome with force, the threat of force, or intoxicants.  Some cases constituted rape 
even when the woman’s will had not been overcome.  In cases where the victim (by 
which they meant girl) was 12 years old or under, or where the victim was, to use 
Hume’s and Alison’s (another early commentator on Scottish law) language, a 
“lunatic” or an “idiot”, rape did not require force or a threat of force, as such victims 
were incapable of providing consent (Ferguson 2002).
24
  To sum up, unless the 
victim did not have the capacity to consent, rape consisted of a man performing 
penile-vaginal penetration after having overcome the will of a woman through force, 
                                               
23
 However, a strong argument can be made that such an attitude is still prevalent, particularly 
amongst the police, prosecutors and the public. 
24 It is necessary for a distinction to be drawn between lack of capacity to consent and the provision of 
a valid consent.  As I have explained, a girl aged 12 or under is thought not to have the capacity to 
offer consent to intercourse; on the other hand, a girl aged between 13 and 15 does have the capacity, 
but such consent is judged to be irrelevant under Scots law (Gane 1992). 
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a threat of force, or intoxicants.
25
  This definition was roughly to provide the actus 
reus of rape until 2002. 
 The case Watt v HM Advocate (2001) was a landmark case in Scottish rape 
law; while there was evidence that intercourse had taken place, plus evidence that the 
sex was not consensual (although the suspect’s defence was that the complainer 
consented), the suspect was found to have “No Case to Answer” and acquitted, as it 
was not proved that he had overcome the will of the complainer via force, threat of 
force or by means of intoxicants.  Lord Abernethy’s decision was highly criticised, 
both in legal circles and in the press (see Ferguson 2002), and the then Lord 
Advocate,
26
 Lord Colin Boyd, employed Section 123(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Scotland Act which states: 
Where a person tried on indictment is acquitted or convicted of a charge, the 
Lord Advocate may refer a point of law which has arisen in relation to that 
charge to the High Court for their opinion (Shiels at al. 2001 188) 
 
The point of law in question was whether “overcoming her will with force or a threat 
of force” was still pertinent in contemporary society, and whether the actus reus (the 
physical aspect) of rape should be defined in terms of non-consent rather than non-
consent plus force.  Seven judges decided, with a majority of five to two, that in fact 
“overcoming her will” was no longer relevant, and so the Lord Advocate’s Reference 
(No. 1 of 2001) (hereafter “Reference”) amended the actus reus of rape to sexual 
intercourse by a man with a woman to which the woman did not consent at the time 
of intercourse.  While it is clear that there has been a significant change in emphasis 
in some of the actus reus, there is much that has not been changed by the Reference; 
most notably, rape is still based on penile-vaginal penetration.
27
 
                                               
25
 Of course, this is a simplification of the pre-Lord Advocate’s Reference 2001 rape law, and cases 
like the oft-cited Sweenie (1858), Fraser (1847), Jamieson v HM Advocate (1994) and Grainger and 
Rae v HM Advocate significantly complicate matters.  For more on these cases, see Gane (1992), 
Gane and Stoddart (2003), Ferguson (2002), Tadros (1999) and Chalmers (2004). 
26
 For a discussion of the role of the Lord Advocate and the other actors involved in the hierarchy of 
Scottish prosecutions, see Young (1992) and Gane and Stoddart (2003). 
27 In 2004, the Scottish Law Commission was requested by the Scottish Executive to evaluate the law 
of rape and provide recommendations for the improvement of the law.  One of the Commission’s 
recommendations was to expand the definition of rape in order to define all penile-penetrative acts as 
rape, thus removing the sexual differentiation of victims (although the Commission rejected the 
suggestion that women should also be capable of rape), and also to introduce a new “sexual assault by 
penetration” offence, which differentiates penetration of the vagina or anus with objects other than the 
penis (including other body parts) from the existing catch-all of indecent assault (Scottish Law 
Commission 2006).  Such a change will mean that the Scottish law becomes more similar to the 
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 While the Reference was generally considered a positive step, some 
commentators have highlighted a significant problem that has manifested as a result 
of the change.  Under the pre-Reference law the mens rea (the intention to perform a 
criminal act) could be determined from the actus reus, i.e. by overcoming the will of 
the victim, it was clear that the perpetrator had the intention to rape her: “if force is 
no longer an element of the actus reus, mens rea cannot be inferred from proof of the 
actus reus alone…  In other words, under the pre-Reference law, proof of mens rea 
flowed almost automatically from proof of the actus reus.  That is, however, no 
longer the case” (Chalmers 2004: 141/2).  The Crown must demonstrate not only that 
the act took place with the suspect, but also that the suspect either intended to do it, 
or behaved recklessly; in the case of post-Reference rape law, that means that the 
Crown must prove that the suspect knowingly had intercourse without the consent of 
the complainer, or was oblivious to whether consent was provided or not.  While I do 
not wish to focus overly on the details of the problems that have resulted from the 
Reference, as they are not wholly relevant to the current study,
28
 it is necessary to 
emphasise this particular shift from force to lack of consent as it provides a 
substantial problem for FMEs.  During the time that evidence of force was a 
necessary precursor to a charge of rape, FMEs held a more powerful position with 
regard to what they could and could not say concerning the corroboration of the 
complainer’s account.  The FME, providing opinions on signs of injury, could speak 
with more certainty on the evidence they had collected.  With the move towards 
having to prove lack of consent, it has become harder for FMEs to corroborate a 
complainer’s account, as it relates to intent and other mental process that do not 
easily fall into FMEs’ sphere of expertise.  I will deal with this issue at greater length 
in Chapter Seven. 
1.3.2 The Criminal Justice Process 
In this section, I will address the organisational context that surrounds the forensic 
medical examination.  I will briefly describe the processes that take place both before 
                                                                                                                                     
English law, which was changed with the 2003 Sexual Offences Act.  For a good description and 
analysis of the English Sexual Offences Act 2003, see Stevenson et al (2004). 
28 However, the cases of McKearney v HM Advocate and Cinci v HM Advocate demonstrate the 
difficulties of administering the Reference, and may have provided the impetus for the Scottish 
Executive to invite the Scottish Law Commission to undertake a review of the law of rape.  See 
Chalmers (2004) for more details. 
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and after the complainer is examined by the FME.  As with the previous discussion 
of the law, such a description of the process is necessary in order to place the medical 
examination in its institutional context.  The aim of this section is to provide a 
narrative of certain aspects of the investigatory procedure (although a particularly 
relevant aspect of the prosecutorial process will also be outlined), intended to 
enlighten the reader about the Scots processes.  Where appropriate, the description 
will also point out the areas in which a case can be diverted from trial. 
One final point before moving onto the investigation element: some of what I 
present here is somewhat reified.  There is no single Scottish investigation procedure 
(there is more homogeneity in the prosecution process than in the police in Scotland, 
given the existence of a single public official, the Lord Advocate).  There are eight 
police forces in Scotland (Central, Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Grampian, Lothian 
and Borders, Northern, Strathclyde, and Tayside) and each police force has its own 
police authority or board, made up of local councillors.  While each constabulary is 
answerable to the police authority, it is the constabulary’s Chief Constable that 
makes decisions on a day-by-day basis, and who decides on the most efficient and 
effective ways for their constabulary to operate (Young 1997).  To this end, each 
constabulary is to some extent autonomous in its operation of investigations 
(although the police are required to submit reports to the more homogenous 
Procurator Fiscal Service, and so, in reporting at least, there needs to be some 
uniformity between constabularies), and there are some substantial differences in the 
ways in which constabularies investigate penetrative sexual assaults.  While I do not 
wish to remove complexity from the research, it is necessary to minimise such 
difficulties for current purposes and present something appertaining to a uniform 
approach by the various constabularies.  Therefore, in the text I will provide an 
idealised description of how rape and serious indecent assaults are investigated and 




                                               
29
 The description has generally been constructed from various police and prosecutor guidelines, 
discussions with the police and reviews of their reporting documentation. 
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1.3.2.1 The Investigatory Process 
The criminal justice process begins when the police are informed that a person has 
been sexually assaulted.  From interviews with police officers it was mentioned that 
this report was usually made by the complainer, over the telephone, a while after the 
actual assault.  Other studies based in England (Harris and Grace 1999, Kelly et al. 
2005) revealed that it was often a third party (friend, relative) that contacted the 
police.  The decision of whether or not to inform the police is often considered the 
first point of attrition or diversion of a case away from trial.
30
  Once the police have 
been informed, a police officer specially trained in interviewing vulnerable victims is 
sent to the complainer’s home to act as liaison to the complainer.  While the term 
Sexual Offence Liaison Officer (hereafter “SOLO”) is not used by all constabularies 
for this liaising or accompanying officer, for ease of exposition I will choose to do so 
here (although I will use the term interchangeably with “accompanying officer” 
throughout the following chapters).
31
  The SOLO’s chief function is to provide 
support for the complainer, but they also collect some initial details about the alleged 
assault, particularly those concerning the alleged suspect.  While the formal 
statement will not be taken at the initial meeting of the SOLO and the complainer 
(particularly in cases where the complainer has reported very shortly after the attack), 
some details (the suspect’s description or identity and whereabouts if known, any 
witnesses, the locus of the assault, the names of anyone else the complainer has 
talked to, and a brief description of the incident) are gathered at this initial juncture.  
Such details enable the rest of the investigatory team to perform some preliminary 
investigations, including apprehending the suspect (if known), to which I shall return 
shortly.  The SOLO also acts as a point of contact between the complainer and the 
police all the way through the investigation, and, due to the level of rapport that can 
develop between the complainer and the SOLO, even beyond (although the Victim 
Information and Advice (VIA) service are supposed to help the complainer once the 
case moves to the prosecutorial stage).  Once the SOLO has gathered the initial 
                                               
30
 See Temkin (2002), Temkin and Krahé (2007) and Withey (2007) for discussions of the reasons 
why some victims choose not to report. 
31 Some constabularies (for example, Lothian and Borders), instead of developing a single officer type 
to liaise with the complainer, have created a specialist section (known as the “Amethyst Team” in 
Lothian and Borders) who deal exclusively with sexual assaults.  The “Amethyst Team” do not call 
their officers SOLOs, however; they prefer to call their liaising officers “accompanying officers”. 
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details of the alleged assault, she
32
 then contacts both an FME and a Scenes of Crime 
Officer (hereafter “SOCO”, who will act as a photographer, photographically 
recording evidence of injuries) in order to organise a forensic medical examination.  
When it is time for the examination, the SOLO, acting as liaison, accompanies the 
complainer to the medical suite. 
 Before providing a brief discussion of the medical examination (brief being 
the operative word, given that the entire thesis is an exploration of the examination 
itself), I should first mention a forensic evidence collection technique that takes place 
before the medical examination, and the suite where the examination takes place.  At 
some point before the medical examination, either once the complainer and SOLO 
have arrived at the medical suite, or when still in the complainer’s home, the SOLO 
will employ an “Early Evidence Kit”.  Early Evidence Kits contain mouth swabs and 
a urine collection module, in order to enable the complainer to have a drink or relieve 
herself (whilst waiting for the medical examination proper) without any potential 
further degradation to trace material that still may be present in the mouth, or 
evidence of the use of drugs (via the urine sample).  Early Evidence Kits were 
introduced to the investigation stage after significant pressure was placed on the 
police, particularly by feminist groups (including academics), rape crisis groups and 
some police doctors, who reported that women were having to wait long hours for 
the examination without being able to drink or use the bathroom due to fears of 
losing forensic evidence.  The Early Evidence Kits serve the purpose of reassuring 
the police that they have done all they can to collect forensic evidence, and, more 
importantly, allow complainers to have a drink or relieve themselves, providing them 
with a certain degree of comfort while waiting. 
 The introduction of “One Stop Shops”, otherwise known as Sexual Assault 
Referral Centres (hereafter “SARCs”),
33
 was also a response to significant criticism 
of the investigation procedure.  SARCs are buildings created jointly by the police 
and the local health authority with the express purpose of serving all the needs of 
sexual assault victims under one roof.  In order to do this, they contain a forensic 
                                               
32 It is certainly the case that the SOLOs are nearly all women.  When visiting constabularies, I only 
came across one SOLO/accompanying officer who was male.  I do not use the “she” in the above 
sentence to signify that SOLOs are women, however; rather I am using it as a generic pronoun. 
33
 For a fuller discussion of SARCs, see Lovett et al. (2004). 
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medical examination suite, and also have counsellors on hand in order to help with 
any psychological problems that the complainer may be suffering, as well as legal 
representatives to provide advice to the complainer.  While there is currently only 
one SARC in Scotland (“The Arch” in Central Glasgow, which serves as the 
examination suite for Central Glasgow, a part of the Strathclyde constabulary), other 
constabularies are trying to organise similar buildings.  The important difference 
between SARCs and other buildings containing forensic medical examination suites 
is that with the former, anyone can walk in and be examined whether or not they 
have been brought there by the police, i.e. victims of sexual assaults can receive 
counselling or be examined without a criminal investigation (forensic samples 
collected during these examinations are kept in case the victim wishes to pursue a 
criminal prosecution).  In non-SARCs, examinations are always followed by an 
investigation.  To this end, the new building used by the Amethyst Team in Lothian 
and Borders, while acting like a SARC (and one of my interviewees was adamant 
that it was), is not, by definition, as it is also the base for the Amethyst Team and can 
only be accessed by those making a criminal complaint. 
 The SOLO accompanies the complainer to either the SARC (if in Central 
Glasgow), or another location which has been kept by that constabulary specifically 
for examining sexual assault complainers.  At that location, they are made as 
comfortable as possible, and await the FME who performs the forensic medical 
examination.  When the FME
34
 arrives, the SOLO informs them of the details of the 
assault which she has already gathered from the complainer.  Having been provided 
with this information, the FME starts the examination.  The aims of the forensic 
medical examination have been most succinctly explicated by Kelly and Regan: 
• to identify the assailant (blood, saliva, semen, skin cells can all be tested 
for DNA); 
• to confirm recent sexual contact (injuries/soreness around the genital area; 
seminal fluid, saliva and internal injuries) 
• to establish force (documentation of internal and external injuries, 
torn/soiled clothing, positive toxicology tests); 
                                               
34
 Some constabularies claimed that the examination was “double-doctored”, i.e. two FMEs performed 
the examination.  After conducting further interviews in those constabularies, however, I discovered 
that this was actually quite rare (although I will explore the times it does happen in Chapter Six) and 
was really only the case during the training of neophyte FMEs (see Chapter Three).  To this end, for 
my description, I think it suffices to say that the examination is generally “single-doctored”. 
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• to corroborate the victim’s account (are findings consistent with it) (Kelly 
& Regan 2003: 10). 
 
During the examination, the FME observes the body of the complainer, searching for 
signs of injury or physical contact and collecting samples for further forensic 
scientific analysis.  A further aim of the examination, not included in the above 
quotation, is to take care of the therapeutic needs of the complainer.  Before making 
a start, however, the FME first has to gain consent to perform the examination.  In 
seeking “informed consent”, the FME informs the complainer of what they are about 
to do (i.e. observe the complainer’s body for signs of injury and collect samples for 
scientific analysis) and the differences between a general medical examination and a 
forensic medical examination.  Along with the latter, the FME must explain to the 
complainer that the report produced, based upon the findings of the examination, will 
be shared with the police, prosecutors and possibly the defence, and that the 
complainer is required to consent to the material being disclosed.  Moreover, if 
photographs or colposcopic recordings are to be taken, then the FME must gain 
additional consent for them.  Before beginning the examination, then, the complainer 
must consent to samples and recordings being taken from them, and to the 
dissemination of that the report to other parties.  This is of vital importance, as the 
point to note here is that the FME is supposed to be disinterestedly gathering 
evidence, be it signs of injury or trace material, and this practice could be highly 
detrimental to the complainer.  The process, in particular the gathering of intimate 
trace material, can be highly traumatising; moreover, the requirement to gather 
evidence could run counter to the therapeutic aspects of medicine, and the evidence 
gathered could actually undermine the complainer’s allegation.  I will engage with 
these points later.  Nevertheless, if any of the consents are not granted, it is likely that 
a particularly forensic medical examination will not be performed, as it will not be 
possible to collect the requisite evidence, and so the examiner will perform a routine 
medical, tending to the complainer’s therapeutic needs only.  It is the SOLO’s job to 
report the reasons why consent was not provided.
35
  Kelly et al. (2005) notes that it is 
very rare for a complainer to refuse consent, as there is an assumption on the part of 
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 If an adult has reported sexual assaults that took place when they were a child, a “historic assault”, 
then a medical examination will not take place (Common 2004). 
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the complainer that upon making the report they will be forensically examined; more 
interestingly, Kelly et al. also explained (and this was confirmed by anecdotal 
evidence in my study) that Senior Investigating Officers (hereafter “SIOs”) looked 
less favourably on cases where the complainer did not consent to the medical than 
those where consent was given. 
 If consent is granted, then the FME follows the routine set out in 
constabulary-developed protocols, employing the standardised Forensic Medical 
Examination Kit.  They commence with general medical questions concerning 
current medication and alcohol consumption, and then move onto questions that may 
have a bearing on their observations; date and time of last consensual intercourse, for 
example, or menstrual and pregnancy history.  Once the questions are asked, the 
FME performs a top-to-toe observation of the body of the complainer, recording any 
injuries observed and taking all necessary samples.  They then focus on the ano-
genital-oral areas, with particular attention to areas of contact suggested by the 
complainer’s account.  The areas are sampled, and any injuries found are recorded.  
The FME stores the samples, as detailed in published guidelines, in preparation for 
distribution to the forensic science laboratory.  Once the examination is complete, the 
FME then prescribes any medication that they believe to be required (usually the 
contraceptive pill or antibiotics to prevent sexually transmitted diseases (hereafter 
“STDs”)), and arranges follow-up appointments with Genito-Urinary Medical 
(hereafter “GUM”) units (if there are signs of an infection or if the complainer is 
worried about HIV) and counselling services.  If necessary, the complainer is then 
given a new set of clothes (if she is still wearing the clothes she was assaulted in, 
these will be taken by the SOLO for forensic scientific analysis) and allowed to 
return home.  At this point, the SOLO is able to hand over the details of the case they 
have gathered to either the Criminal Investigations Department (hereafter “CID”) or 
a specialist “Family Protection”/”Sexual Assault” Unit (depending upon 
constabulary) for further investigation, and the FME writes up their report based on 
what was observed during the examination.   
 When the suspect has been identified by the complainer, the police attempt to 
apprehend and detain him in line with Section 14, “Detection and questioning at 
police station”, of the Criminal Procedure Scotland Act 1995 (Shiels et al. 2001).  In 
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cases where the suspect is unknown, more work is necessary to deduce the identity.  
It is not the aim of this thesis to go into details about the various investigative 
strategies that the police employ to uncover the identity of a perpetrator, but I do 
want to touch upon the ways in which some of the forensic medical samples 
collected by FMEs are used in the attempt to discover the identity, and the situation 
that results if the police do not uncover the identity, or to put it another way, the 
crime is not “cleared up”.  Firstly, in cases where the suspect is known and where the 
case is forwarded to the procurator fiscal, it is the fiscal who decides which samples 
are sent to the laboratory and which analyses are run, as they are attempting to piece 
together the strongest case possible in order to secure a conviction.  Due to this, it is 
also their responsibility to pay for those analyses.  In the case where the identity of 
the suspect is unknown, it is the police who decide which samples are sent to the lab 
and which analyses are conducted, with the aim of discovering the identity of the 
suspect.  Using the trace material collected on the swabs, the police can make a 
request for a DNA-typing analysis to be performed by the forensic scientists; this 
will produce a DNA profile, which the police hope will match with a pre-existing 
profile contained on the Scottish DNA Database (Williams and Johnson 2008) and so 
provide a suspect for the police.
36
 
If the case is not cleared up, i.e. the identity of the suspect is not discovered 
(from either the database, or other investigative techniques), or the police are unable 
to arrest the known suspect (no evidence is discovered that corroborates the 
complainer’s account, or the suspect has absconded), then the police choose to leave 
the case open, in case evidence appears in future which is useful to the open case.  
Although cases left unresolved during the investigation are not marked “No Crime” 
or “No Further Action” as they are in England (Harris and Grace 1999, Kelly 2005), 
the unresolved case still constitutes the second attrition point in the criminal justice 
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 While I do not follow the samples collected by the FMEs after the examination, and therefore do 
not explicitly engage in this thesis with the question of how the samples are sent to the lab, I believe it 
is appropriate to add this information as it supports the claims made by Liz Kelly about samples not 
being forwarded that I touched upon earlier.  It is my contention that criticism has shifted from the 
sample collection to sample distribution under the assumption that FMEs are now collecting all 
samples in agreement with guidance artefacts.  I will explore such assumptions in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
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process (unless the case is resolved later via the Moorov doctrine).
37
  On the other 
hand, if the investigation does discover a suspect, either via the complainer providing 
the identity or through the investigation, and the police have corroboratory evidence, 
then they will pass the case, including all the evidence they have gathered, to the 
procurator fiscal for the prosecution. 
1.3.2.2 The Prosecution Process 
Having set out in detail the aspects of the investigation process, in this final section I 
intend to address a single aspect of the pre-trial prosecution process that is salient to 
FME work.  While Scottish law has many diverse aspects to its pre-trial decision-
making, I will focus upon the Preliminary Diet.
38
  The Preliminary Diet became a 
mandatory part of the Scottish criminal justice process with The Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1995 (Young 1997).  It has two chief aims: 1) to discover the level of 
preparation of both the prosecution and defence (including whether or not the 
defence intend to plead guilty) and 2) to ascertain if there is any evidence that the 
prosecution and defence agree upon and can therefore be disposed of.  I will discuss 
both aims in turn.  Prior to The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995, it was 
considered to be too common for the accused to plead guilty on the day of the trial, 
causing inconvenience to all involved (particularly witnesses) (Young 1997).  In 
order to limit this practice, it was decided to make the Preliminary Diet mandatory 
and thereby provide a mechanism for the accused to plead guilty earlier, potentially 
avoiding inconvenience.  If the accused does plead guilty at this stage, the case goes 
into Accelerated Procedure, skipping the Trial Diet and passing directly to 
Sentencing.  The second aim of the Preliminary Diet is the statutory requirement of 
the prosecution and defence to agree (and thereby dismiss) uncontested evidence.  
Sections 256 and 257 of The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 make it 
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 See Raitt (2001) and Chalmers (2006) for discussion of the Moorov doctrine, which enables crimes 
“so inter-related by character, circumstances and time… as to justify an inference that they are 
instances of a course of criminal conduct systematically pursued by the accused person” (Lord Justice-
Clerk (Aitchison) cited in Chalmers 2006: 26) to corroborate each other.  Cases that have not yet been 
cleared up could still be useful for other cases, and could themselves be resolved via the Moorov 
doctrine. 
38 For discussions of procurator fiscal decision-making, particularly those concerning the relationships 
between the police and the procurators fiscal and focusing on the way that decisions are made 
regarding Solemn and Summary decisions and breakdowns of the types of courts used in Scottish 
Criminal Procedure, see Pounder 1993, Young 1997, Duff 1999, Gane 1999. 
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necessary for both parties to agree on certain facts, making their appearance 
unnecessary at trial.  This is vitally important when it comes to forensic scientific and 
medical evidence; if the forensic evidence confirms only that penetrative sexual 
contact has taken place (findings of genital examination consistent with recent sexual 
intercourse, semen found in the vagina, etc.) and the defence are intending to claim 
that the complainer consented, then the forensic medical and scientific evidence can 
be dismissed, as the evidence does not conflict with either account.  Both parties can 
agree with the findings of the forensic practitioners, and so they need not be called as 
witnesses to trial.
39
  If the accused does not plead guilty, then once the evidence has 
been agreed upon, the case proceeds to the Trial Diet. 
1.4 Chapter Summary 
As previously set out, this thesis aims to investigate the pre-trial work of a particular 
forensic practitioner, the FME, with particular focus on the way that they attempt to 
make their evidence appear authoritative.  In Section 1.2 I explained, using the work 
of STS scholars Roger Smith, Simon Cole and others, that a facet of this is the 
construction of facts, employing community cohesion and consensus in order to 
construct credibility.  In the following chapters, I will demonstrate how such fact 
construction can be observed in FME work as well as the examples employed by 
those scholars.  To this end, as this study investigates the routine work of FMEs, it 
will also show how FMEs claim to construct incontrovertible evidence.  In the 
following chapter, I will set out the methodology that I will employ: the semi-
structured interview, accompanied by the analysis of documents and other clinical 
forensic medical artefacts.  I will also discuss my choice of analytical method, the 
use of the theoretical concept “meaning finitism”, which is a philosophical tenet that 
sets out that all classifications are essentially underdetermined, and so communities 
determine the appropriate manner by which objects are classified; this argument is of 
particular salience to my own study of the ways in which communities of FMEs 
develop facts and make classifications. 
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 A forensic medical report that does not benefit either the prosecution or the defence I will label 
(using the FMEs’ language) the “neutral report”.  The neutral report, and its problems, will be the 
major focus of Chapter Seven. 
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 Chapter Three investigates how medical practitioners are trained to become 
competent FMEs.  The chapter focuses upon the importance of shadowing and 
textbook photographs as exemplars to the neophyte, which start to shape their 
perceptual and cognitive apparatus.  Such shaping is reinforced through the use of 
exercises, both in textbooks and by the observation of the trainer during shadowing; 
in both cases, the authority corrects the responses of the trainee until they fit with 
those agreed upon by the rest of the community.  Possession of the same shared 
vision as that of the general FME community is finally achieved (after the trainee has 
been deemed competent by their trainer) via the undertaking of an examination, the 
Diploma of Medical Jurisprudence (hereafter “DMJ”).  An FME passing the DMJ, or 
being judged “safe”, means that they observe, classify and record cases in the same 
manner as other members of the community.  Chapter Three sets out the way that 
FME training is an attempt to develop a shared vision and shared praxis amongst 
members of the forensic medical community, in order to construct unanimity in the 
classifications and practices of its members. 
 The real world provides more complex cases than those provided in textbooks 
and encountered in training, however, and the competent FME is required to draw 
analogies between the cases they observed during their training and new cases that 
they encounter during their professional life.  Chapter Four investigates FME injury 
classification more closely, focusing on the process by which FMEs record and make 
judgements about contusions upon the body.  In the majority of cases, FMEs are 
capable of describing the type of injury observed and determining its cause, a result 
of their training and their experience of injuries.  Such statements are granted the 
ontological statements of facts, because practitioners generally make statements that 
would be accepted by others within the community as a result of their shared 
training; in addition, they do not extend themselves in cases where there is a risk of 
being contradicted (for example, if they are unable to determine the cause of an 
injury, they either bring in a more experienced practitioner or limit their claims-
making in an effort to avoid providing refutable testimony).  Even with these 
conservative strategies, there are still cases where FME evidence is contradicted, and 
the community of FMEs is attempting to further limit this by pressuring the COPFS 
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to establish the disclosure of defence expert evidence before trials, thereby providing 
opportunities for FMEs to limit any demonstration of community disagreements. 
 Chapter Five takes a step away from actual forensic practice, and investigates 
the incorporation and subsequent development of guideline-driven work in clinical 
forensic medical examinations.  Focusing initially upon the sustained criticism of 
police doctor work in the late 1970s/early 1980s and the introduction of the FMEK, 
the chapter identifies the incorporation of such technologies as legitimation 
strategies, which chiefly served the rhetorical purposes of alleviating the pressure on 
police doctors and making the evidence gathered during the examinations credible 
again (although they did make some changes to the content of medical examinations 
of sexual assault complainers).  Likewise, the rise of the Evidence-Based Medicine 
and Evidence-Based Policy movements in medicine and the law in the late 
1990s/early 2000s made it imperative that the FME community also appeared to 
have an evidence-base if it was to continue with its claim that it produced 
authoritative evidence.  This resulted in something of a paradox, given that although 
the FME community did not wish to prescribe rules governing work and desired to 
maintain doctor discretion, it required its work to be accountable to guidelines.  
Forensic scientists have picked up on this paradox, and have put pressure on FMEs to 
be more accountable to the published guidelines by asking them directly (in face-to-
face meetings) to collect all possible samples.  Chapter Five engages with the rise of 
guidance-based medicine, and also questions of autonomy and accountability. 
 Chapter Six looks at the questions of FME practice and guidance artefacts on 
a micro-sociological level, by investigating the way that FMEs actually classify cases 
and make decisions about which questions to ask, samples to collect, etc.  As with 
the work of Parnis and Du Mont, Kelly et al. and Savage at al., my findings 
suggested not only that the notion of the FME role-conflict between the therapeutic 
and evidence-gathering aspects of the forensic medical examination is sound, but 
also that there exist other role-conflicts, such as the economic conflict between the 
desire to gather all evidence and the time and cost required to process such evidence, 
resulting in FMEs gathering only what they consider to be enough to generate 
corroboratory evidence.  FMEs have developed strategies for negotiating these 
multiple role-conflicts, and have partly codified them into their guidance artefacts.  
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While such artefacts are in some ways consistent with FME practice, and supply 
FMEs with an aide memoire, they are necessarily underdetermined, requiring the 
practicing FME to classify the case and assess which practices (samples, questions, 
etc.) would be agreed upon by their colleagues.  Guidance artefacts still play an 
important role, however; guidance documents help explain FME work to outside 
parties, and legitimate FME work in cases of critical deconstructive questioning. 
 While Chapters Three to Six address the ways that FMEs ensure the authority 
of their evidence, Chapter Seven outlines an unintended consequence of these aims.  
Focusing on the example of the “neutral report” (i.e. a report that does not confirm 
nor refute the complainer’s allegation of rape, itself an act of boundary-work (Gieryn 
1983, 1999) demonstrating an FME’s impartiality in the adversarial framework of 
the trial), the chapter suggests that as their evidence is not contentious, i.e. it does not 
support either side, FME evidence is unlikely (because of the procedure of the 
Preliminary Diet) to be called as evidence.  FMEs, therefore, make a trade-off 
between epistemic authority and evidential significance.  Unfortunately this trade-off 
could serve to undermine FME efforts to diminish society-wide “rape myths”, in 
particular those that postulate a relationship between injuries and “real rape”.  
Prosecutors’ use of FME (injury) evidence, could, in fact, be serving to reinforce 
such beliefs, not undermine them. 
 In Chapter Eight, I will reinforce the arguments of the previous chapters, 
particularly those relating to the way that FMEs construct and maintain consensus in 
complex and contentious areas.  I will explain how the maintenance and 
dissemination of a paradigm allows FMEs to claim that they produce incontrovertible 
evidence for use by the courts, and explain that even when such a claim is open to 
challenge (a “meaning finitist” interpretation of classification asserts this is possible), 
they have means by which to limit the demonstration of divergent forensic medical 
discourse in the courtroom.  However, I will also argue that whilst sustaining such a 
consensus is beneficial to the credibility of FMEs, it may also be doing a disservice 
to both rape victims and the FME community, as the evidence produced does not 
benefit either party in the adversarial arena of the legal courtroom; their evidence 
may be dismissed in the majority of cases, with FMEs being called only in cases 
demonstrating significant injury – actively reinforcing popular mythologies 
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concerning rape and injury.  I will conclude by comparing my findings to the policies 
currently advocated by police and prosecutors concerning the generation of clinical 




The Introductory Chapter set out the questions that I intend to answer in the thesis.  
In this chapter, I will explain how I set about researching them, by outlining the 
methods that I chose to employ and the manner in which I actualised those methods.  
I will explain how, having drawn entirely upon qualitative research methods (chiefly 
the semi-structured interview, but also document and artefact analysis), I generated 
access and sampled interview respondents and documents, interviewed respondents 
(at all times ensuring that the interview procedure itself and my use of data was 
consistent with ethical protocols) and then proceeded to analyse the collected data, 
via the appropriation of the “framework analysis” method, and using the conceptual 
tool “meaning finitism” as an explanatory framework.  As such, this chapter will 
conclude with an explanation of “meaning finitism”, which will set up the analysis 
within the following chapters. 
2.1 Interviews 
2.1.1 Qualitative Interviews, Sampling and Generating Access 
Given that my research questions addressed the minutiae of FME work, I was 
initially afraid that an interview-based study would not be the most effective means 
by which to find answers to my research questions.  Methods texts such as Arksey 
and Knight (1999) and Silverman (2007) have suggested that issues of memory or 
self-representation may have an effect on the interview, meaning that the collected 
data does not provide an exact account of the performance of work.  Such texts assert 
that the best manner to collect data upon work and practice is an ethnographic 
observational study, which (because of such advice) has become a highly established 
technique within STS (see Latour 1987), and has already been found to be of value 
within studies of forensic science laboratories (Jordan and Lynch 1998).  
Unfortunately, the highly distressing nature of the forensic medical examination of 
sexual assault meant that my presence at an examination would be highly 
traumatising for all involved (myself included), and so could not be considered 
ethically appropriate.  It soon became clear, however, that my area of interest lay not 
specifically in the minutiae of actual working practices, but rather in the way that 
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FMEs present themselves as credible and expert.  As I was interested in uncovering 
FME accounts of their practice and the resources that they draw upon in order to 
legitimate and explain their work, rather than the detail of that work (although I 
would also grant the latter a certain level of importance), the interview became the 
best method with which I could achieve my aims.  Of course, the focus on accounts 
rather than the actual minutiae of work does have significant repercussions for the 
study’s validity and generalisibility.  I will engage with these problems shortly.  
Having decided upon the technique of interviews, I next approached the National 
Health Service’s (hereafter “NHS”) Central Office for Research Ethics Committees 
(COREC) with a request to perform the study, as NHS approval is required when 
interviewing NHS employees about their work (some FMEs are also NHS-employed 
GPs).  Upon receiving the necessary approval (see appendix 1), I was able to invite 
practicing FMEs to take part in the study. 
 As evidenced by my choice of qualitative methods, it was never the intention 
to produce statistical analyses, and so I did not require a statistically significant 
sample of interview respondents; however, in order to make claims appertaining to 
the entire community of FMEs in Scotland, it was necessary to construct a sample 
that was “symbolically representative” (Ritchie et al. 2004a: 83) of the Scottish FME 
community.  As such, the sample needed to include FMEs from a range of 
constabularies, with a variety of levels of experience, a representation from both 
urban and rural areas, and a balance between male and female.  As I did not plan on 
conducting statistical analysis, the sample did not need to be large, and I aimed to 
cease interviewing when a saturation point (a point where no new data is 
forthcoming) emerged (Ritchie et al. 2004a).  Having decided on these methods, I 
started to approach potential interview respondents in the manner suggested by Susan 
Ostrander (1995).  The recruitment process drew upon Ostrander’s suggested method 
of developing access to elites by contacting relevant members of the researcher’s 
own social circle in order to access members of the appropriate organisation, and 
then using the organisation’s hierarchy in order to determine the best potential 
interviewees and generate access.  I was able to follow this process with FMEs, as a 
member of my social circle, although not an FME herself, worked within the 
Pathology department at the University of Edinburgh and was able to introduce me 
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informally to members of that department (as well as FMEs in various other 
constabularies) who she believed would be both interested in my work and willing to 
speak with me.  One of these was a high-status medico-legal professor, who provided 
me with a list of names of people to interview (see the idea of “snowball sampling” 
(Arber 1998)) and also (arguably more importantly) allowed me to mention their 
name on invitations to other FMEs, in both their constabulary and others, which (I 
assume) granted my invite more authority in the eyes of other FMEs.
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In an effort to learn more about the investigation process and the way that 
forensic medical evidence is employed, collected, and understood by the police, I 
also interviewed police officers.  In a similar manner to my access of FMEs, I began 
by generating informal contacts via my friend, and also attained clearance from the 
relevant constabularies’ Chief Constables.  In each case, the Chief Constable was 
very glad for me to interview their officers, and attempted to set up meetings; 
however, when officers were “requested” to attend an interview by their superior 
officer, the officer either was highly evasive (for example, SIO A, who asked that I 
not record the interview electronically) or made it very difficult to find a suitable 
time for the interview, resulting in the briefest of interviews (SOLO C) or, in some 
cases, in interviews not taking place at all (I did have a SOLO D and a SIO E; 
however, these interviews did not take place due to difficulties in arranging a 
meeting).  On the other hand, in cases where I pre-arranged the interviews on a 
personal basis (either through my friend, or through FMEs who introduced me to 
officers, such as SOLO A and B who are quoted throughout the thesis), both the 
original access and the interviews themselves went without a hitch. 
 While my gaining access to both FMEs and police did rely in many ways 
upon interpersonal and professional relationships, I also tried to generate access by 
                                               
40 This is an example of an instance where generating access by means of a hierarchy proved 
beneficial in my work; however, there were also instances where the same practice proved deeply 
problematic.  At the outset of the study, it was also my intention to interview procurators fiscal and 
advocates depute about the use of clinical forensic medical evidence in their decision-making.  As 
with my access to the community of FMEs, I was informally introduced by my friend to people 
working in the Crown Office, who agreed to be interviewed by me and set up other interviews with 
other staff.  However, before starting to conduct the interviews, I thought it only right that I should 
formally request interviews with the COPFS, and so I sent a letter to the Crown Agent (appendix 1).  
Unfortunately, the already prepared interviews had to be cancelled (and the study’s avenue of 
investigation discontinued), as a member of the Crown Office, writing on behalf of the Crown Agent, 
did not believe it appropriate for fiscals and deputes to be interviewed about their experiences, 
(response reproduced in appendix 1). 
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disclosing a great deal about the study within the invites that I distributed (again, this 
is advocated by Ostrander).  The invitations explained the fact that I was a PhD 
student, the nature of my research interests, and the areas on which I wished to 
question the respondents (for template versions of these letters, see appendix 1).  In 
addition to the invitation, I also drew up a research agenda and posted it on a 
website, the address of which was included with the invites (a copy of the research 
agenda can also be found in appendix 1); the aim of the agenda was to provide FMEs 
with more information about the study than had been provided in the invitation, 
meaning that if the respondent was so inclined, they had the opportunity to research 
further my personal credentials.  As with the name-dropping of high-status 
practitioners within the invite, it was hoped that such self-disclosure on my part 
would provide the study with more credibility in the eyes of potential respondents.  
Having completed these processes, I managed to collect enough respondents to reach 
a saturation point; I will next turn to the breakdown of my sample, and then explain 
how I conducted the interviews. 
There are approximately 150 practitioners who can loosely be labelled as 
FMEs working in Scotland; however, an overwhelming proportion of these are 
located in one constabulary (110 in Strathclyde), and the vast majority of these 
Strathclyde FMEs work in rural areas, where a surgery is linked to the local police 
station and provides a forensic medical service, although without a rigorous training 
system for its practitioners.  In these cases, all doctors working within the surgery are 
counted as FMEs by virtue of their workplace, even though they may not actually 
perform FME work.  Such figures tend to skew the overall numbers of FMEs in 
Scotland.  While this finding is important, it should also be noted that I did not intend 
this study to be statistically representative, as I have already mentioned.  However, I 
did hope that the study’s findings would be generalisable to other FMEs working in 
Scotland,
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 and so I intended to interview FMEs from a range of constabularies; the 
study, as envisaged in the design, was of practice within the whole of Scotland.  
Although I did not gain access to FMEs in every one of the eight constabularies, I 
was granted access to the four that had not only the largest quantity of practitioners, 
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 My wish to be generalisable appears to contradict my acknowledgement of the use of accounts and 
FMEs’ representations of their work.  I will attempt to square this circle shortly. 
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but also the highest levels of recorded assault cases (particularly Strathclyde and 
Lothian and Borders).  The four constabularies sampled also provided a balance 
between urban and rural areas, meaning that the doctors working in those areas had 
experience of performing examinations in both kinds of area.
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  Overall, I 
interviewed thirteen FMEs: one in Constabulary 1, four in Constabulary 2, seven in 
Constabulary 3 and one in Constabulary 4.  This group of 13 was made up of a mix 
of practitioners, some working full-time for the police and some dividing their time 
between the police and another organisation (university, surgery, or professional 
association); their backgrounds provided different kinds of medical specialism (8 
GPs, 3 Forensic Pathologists, and 2 Community Gynaecologists) and a spectrum of 
levels of experience, with some practitioners being retired or close to retirement, and 
some practitioners just beginning to work as FMEs.  I have not provided a figure for 
the number of experienced or inexperienced FMEs, as I do not believe it would be 
appropriate: it would be difficult and arbitrary to demarcate “experience” as 10 years, 
20 years, etc.  The practitioners ranged from those with over thirty years of 
experience to those who were currently compiling a casebook for the DMJ (see 
Chapter Three); to this end, all interviewees had been through a period of training 
and were considered competent practitioners by their own community. 
The final category that needs to be recorded is the sexual division of the FME 
interview respondents.  While my analysis does not consider the sexual 
differentiation between male FMEs and female FMEs, there has certainly been much 
prior discussion of whether the forensic medical examination of penetrative sexual 
assault victims should only be performed by women practitioners, and some readers 
may use the data within this thesis to make further arguments for or against such 
causes.  Anecdotally, while I was performing the interviews, I did find it far easier to 
develop rapport with female practitioners than with their male colleagues; however, 
whether that has more to do with my role as a male researcher (as opposed to a male 
or female complainer) is a point of contention.  Either way, my sample had eight 
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 While I have no direct evidence for the reasons why four of the constabularies did not provide 
access, I do have my suspicions.  One of the constabularies that did not offer access was Northern, 
which was criticised in 2005 for employing agency doctors as FMEs (Dyer 2006); another was 
Grampian, which was criticised by the Scotsman journalist, Howie (2007a), for its low conviction 
rate.  Such bad publicity may have led to these constabularies wishing to avoid being interviewed 
about their decision-making practices. 
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male practitioners and five female practitioners.  By constabulary, the sexual 
differentiation breaks down thus: 






As the sample contained a mix of sexes, levels of experience, knowledge of working 
in urban and rural areas, and occupations, I believe that the chosen sample is 
“symbolically representative” (Ritchie et al. 2004a: 83) of FMEs in Scotland. 
 In addition to FMEs, I also interviewed the police, including officers at both 
the SOLO/accompanying officer level and at the SIO level.  While I was unable to 
gain access to the police at Constabulary 4, I did manage to interview police 
(although with great difficulty; see above) in the other three constabularies.  Overall, 
I was able to access seven police officers, four SIOs and three SOLOs, with a sex 
split of three to four (three of the SIOs being male, the remaining one SIO and all 
three SOLOs female).  The constabulary split is below: 





As questions concerning the relationship between FMEs and prosecutors are not at 
the forefront of the current study, I employed the data collected during these 
interviews as context for the more important FME interview data, using the police 
data to triangulate aspects of the FME interviews.  Where I have used the police data 
during the results chapters that follow, I have used it very sparingly, and only to 
reinforce points already made by the FMEs themselves, or as part of a broader 
argument.  Having broken down the sample of 20 interviews conducted during the 
fieldwork, I will now explain how I conducted the interviews themselves, with 
particular focus on the way that I framed the interview for ethical purposes. 
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2.1.2 Framing the Interview, Ethics and Transcription 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, I decided to employ semi-structured 
interviews, and so drew up an interview plan based around a selection of key areas 
and questions that developed from my research questions, while also leaving enough 
space within the interview itself to enable me to follow up on answers and allow the 
respondent to veer off in directions that I had not anticipated.  While the semi-
structured format is flexible, it is also robust enough to provide a baseline structure to 
which I could return if the interview began to move towards discussion of areas that I 
did not believe profitable (see Kvale 1996, and Arksey and Knight 1999 for 
comparisons of the different kinds of interview).  I piloted my interview plan with 
the friend who had helped me generate access before the first interview.  Having 
made a small number of amendments upon her advice, I was ready to conduct the 
actual interviews.  In this section, I will explain how I conducted interviews, with a 
particular focus upon the way that I framed them in order to ensure that my 
respondent was adequately informed of both the focus of the study itself and the way 
that the interview material would be used, which would hopefully result in the FME 
feeling safe and secure when telling me about their work.
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 Kvale (1996) advocates that framing the interview is of great importance to 
good interview technique, and also to ensuring that the interview material gathered is 
ethically generated (i.e. the respondent has been adequately informed about its 
purpose and has not been forced into providing it).  As I have already explained, in 
order to help gain access for interviews, I outlined the most important details of the 
study in the letter that I sent to the respondent, and also created a website which 
provided greater details about the study.  Prior to the interview, therefore, there was 
considerable opportunity for the respondent to find out more about the study.  As I 
was recording the interviews (of which more below), I started by asking the 
respondent whether or not they were willing to be recorded, explaining that recording 
would enable accurate transcription (more accurate quotations in any written 
documents), that nobody else would hear the recording, and that all identifying 
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 Such a point cannot be over-exaggerated; I was frequently amused after an interview when the 
respondent would let out a sigh of relief and inform me that “that was not contentious at all” or words 
to that effect.  I suspect that FMEs, working in such a difficult area, constantly believe themselves to 
be under siege, and being asked about their work by social scientists constitutes another potential 
means by which their authority can be undermined. 
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details (names, high-profile cases in which they were involved) would be removed 
during the transcription (this was done by alphabetising the respondents – Dr. A, B, 
C, etc. – and numbering the constabularies – Constabulary 1, 2, 3, etc. – although I 
did believe it important to provide the gender of the respondent).  If they agreed to 
the recording (and all did with the exception of one SIO), then I recorded the 
interview and started by outlining again who I was, the nature of my research 
interests and motivations, and the main foci of the particular interview.  I then 
proceeded to conduct the interview proper, asking all the pre-set questions while still 
allowing space for the interview to organically flow into new areas, and all the while 
returning to the structure when the respondent ran out of steam or moved into what I 
considered to be significantly irrelevant areas, or when I noticed that time was 
running out. 
At the end of the interview, the respondent and I both signed a contract (see 
appendix 1 for a template contract).  The contract stated that, if requested by the 
respondent, I would make a copy of the transcript and any future published material 
(including the PhD thesis) available to them, and would make changes to those texts 
if we both agreed that I had made a technical mistake or a potential breach of 
anonymity.  It was made clear during the closing of the interview that I would not 
make substantial changes to the content of the material.  Furthermore, I also agreed 
that I would uphold the statements that I made at the beginning of the interview (that 
I would anonymise the data, transcribe and quote accurately, etc.).  In signing the 
contract, the respondent agreed that she was happy with what she had said during the 
interview and gave consent for me to use the recorded material (this was part of the 
reason for asking for their signature after the interview, as only then could the 
respondent be said to be “informed” and properly able to offer consent to the use of 
their responses (Kvale 1996)).  Having conducted an interview, I then proceeded to 
transcribe it. 
I decided to record the interviews, as doing so would enable an accurate, 
verbatim record capturing the intonation and hesitations of the respondents, and also 
allow me to devote my full attention to the respondent instead of taking copious 
notes (Fielding 1998, Legard et al. 2004) (although I did take notes recording 
phenomena that could not be captured on the audio recording, such as body 
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language).  I transcribed each recording shortly after the interview (I would generally 
start the transcribing process the day after the interview, in order to give myself a 
chance to reflect), typing up the entire interview in keeping with my agreement with 
the respondent.  Each act of transcription identified new areas of interest, or ones that 
required further development, and with these new areas, I was able to amend 
following interviews (particularly with the use of probes) to investigate areas that I 
had not focused upon previously.  Having full transcripts of each interview to hand 
meant that I was then ready to perform data analysis (although of course the act of 
transcription itself should be considered analysis, as illustrated by the changes in my 
interview content i.e. the probes asked and the avenues of investigation followed 
during subsequent interviews).  I will discuss my data analysis shortly; however, I 
will first briefly touch upon the other data collection method that I utilised: the use of 
documents. 
2.2 Documents and Artefacts 
As previously mentioned, the general aims of the study were to outline how FMEs 
perform forensic medical examinations, and how they make their work and evidence 
credible.  While interviewing presented one useful way to collect data for such a 
study, it did not constitute the only means; FMEs write about their practice in journal 
articles and textbooks.  Moreover, as Prior (2003) citing Weber makes clear, modern 
organisations are inherently bureaucratic, resulting in the production of masses of 
paperwork as work moves from one location to another (the files examined in 
attrition rate studies (Harris and Grace 1999 and Kelly 2005 for instance) are 
evidence enough of the use of forms and documents in criminal investigations).  The 
professional associations concerned with forensic medicine have, over the past thirty 
years, developed greater amounts of documentation for FMEs to fill in and follow; 
however, as Garfinkel makes clear (1967), completed forms themselves do not fully 
explicate how work is conducted.  They are, after all, a community resource, and the 
community has agreed ideas about what does and does not need to be recorded upon 
a form.  Documents and artefacts, although not unproblematic, are a further means, 
therefore, to attain information about how FME work is conducted.  In the following 
two sections, I will explain how I decided on the documents and artefacts that should 
be investigated. 
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2.2.1 Sampling Documents 
I have already mentioned some of Ostrander’s strategies for gaining access to elites.  
She also suggests means by which to develop rapport and credibility during the 
interview interaction; one of these was “doing your homework” and making oneself 
aware of the work conducted by the respondents by reading their literature.  To this 
end, just prior to the outset of the fieldwork period, I consulted three textbooks that 
contained sections on the forensic medical examination of sexual assault complainers 
(Stark 2000, Payne-James et al. 2003, Dalton 2004).  In addition, during the course 
of the fieldwork, I discovered that the Worshipful Society of Apothecaries
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advocated A Color Atlas of Sexual Assault (Girardin et al. 1997) as the training 
material for injury interpretation, and so I believed that an analysis of said textbook 
would be highly enlightening in my objective of understanding and explaining how 
FMEs develop a shared medico-legal vision. 
At the same time that I was distributing the first wave of invitations to 
potential respondents, I also reviewed two forensic journals; one was aimed squarely 
at FMEs, the Journal of Clinical Forensic Medicine, founded in 1994 (although it 
was previously The Police Surgeon, as I discuss in Chapter Five) and published until 
2006,
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 becoming the Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine in 2007 (the effect of 
a shift in the professional status of the association concerned with FMEs, as I will 
outline in Chapter Three).  The other journal was the Journal of Forensic Science 
International, which had a far broader purview than just clinical forensic medicine.  
Founded in the early 1970s, the journal has an expansive remit and an interest in all 
aspects of the interaction between science and medicine and the law.  It was 
important to review these journals as 1) they could provide an alternative data 
collection method in the worst case scenario that I could not gain access to any 
respondents, and 2) I was aware from my friend in pathology that these were two of 
the most oft-cited journals in the field.  In addition, the archives of both journals 
were available online, providing ease of sampling.  Performing both keyword 
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 The Worshipful Society of Apothecaries examines forensic practitioners and offers the DMJ, which 
is widely considered by FMEs to be the best qualification.  I will discuss the DMJ in detail in Chapter 
Three. 
45 It should be noted that one article, by O’Keefe (2008), which is drawn upon throughout the thesis, 
was not actually published in the Journal of Clinical Forensic Medicine, but in its successor, the 
Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine; however, it was on “First Look” while I was conducting the 
keyword search and so it was generated as a “hit”. 
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searches generated a multitude of hits; I read the abstracts of all the articles 
generated, and managed to streamline this vast collection (by removing articles that 
were focused more on forensic science or pathology) to a more manageable 
collection: a total of 54 articles.  As with the discovery of the Color Atlas of Sexual 
Assault, I also discovered a useful collection of journal articles during the fieldwork 
period.  In 1984, the APS published a booklet entitled The New Police Surgeon: 
Rape (McLay 1984a), which consisted of a collection of articles previously 
published in The Police Surgeon journal.  These constituted an additional seven 
articles.  Moreover, through the data collection and analysis process, a number of 
other topics became important, such as the reasons behind the change in the 
professional association.  As such, I collected other clinical forensic medical journal 
articles in order to answer specific issues; however, I have not counted these towards 
the 54 articles mentioned above. 
2.2.2 Gathering Artefacts and Bureaucratic Documents 
The published clinical forensic medical literature was not the only documentation 
that I analysed during the fieldwork; other bureaucratic documents also provided 
beneficial evidence.  Among the documents that I gathered were those from the 
Worshipful Society of Apothecaries outlining the details of the courses that they 
examined: these included the rules and regulations and advice to candidates sitting 
the examinations offered by the Worshipful Society.  I also observed forensic 
medical examination kits from both the past and more recent times (paying particular 
attention to the attached documents that came with them: reporting forms, guidance 
documents, etc.), and the contemporary published guidelines found on the 
professional associations’ websites.  Having gathered both types of documents 
(professional texts and bureaucratic procedural artefacts), as well as the interview 
data, I was then able to analyse the material in an attempt to answer my research 
questions.  In the following sections, I will address how I performed the analysis. 
2.3 Data Analysis 
In this section I will explain how I performed my data analysis, and explain the 
strategies I employed to ensure that the data I collected was internally consistent, 
thus enabling me to assert that my findings are not only pertinent to my respondents, 
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but are generalisible to all FMEs working in Scotland.  Of course, as part of this 
latter claim, I must also engage with the supposed problem introduced by the 
employment of accounts of practice rather than “naturally occurring data” 
(Silverman 2007: 16).  Before turning to this however I will describe the analytical 
method I employed: “framework analysis”. 
2.3.1 Framework Analysis 
[Framework analysis] is a matrix based analytic method which facilitates 
rigorous and transparent data management such that all stages involved in the 
‘analytical hierarchy’ can be systematically conducted.  It also allows the 
analyst to move back and forth between different levels of abstraction without 
loosing [sic] sight of the ‘raw’ data (Ritchie et al. 2004b: 220). 
 
This quotation encapsulates the way in which one performs framework analysis, as 
well as the justification for its use.  Framework analysis - essentially consisting of the 
construction of matrices (or databases) containing the researcher’s data, which 
become more refined throughout the analysis process - enables analysts to review 
cases (interview respondents’ talk, for instance) against one another, and also allows 
testing of explanations against original data (i.e. at all stages of the framework 
analysis, the analyst can return to interrogate the original data and evaluate the 
strength of their theoretical explanations).  To put it briefly, framework analysis 
consists of the following: reviewing data; developing a set of core and subsidiary 
themes based upon that data; indexing these themes (upon the transcript or document 
– note that this is not the same as coding in terms of “code and retrieve” analysis, as 
at no point is the coded passage ever extracted from its source document); 
construction of matrices around those themes with the entirety of relevant quotations 
being input into the matrix; searching the completed database for relationships and 
commonalities amongst core themes, practitioners, etc.; the eventual refinement of 
the original database using analytical language; and the development of a descriptive 
account of the data based upon any observed commonalities (for more detail about 
framework analysis see Spencer et al. 2004, Ritchie et al. 2004b, Ritchie and Lewis 
2004).  Using this method, I was able to draw out four main themes: Training, Injury 
Interpretation, Introduction of Guidelines and FMEs’ Use of Guidelines in Work; 
these were separated into 35 subsidiary themes, from which I constructed the 
databases.  On reviewing the databases, I discovered that an essential aspect of all 
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parts of FME work was judgement, and that considerable work is done by FMEs to 
maintain a communitarian way of seeing and praxis. 
2.3.2 Triangulation and the Problem of Accounts 
I commenced this chapter by explaining why collecting interview data would be the 
most beneficial method for answering the research questions that I had set myself.  
As I was interested in the strategies and practices employed by FMEs to present 
themselves as authoritative and credible, accessing their own representations of their 
work would be a vital means by which to investigate the way that they account 
themselves and their work to others.  However, using accounts does raise a potential 
provide a problem for making my work generalisable to other FMEs.  How can I be 
sure that the accounts of the working practices I collected from my interview 
respondents are representative of all FMEs working in Scotland?  An important 
aspect of addressing this question was finding a means by which I could identify the 
level of distribution of these accounts amongst the community.  To determine this, 
not only did I conduct a number of interviews with FMEs in differing constabularies, 
but I also used a further method, documentary analysis, to see if similar discourses to 
those arising in my interviews existed within the texts.  Such methods triangulation 
convinced me that the representations of FME practice generated during interviews 
were shared by many of the respondents (and in the documentary sources), i.e. the 
data was consistent. 
Moreover, I also conducted a small number of interviews with the police, 
both accompanying officers and SIOs in a number of constabularies.  It was the case 
that these too corroborated the accounts of FME working practice provided by 
FMEs, allowing me to draw conclusions that such accounts as I had gathered during 
interviews are exactly the representations of FME work that FMEs generally employ 
to explain their work to others in the criminal justice process.  To this end the use of 
accounts about FME work does not constitute a problem for the study, or undermine 
the generalisability of its findings: on the contrary, it is only by uncovering such 
accounts that I am able to understand the way that FMEs explain their work to other 
actors in the criminal justice process and thereby attempt to develop and maintain 
their authority.  I will conclude this chapter by outlining the philosophical tenet of 
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“meaning finitism”, which is the theoretical framework I will employ in order to 
understand FME classificatory practice and fact-construction. 
2.4 Meaning Finitism 
The Edinburgh “Strong Programme’s”
46
 finitist approach (Barnes 1981, 1982, 
Barnes et al. 1996, Bloor 1982, 2002, Kusch 1999) draws upon and combines the 
earlier work on paradigms by Thomas Kuhn (1977, 1996) and the “network model of 
universals” by Mary Hesse (1974).  Finitism identifies all acts of classification as 
based on an individual’s previous experience of phenomena, and the classification 
itself derives from a judgement of the similarity (or difference) between a new 
phenomenon and previously experienced phenomena.  The classification itself, 
therefore, is a drawing of an analogy between an old case and a new one based upon 
the judged similarity between the old case and the new.  Such similarity judgements, 
however, are not the products of an individual mind, but are instead collectively 
developed, judged and disseminated by communities; this means that they can also 
be altered as new, problematic cases arise, meaning that all classifications are 
indeterminate and revisable.  In the following sections, I will expand upon this brief 
definition of finitism, explaining how individuals are taught how to classify objects 
(i.e. how to identify phenomena based upon a similarity relation shared by a 
community), and also how such a concept can be taken further to explain how 
scientific and medical work is done in addition to classification.  I will start by 
explaining training. 
2.4.1 Training 
The Strong Programme’s “meaning finitist” account of training draws heavily upon 
Thomas Kuhn’s (1977) allegory of a child learning to identify different kinds of 
waterfowl.  Kuhn asks the reader to imagine a pair of actors, Johnny (a small child) 
and his father, as they walk around a park labelling different birds.  The father is 
considered a competent labeller of birds by the community (i.e. he knows the 
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 The “Strong Programme” label derives from the development of a particular form of the sociology 
of knowledge that developed in Edinburgh in the 1970s.  Formed in contradistinction to previous 
“sociologies of error”, which only provided social explanations for why members of different cultures 
shared beliefs that disagreed with “scientific knowledge”, the Strong Programmers advocated a 
“symmetrical” approach that treated all knowledge (including science) as conventional, and sought 
social explanations as to why people held such beliefs (Bloor 1976). 
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“correct” names for them), while Johnny is deficient in such knowledge.  Already, 
then, one actor (the father) is considered to have greater competence by the 
community than the other (Johnny), and so the father’s claims about the world are 
more valid than those of his son.  The father, as the authority figure, points to a 
particular object (in this example a type of bird) and attaches to it a particular label, 
“swan”.  Johnny’s attention is directed to the bird by his father’s pointing, and 
Johnny then proceeds to observe the bird (due to the authoritative relationship 
between the two actors), accept that the name of that particular kind of bird is 
“swan”, and add the mental image of that bird to his pre-existing cognitive collection 
of birds under the label “swan” (we are told that Johnny can already distinguish birds 
from other phenomena and can discriminate a particular kind of bird, the robin 
redbreast).  Johnny and his father next come to another bird, and Johnny attempts to 
classify it against his existing collection of examples of birds.  Johnny states that the 
observed bird is a swan, because within Johnny’s stored mental collection of birds, 
the new bird being observed most closely resembles the swan that they saw 
previously.  According to Johnny’s father, however, the bird being observed is not a 
swan, but instead a kind of bird that Johnny has yet to observe, a goose.  It is not the 
case at this point that Johnny challenges his father about the validity of his 
correction; Johnny does not even ask his father to provide particulars to justify why 
the bird is a goose and not a swan.  Instead, Johnny assumes that his father is the 
authoritative source of knowledge, and so amends his own cognitive schema to 
accommodate the new class of bird, the goose. 
Kuhn tells us that after a few more attempts at classifying geese and swans, 
Johnny becomes adept at both distinguishing between the two types of birds and 
identifying them, but what does it mean to be able to correctly identify an object?  It 
is clear that Johnny was generalising (what I will later call drawing an analogy) from 
the previously observed case to the new ones in front of him (with his father either 
agreeing with Johnny’s classification or correcting him).  No two swans are identical, 
and so each one that Johnny observed (reinforced or corrected either directly or 




  Johnny’s cognitive schema was altered by each observed case.  Barnes, 
using L to represent a learner being taught to identify dogs by T the trainer, put it like 
this: “L shows that he knows what a dog is by correctly identifying dogs generally 
within his environment, and not just the particular instances of ‘dog’ given by T” 
(Barnes 1981: 309).  The trainee, then, is “endowed with a disposition to generalise” 
(Bloor 1982: 270) from the finite number of previously generated cases to new cases.  
It should be noted, however, that while the neophyte is developing their own 
cognitive framework, the independence of that framework is minimal (if it exists at 
all); through the sanctioning and reinforcement of the trainer, the neophyte develops 
a classificatory schema that fits with that of the already competent members of the 
community.  In Kuhn’s example, Johnny learnt to identify birds in the same way his 
father identified birds.  As mentioned, Johnny’s father was considered a competent 
practitioner in labelling birds, and so by learning from his father, Johnny learnt the 
community’s agreed terms for the different cases of birds. 
Training, therefore, provides neophytes with a finite selection of cases, from 
which trainees learn to generalise when presented with new cases.  Some of these 
generalisations will not be appropriate, and so an authority figure will either correct 
or reinforce the classification; either way, the experience of that case will amend the 
trainee’s cognitive schema, bringing it closer to the schema shared by the rest of the 
community.  Kuhn, and those subscribing to the Strong Programme in the Sociology 
of Scientific Knowledge (hereafter “SSK”), do not think that such training is only 
relevant to questions of language learning, however; the example is a metaphor that 
can also be employed to explain how scientific work is carried out.  Kuhn uses the 
same procedure to explain how physics students learn to identify and employ 
concepts such as “force” or “speed”; it is only through the process of working out 
accepted exercises or examples (exemplars) that such abstract concepts become 
meaningful to the student, and via the introduction of textbook answers to those 
exercises, which are granted a considerable level of authority, the student gains a 
sense of whether or not their interpretation and use of such concepts is considered 
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 An easier-to-comprehend example is Barnes’ (1981) illustration of dogs; the finite cases that 
Johnny’s father would show him to identify dogs could be big dogs (for example an Alsatian, 
Rottweiler, or a Great Dane) or small dogs (for example Yorkshire Terriers, Pekinese or Chihuahua).  
All examples, however, represent the class “dog”, and each exemplar would serve to change Johnny’s 
conception of what a “dog” is. 
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“correct” by the community of physicists.  Barry Barnes summed up Kuhn’s work 
thus: 
Just as competence with regard to ‘duck’ involves familiarity with a finite 
cluster of instances of ‘duck’, so competence with, say, ‘compound’, or 
‘force’, or ‘speed’, involves familiarity with a finite cluster of problem 
solutions (paradigms, exemplars) wherein the use (and thus the ‘meaning’) of 
the terms is directly displayed.  And just as consideration of the finite cluster 
that is the similarity relation ‘duck’ leads to a finitist account of its use, so 
can consideration of the finite cluster of exemplars associated with physical 
concepts establish how finitism properly describes the use of concepts in 
physics (Barnes 1982: 36). 
 
Likewise, Warwick and Kaiser (2005) have outlined a model based upon the work of 
Kuhn that explains scientific and medical training.  For a medical case study drawing 
upon their method, see Sturdy (2007a).  Finitism, therefore, does not only provide the 
analyst with a way to explain how people learn language, but also provides an 
explanation for the way that scientists and medical practitioners learn to perform 
their highly sophisticated work.  The learning of classification and concept 
applications does not end with training, however, and I will expand on this in the 
following section. 
2.4.2 Concept Application 
The previous discussion of training served to start an account of the way that an 
individual actually classifies phenomena, be it an object or a situation.  Kuhn’s 
illustration identified that a neophyte is first ostensively taught the correct name for a 
phenomenon, then attempts to generalise from the particular case that they observed 
to new cases and is either corrected or praised; either way, their internal 
classificatory system is amended.  At some point, the community determines that the 
practitioner has adequately mastered their paradigm, and labels that practitioner 
“competent”.  However, being determined competent does not necessarily guarantee 
that practitioners are capable of making classifications without difficulty.  This stems 
from the fact that classifications are essentially judgements, based upon what 
members of the “Strong Programme” call a “similarity relation”, i.e. the similarity 
between object x (the new object to be classified) and a person’s pre-existing 
categories y and z (made up of previous exemplars).  When a person makes a 
classification, therefore, they make a judgement about the closeness of the fit of the 
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new phenomenon with the previously observed phenomena.  The discrimination of a 
swan or a goose requires a comparison of new and known: a judgement on whether 
the new bird looks more similar to the previous geese or the previous swans that the 
person has seen.   
An assertion of resemblance therefore, which is what the application of a 
concept amounts to in this case, involves that the similarities outweigh 
differences.  But there is no scale for the weighting of similarity against 
difference given in the nature of external reality, or inherent in the nature of 
the mind…  All applications of ‘dog’ involve the contingent judgement that 
similarity outweighs difference in that case (Barnes 1981: 309 emphasis in 
original). 
 
The claim that all classifications are judgements has significant implications; some of 
these I will address presently.  The most important point to note is that as 
classifications are judgements, and (as the quotation makes clear) “there is no scale 
for the weighting of similarity against difference given in the nature of external 
reality”, all of our classifications are ultimately social conventions.
48
  It is the 
relevant social community (not nature itself) that determines what counts as the 
appropriate classification; hence, Johnny’s father (who was considered a competent 
classifier) corrected Johnny when Johnny’s classification was not the same as that of 
the rest of the community, or, to use Wittgenstein’s language, “as we do it” 
(Wittgenstein 1968: 145).  A correct act of classification such as labelling a natural 
object is correct only by virtue of its acceptability by other members of the relevant 
community, and that acceptability derives from whether it fits with the classifications 
of other members of the community, i.e. whether the individual is classifying an 
object in the same manner as the community “do it”. 
 With the argument that classifications are conventional, it follows that they 
must be open-ended and revisable (Barnes et al. 1996).  Consider the case of the 
practitioner who has already been trained and is considered a competent classifier by 
a community.  Is it the case, as Barnes et al. ask, that such a practitioner is capable of 
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 It is necessary here to make clear that, by social conventions, Barnes and the other members of the 
Strong Programme are not stating that such classifications are imaginary, or that they have no 
relationship to the real world; this is vital for the reader to understand.  Barnes and others are realist in 
that they argue quite convincingly that there is an existing real world which has an effect on our 
existence, i.e. it constrains us etc.; however, it is our descriptions of the real world that are 
conventional and relative to our current circumstance (see Barnes 1983, Barnes et al. 1996, Bloor 
1999, 2006). 
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carrying on with classification without any difficulty?  If we accept the basic tenets 
of finitism, then this is not always the case; the classificatory schema is based on a 
previously observed, finite collection of cases and so a new case can always pose 
difficulties to that schema.
49
  It may be a new class of object that the individual has 
not experienced before, or it may be an object that is highly similar to two distinct 
previously observed classes.  Barnes (1981) invites the reader to consider two 
competent classifiers from the same community, who observe the same object but 
classify it differently: one classifies the object as “dog”, as it has greatest similarity 
to previous dogs that they have observed, while the other classifier labels the object 
“cat”, as it is similar to their previous experience of cats.  In the final analysis, the 
“correct” classification (i.e. what the object “actually is”) constitutes the 
classification that the others in the community agree with, but, of course, such a 
determination is open to revision in the future.  Bloor provides an illustration of how 
a new case could undermine the community’s existing classificatory arrangement, 
which also displays the inter-relatedness of the schema.  
Imagine a very primitive system of classification where it is said that ‘fish’ 
live in the sea; ‘birds’ fly in the air; and various classes of ‘animal’ live on 
the land.  Of the land animals a sub-group of ‘mammals’ has been 
discriminated on the grounds that they suckle their young…  Suppose now 
that the users of this network come into contact with a new creature, say, the 
whale.  This has the habitat and appearance of a huge fish but suckles its 
young – facts which could be established by the routine use of the labels of 
the network (Bloor 1982: 273-4) 
 
The new case, the whale, problematises the community’s classificatory scheme in 
that it lives in the sea, and so is most similar to the class of animals that the 
community call fish, but is also similar to a sub-set of the land-based animal 
population, mammals, which suckle their young.  The discovery leads to necessary 
adjustments to the classificatory schema, in that the community have to accept either 
that some fish also suckle their young, or that mammals are not just land-based 
animals.  This finding, which could jeopardise earlier acts of classification, 
demonstrates the inter-relatedness of the scheme; the introduction of the whale has 
an effect upon both the animal and fish groups, leading the community to determine 
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 This, of course, is not a new claim and is a direct descendant of the philosopher David Hume’s 
“Problem of Induction” (Hume 1984). 
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whether the whale resembles a fish or an animal, resulting in a significant 
amendment to both groups.  We can understand the cognitive schema, therefore, as a 
network of classes of phenomena where a change to one class has a “rippling” effect 
through the network and affects the other classes as well (each correct classification 
of a swan, for example, provides further grounds for discrimination). 
 Having outlined the main arguments supporting finitism, I will now 
summarise its main tenets: 
1) The future applications of a term are open-ended. (All classifications are 
ultimately judgement calls.) 
2) No act of classification is ever indefeasibly correct. (There is no natural 
determination for one classification being more suitable than another.) 
3) All acts of classification are revisable. (It follows that all classifications may 
be revised in the future.) 
4) Successive applications of a kind term are not independent. (Each new case 
provides a new exemplar, adding to the practitioner’s existing compilation.) 
5) The applications of different kind terms are not independent of each other. 
(Each class in a schema relates to the others by being different from them; an 
evaluation of resemblance concerns the practitioner determining whether or 
not the object in question is similar to other objects in the list.  Amendments 
to one of the kind terms can result in changes to the entire network.) (Barnes 
et al. 1996). 
These tenets not only provide a conceptual framework to help explain how FMEs 
make classifications, but also explain how FMEs generate evidence and maintain that 
evidence as credible.  I do not wish to pre-empt my discussion in the following 
chapters, but I will briefly outline how these tenets fit the argument that follows.  In 
Chapter One, I drew upon the work of STS scholars who argued that fact-creation is 
the result of community consensus; this fits closely with the finitist argument that the 
determination of the nature of an object does not derive from an external source 
(nature, for example) but is instead an achievement of the community, and new cases 
can always challenge that interpretation, requiring the community to police itself 
regularly, or alter its classification.  Moreover, it is only via the use of exercises and 
the gathering of examples and cases that practitioners know the correct work praxis.  
 57 
Both of these arguments will be at the heart of the following chapters and my 
explanation of the ways that FMEs perform medical examinations and make the 
generated evidence credible. 
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3. Forensic Training and the Disciplining of a 
Trainee’s Vision 
 
This chapter will investigate the process by which practicing medical doctors are 
trained to become FMEs, focusing in particular on the way that they learn to classify 
injuries of medico-legal significance.  While all medical doctors are able to speak 
competently on medical pathology, with greater or lesser specificity (depending on 
their particular specialism), most doctors are not considered forensic medical experts.  
Doctors granted the status of FME are distinct from their medical colleagues; the 
latter may also perform medical examinations of sexual assault victims within 
hospitals (and be asked to provide evidence at a potential future trial), but are not 
considered forensic medical experts.  The distinguishing factor is the education and 
training undertaken by the novice FME.  During training, the FME is taught how to 
identify and interpret injuries of medico-legal significance, in accordance with the 
agreed classifications of the forensic medical community.  A successful assimilation 
of the community-agreed classifications means that the trainee FME has mastered the 
community’s paradigm.  The extent to which the trainee has done so is assessed by 
FMEs via determinations of the trainee’s “competence” and “safety”.  As part of 
training and the gathering of postgraduate qualifications, the trainee is examined, 
which (it is suggested by FMEs) helps to impress upon the court in any future trials 
that the medical expert providing testimony has been appropriately educated and 
tested.  While this is true, such examinations also serve the purpose of assessing 
whether or not the trainee’s perception, cognition and practice has been disciplined to 
fit with the rest of the FME community (meaning that they would be unlikely to 
bring the FME community into disrepute). 
In this chapter, I will investigate the processes of developing forensic medical 
competence: the shadowing process and the attainment of the postgraduate 
qualification.  Particular emphasis will be placed upon the role of authority in the 
determination of correct acts of classification, and the way that the dissemination of a 
shared vision by way of both training and determining “safety” serves to develop the 
credibility of the individual practitioner, and also maintain the authority of the entire 
FME community. 
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3.1 An overview of the shadowing and qualification 
procedures 
Trainee FMEs come from a variety of medical specialisms.  In my sample, the FMEs 
had previously worked as GPs, Forensic Pathologists, Community Gynaecologists 
and Community Paediatricians.  It was thought that the trainees’ pooling of their 
varied experience (in cases where several novice FMEs were training at the same 
time) was useful for new FMEs, as this pool of shared experience could rectify any 
deficiencies in an individual’s knowledge.  As Dr. A explained: 
We did a good thing because hers [a fellow new FME’s background] was 
general medicine and mine was gynae [gynaecology], so we just 
complemented each other.  She would tell me about the medicine side, if I 
needed something, and she would with the gynae side [ie. I would tell her], so 
we complemented each other very well (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Coming to the field of clinical forensic work with significant previous medical 
experience was considered highly beneficial, as it could enable sharing of 
information and experience with other neophyte practitioners.  Moreover, it could 
inform the future forensic practice of the individual examiner.  As Dr. A again put it 
during a discussion regarding the empathy of doctors: 
But I find that two or three of these guys are so nice and the victim, once the 
victim have met them, they’ve changed their mind, and that’s okay, and I 
think the police will say “I’ve seen him, I’ve met him, he’s really nice” and 
most of them are, because they are full-time GPs, they are used to seeing 
people and dealing.  I think that’s why I feel that this is one field I don’t feel 
this [clinical forensic medicine] is ideal for somebody finishing their training 
and coming into it.  I think you have to have a well defined experience, then 
you can go into court, stand up and say “Look, in my experience, I’ve done 
this, dah-dah-dah, and that’s why I have come to this conclusion”; so to have 
that I think mid-thirties to early forties would be the right time (Dr. A, 
female, Constabulary 1). 
 
A trainee’s previous medical experience can provide them with the appropriate skills 
for dealing with vulnerable and emotional patients, as well as a basis on which to 
justify their evaluations of cases.
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  On the other hand, an extensive previous 
experience is not, in itself, sufficient qualification for a candidate to become an FME; 
                                               
50 A recent advertisement for new FMEs suggested that the skills necessary for a successful FME are 
“great listening skills, warmth, humanity but ability to be scientific in assessing an account, 
thoroughness in examinations and documentation, clarity in statement writing, and confidence when 
presenting in court.” (White 2007) 
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the neophyte must undergo a period of apprenticeship under an experienced FME 
and gain a postgraduate qualification. 
 The apprenticeship, or shadowing, is a period of time during which the 
initiate follows an experienced examiner and observes them in their performance of 
their various functions, including sexual assault examinations.
 51
  Following this 
period, roles are reversed and the experienced examiner observes the initiate, 
reviewing the novice’s practice and correcting if necessary.  While the initiate is 
shadowing, they compile a casebook in which they note the specifics of observed 
cases as well as anything encountered that is new to them.
52
  The casebook enables 
the trainer to keep track of the types of phenomena, or cases, which are missing from 
the trainee’s experience.  Shadowing continues until the trainer believes the initiate is 
of a suitable standard to work competently on their own, or conversely, that the 
novice is unsuitable for FME work. 
During the period when the novice is undergoing the apprenticeship, they are 
also expected to research the medical expert’s function within the legal system.  This 
research has been consolidated within the “Diploma in Forensic Medical Sciences” 
(hereafter “DFM”) that is offered by the Division of Cancer Sciences and Molecular 
Pathology at the University of Glasgow
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 and examined by The Worshipful Society 
of Apothecaries of London.  The DFM is run as a part-time evening course in 
Glasgow, and provides attendees with a “theoretical knowledge of the basic facts and 
principles of all forms of medico-legal enquiry and the reasons for the form of that 
enquiry” (The Worshipful Society of Apothecaries of London 2007a: 6).  The course 
covers a broad range of medical as well as legal topics (modules range from basic 
“human anatomy and physiology” to more complex matters of jurisprudence such as 
the module “Procurator Fiscal and sudden deaths”), and all who attend receive a 
Certificate of Attendance.  Those with a Certificate of Attendance are then eligible to 
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 The forensic medical apprenticeship does not only cover sexual assault examinations; it also 
provides experience that can be drawn on in other aspects of the FME’s job.  These include (among 
other things) examinations for “fitness to be interviewed”, “fitness to be detained” and other forms of 
assault.  As the focus of my research is the forensic medical examination of sexual assault 
complainers, I will not touch on these other forms of examination here. 
52 For a discussion of the politics of medical case notes (focusing upon sexological cases) see Crozier 
(2008). 
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 A similar course has recently opened in St. Bartholomew’s Hospital and the London Queen Mary’s 
School of Medicine and Dentistry. 
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take the examination, which comprises a 6,000 – 10,000 word dissertation on one of 
the topics covered and a three-hour examination covering the medical, legal, 
scientific and toxicological aspects of the forensic medical sciences.  Increasingly, 
while the course and the qualification are still available, new FMEs often choose to 
attend the course but not apply for the examination.  This is because the DFM course 
serves as good preparation for Part I of the DMJ. 
The DMJ is the preferred qualification of FMEs: 
I think you need to have a qualification that makes you show the courts that 
you, that you have been through the mill and have developed some sort of 
specialisation/expertise, and the only qualification that I think fits that is the 
Diploma in Medical Jurisprudence, or the Society of Apothecaries, that has 
been going on since year dot (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
The DMJ, which is also examined by the Worshipful Society of Apothecaries, is 
constituted by two parts: Part I concerns theoretical knowledge, Part II practical 
expertise.
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  While Part I takes place at the same time as shadowing (in place of the 
DFM), Part II occurs (up to) three years after the trainee has been determined a 
competent practitioner by their trainer and started to perform medical examinations 
independently.  During Part II the practitioner specialises into her particular area; this 
can either be in clinical forensic medicine (D.M.J. Clin), forensic pathology (D.M.J. 
Path) or forensic dentistry (D.M.J. Odont).  The Part II clinical examination consists 
of the submission of a casebook of ten cases completed individually by the FME, two 
written examinations and an oral examination. 
It’s [DMJ] two exams, part one and part two.  Part one is a theoretical 
examination where you really have to learn the law, know the books about 
forensic medical work, and part two is a practical where… if you are a 
clinician, you have to look at photographs, look at reports and give your 
opinion on those (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
While there is a separation in time between the apprenticeship and Part II of the 
DMJ, I prefer, for analytical purposes, not to separate the disparate aspects of an 
FME’s training, as there are common themes in the separate (yet dependent) training 
procedures.  To this end, the analysis in this chapter will be thematic rather than 
chronologic.  In the next section, I will discuss the role of the experienced examiner, 
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 It used to be the case that practitioners holding the DFM were exempted from Part I of the DMJ as 
this was considered equivalent; however, since March 2006, exemptions have been withdrawn and so 
practitioners are choosing not to sit the DFM examination, but instead the DMJ Part I. 
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textbooks, and the part that exercises play in learning to identify and classify signs of 
pathology.  This will be followed, in a later section, by a discussion of the way that 
initiates are examined and come to be classed as competent examiners (the forensic 
medical casebook will be discussed in the latter section).  In all of these discussions, 
I wish to emphasise the importance of authority and community.  I will commence 
with injury identification. 
3.2 Learning to classify injuries 
3.2.1 Observing injuries during the shadowing process 
The aim of the period of apprenticeship is for the trainee FME to develop experience: 
experience of the types of cases they will be expected to deal with in their own work, 
and experience of the kinds of injuries that are generally of medico-legal 
significance. 
And I think, shadowing seems to be at the moment a big part for any job and 
this is where most of the experience comes, and I think in shadowing, saying, 
you know, how many have you seen and how many (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1). 
 
When a complainer undergoes an examination, the trainer points out any injuries to 
the trainee, explains the injury type that they represent and explains how they were 
produced.  This process is a continuation of more general forms of medical training, 
by which a teacher educates the vision of an undergraduate medical student.  In some 
cases of undergraduate medical training, the best students are taken to the mortuary 
to observe examples of injuries upon dead bodies, and are informed of the injury’s 
type and how it came to be made.  The experienced FME behaves similarly with her 
trainee during the apprenticeship, except using the live bodies of complainers 
instead. 
You can do a lot of teaching from a single lesion, you can, it doesn’t matter if 
this injury is from a dead body or a living person, you can focus the interests 
of the students, of postgraduate trainees of course, on these reconstructive 
aspects.  How can, might this have happened? What would you expect if 
someone falls to the ground?  What, which injuries?  So we have a physical 
assault, these persons are often examined by a clinical, by the forensic, by the 
FMEs, and you must ask yourself, well the accused says he hit the table when 
he fell to the floor and is this consistent?  So you can ask the same question 
on a body and that is most interesting, it is not that there’s a laceration and 
you take the details of this laceration, but it’s not the main question to take 
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details; details may be important when you have got a tool or item which was 
involved, a hammer or something else, but just to get into a different way of 




As well as the description and cause, Dr D’s quotation focuses on the process of 
“thinking dynamically” about the injury (i.e. what does the injury tell the FME about 
the case being examined?).  The novice experiences injury types as coupled with the 
history of the case, whether observed in the mortuary or while watching their trainer 
performing a sexual assault examination.  The FME’s role is to assess whether the 
physical evidence is consistent with one account or another; as Dr. D suggests, it is 
not enough to describe the injury, or even to produce a potential mechanism for its 
production.  Their role is to judge whether the injury corroborates one or another of 
the accounts offered in the case. 
Although the process of “thinking dynamically” is a part of this first 
shadowing phase, the trainee’s actual role at this stage is simply to observe the more 
experienced practitioner and develop experience; this includes a development of their 
own collection of injuries and potential causes.  There are two corollaries of this.  
First, it would be very rare, if at all possible, for the trainee to challenge their trainer 
on their conclusion regarding the type and cause of injuries; such an argument echoes 
Barry Barnes’ (1982) exegesis of Thomas Kuhn’s work, where Barnes described 
scientific training thus: 
Scientific training is dogmatic and authoritarian, and it is hard to see how it 
could be otherwise.  Since the neophyte initially lacks the competences and 
concepts of the scientific culture, he cannot evaluate it or criticise it in its own 
terms.  He has to be regarded more or less as an apprentice… Even his 
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 I discuss the manner in which an FME records injuries in my section on the process of conducting a 
forensic medical examination in the next chapter. 
56
 While Kuhn, and latterly Barnes use the words “dogmatic” and “authoritarian”, they do not intend 
to use these pejoratively.  Barnes continues: 
Many theories of knowledge are morality plays set in a Manichaean cosmos.  The source of 
light is experience; its agent ‘reason’.  The source of darkness is culture; its agent authority.  
The remaining dramatis personae are garbed according to their origins.  Truth, validity, 
rationality, objectivity are to be seen among the many white-apparelled children of the light; 
error and irrationality, custom, convention, dogma and many others are dressed in black.  The 
moving principle of the drama is the unremitting conflict of the two opposed and 
irreconcilable forces…  Kuhn, however, is no Manichaean.  At no point does his work 
suggest any conflict between culture and experience, authority and ‘reason’ (Barnes 1982: 
22/23 emphasis in original). 
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The second corollary is that as the trainee is required to increase their experience of 
types of injuries and cases, they are expected to drop everything and attend sexual 




Ours isn’t a field where we can say to this one [trainee], “Oh yes, this 
afternoon, come in we’ve got this.”  No we don’t, we may get a case, we may 
not get a case, and luckily so, the people who are come to be seen [trainees] 
are said to them, you are to be prepared to come at the last minute, whether 
you are on-call or not, because that is the only way you are going to learn.  
For two or three weeks I might not examine anyone for rape, and then 
suddenly one day I have three or four, so this, it’s feast or famine (Dr. A, 
female, Constabulary 1). 
 
The trainee, if they wish to acquire increased levels of experience, must enter into an 
exchange with the trainer.  The trainer guarantees the movement of knowledge and 
experience (in this case, the labelling of particular types of injuries, as well as what 
they look like and how they were produced) from themselves to the trainee.  In 
exchange, the apprentice becomes subordinate: the trainee agrees to attend whenever 
called and accepts the classifications made by the trainer without question.
58
 
3.2.2 Observing injuries during the DFM/Part I of the DMJ 
While the FME is shadowing their trainer, they are also expected to be preparing 
either for the DFM or, more frequently, for Part I of the DMJ.  As already explained, 
the aim of both these examinations is to provide a baseline knowledge for all forensic 
practitioners, covering both the varied nature of forensic medicine and science and 
the legal contexts in which the practitioners will be working in due course.  While 
there are many aspects of the DFM/Part I of the DMJ, I will illustrate this aspect of 
the training process by focusing upon the way in which this course provides the 
trainee with experience of injuries and their mechanisms.  To this end, the DFM 
course has developed modules devoted to “Injuries and their Interpretation”, “Major 
Trauma”, “Specific Injuries: Gunshot/Head Injuries” and “Sexual Offences” 
(Worshipful Society of Apothecaries 2007a).  These modules are carried out using a 
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 The trainee records all-new clinical experiences in a casebook; I will discuss this in Section 3.3.1. 
58
 Such an analysis is consistent with Foucault’s (1977) descriptions of apprenticeships and schools.  
See also Warwick and Kaiser’s (2005) analysis of Foucault. 
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combination of lectures and self-directed learning, mostly focused around textbooks.  
Both lectures and textbooks make copious use of injury photographs. 
Yes, the Glasgow DFM – Diploma of Forensic Medicine, so that was lecture-
based, one evening a week, an hour’s lecture with illustrations (Dr. B, male, 
Constabulary 2). 
 
As with the first phase of the shadowing process, the injuries in the photographs 
offered in the lectures and textbooks are described and then explained in terms of a 
causal mechanism.  For instance, the textbook recommended for the “Sexual 
Offences” module, The Color Atlas of Sexual Assault (Girardin et al. 1997), contains 
221 illustrations of injuries (over 200 photographs; the remainder are anatomical 
diagrams) found upon actual sexual assault complainers.  Due to the importance of 
this textbook as a pedagogical tool, I will discuss it briefly.   
The textbook commences with anatomical diagrams of the male and female 
anal and genital regions, including representations of adolescent development.  This 
is followed by a chapter showing magnified photographs of the genital, anal and oral 
areas of sexual assault victims, emphasising injuries found in those regions.  Chapter 
Three contains photographs of complainers whose ano-genital-oral abnormalities,
59
 
including injuries, are judged to have been caused by other processes; for example, 
infections, surgery, and what the authors call “other variations” such as incorrectly-
inserted tampons.  The photographs in Chapter Three are offered as a comparison to 
the photographs of the previous chapter, and enable the reader to experience the 
differences between injuries caused by “other variations” and those that are 
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 Methodologically, I feel it is important to use the word “abnormal” and its derivations, as this is the 
language of my actors; however, it must be used with significant caution.  On the one hand the extent 
to which FMEs can talk about normal versus abnormal or pathological female genitalia is unclear; 
Lloyd et al. (2005) purport that there is only a small collection of studies that have systematically 
studied “normal” female genitalia, and they found that there is “greater diversity than previously 
documented relating to labial and clitoral size, colour and rugosity, vaginal length and urethral 
position” (Lloyd et al. 2005: 645).  Given such diversity, is it applicable to situate normal female 
genitalia?  It is intriguing, given this argument, that Girardin et al. choose to use an anatomical 
diagram to represent normal genitalia, when they use photographs for their other examples.  Some 
may argue that as modern textbooks use photographs of real genitalia, such diversity will be passed 
onto the student reading the text.  In response to this claim, I would flag up the work of Moore and 
Clarke (1995), who argue that all genital representations (illustrations, computer simulations and 
photographs) contain implicit values (most commonly patriarchal) and editorial judgements, and so 
anatomical representations are actively constructed (I will explore some of the processes of such 
construction shortly) and therefore not neutral representations of reality.  The extent of the diversity 
shown by photographs is certainly up for debate.  While I will continue to use the language of my 
respondents, it will be used critically. 
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representative of sexual assaults.  Chapter Four provides a description of what the 
authors consider “best practice” with regard to the care of the complainer, and 
Chapter Five contains a set of exercises to enable the reader to test what they have 
learnt.
60
  The authors of the textbook suggest that it is “a crucial visual aid in the 
examination of patients who report having been sexually assaulted” (Girardin et al. 
1997: vii); not only can it act as a reference point for the already practicing FME, but 
it also serves as a valuable resource for the trainee (as viewing photographic 
representations of an injury can stand as a proxy for actually viewing the injury type 
itself, if that particular type of injury/assault does not manifest during shadowing – in 
addition, viewing these images can provide further examples of already observed 
injury types).  The textbook can provide such experience to the trainee because its 
compilation was based on a set of conventions (Law and Lynch 1988, 1999, see also 
Lynch 1985).  I will discuss these next. 
One of the first things to note regarding the construction of the Color Atlas of 
Sexual Assault (and, in fact, any form of textbook or field guide) is that the 
photographs used as exemplars for a phenomenon (in this case genital injuries) have 
been specifically chosen in order to limit complexity for the reader.  As such, the 
photographs chosen are the “best” available out of all the photographs that are 
considered to demonstrate a particular genital injury, with “best” approximating to 
the clarity with which a particular injury can be observed.  The first thing to note 
about this process of experiencing injuries via photographs is that the examples that 
best exemplify the injury are chosen by the authors; one problem with this, of course, 
is that these injuries may not appear with such clarity during an FME’s work.  The 
second convention that textbook compilers employ in order to educate the reader 
about a particular natural phenomenon is the use of arrows.  In the case of the Color 
Atlas of Sexual Assault, the authors used white lines running from the top of an 
injury to its end.  Such lines serve to draw the eye of the reader to the phenomenon 
described and emphasised by the authors.  To this end, the observer of the 
photograph does not focus upon the entirety of the genitalia shown, but rather the 
small fraction emphasised by the lines. 
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 I will discuss these exercises in detail in the following section. 
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In addition to the use of arrows to focus the reader’s observation, each 
photograph also has a caption explaining exactly what the reader is looking at.  These 
captions provide the trainee with an explanation equivalent to that given by their 
trainer during shadowing, which is granted the same authority.  As the textbook was 
advocated by the Worshipful Society of Apothecaries to prepare trainees for the 
examination (as well as FME work), it carries the authority of that institution.  
Furthermore, the authors of the Color Atlas of Sexual Assault make clear in their 
introduction that the photographs exemplify the knowledge base of the community of 
FMEs, and that all of the authors have been “frequently… called as expert witnesses 
in litigated cases of sexual assault” (Girardin et al. 1997: vii), thus imbuing the text 
with their own individual expertise.  To this end, as with the pronouncements of the 
trainer, the trainee accepts the classifications and inferences that she encounters in 
the label under each photograph.
61
  As can be seen in the two following examples, 
each caption provides a description of the injury observed in terms of its type and 
location, and then a proposed mechanism for its cause: 
FIGURE 2-8 Labia minora tear (x15)
62
.  Bilateral linear lacerations [injury 
type] on lateral margin of the labia minora [location] from nonconsensual 
penile vaginal penetration in a supine position [proposed cause].  Redness 
[injury type] on the right at 7 o’clock to 9 o’clock [location].  Lacerations 
result from the force of the unlubricated, penetrating object pushing the labial 
tissue inward [proposed cause].  The patient is a white 15 year old (Girardin 
et al. 1997: 28). 
 
As can be seen from the last sentence of this quotation, in addition to the details of 
the injury, the captions also provide some context about the complainer (age and 
race); some figures also addressed the outcome of the investigation: 
FIGURE 2-27 Ecchymosis of the gums [injury type] from the frenulum 
extending left [location] (x10).  There is hypervascularity [injury type] of the 
lower lip [location] that was absent on the follow-up.  The frenulum is red 
and intact.  That patient is a white 26 year old who had nonconsensual oral 
copulation while sitting [probable cause].  The perpetrator was a masked 
stranger who pushed into her house and threatened her with his knife.  He 
asked her to disrobe, there was no vaginal nor anal penetration.  OUTCOME: 
Suspect was a serial rapist who is in jail, pending trial (Girardin et al. 1997: 
39). 
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 For a history of the construction of scientific atlases, particularly the relationship between image 
and text, see Daston and Gallison (1992, 2007). 
62
 This number represents the level of magnification used in the photograph. 
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There is little difference, therefore, between trainers and textbooks (and for that 
matter, photographs in lectures) in the training of FMEs.  The authors of textbooks 
(or lecturers) decide on the photographs that would be of interest to the trainee or 
demonstrate an injury type particularly well; this is similar to particular injuries of 
interest being pointed out by a trainer during the first stage of shadowing.  When the 
trainer points out an injury during shadowing, they also explain the nature of the 
injury and the inferences that can be drawn from it.  Likewise, each photograph in a 
textbook carries a label providing the same information.  The trainee accepts the 
label as authoritative (as with the pronouncements of her trainer), because the 
community of FMEs (via the body of the Worshipful Society of Apothecaries) have 
advocated that the book should be used by trainees, and because the authors set out 
their own credentials in the introduction.  As such, in reading the book (or viewing 
the photographs in a lecture), the trainee gains further experience of injuries, as well 
as related inferences considered appropriate by the community of FMEs. 
 While the above descriptions set out the manner by which trainee FMEs gain 
experience of different types of injuries (i.e. by observing them during both the 
apprenticeship and/or in textbooks), I have yet to outline how the neophyte learns to 
differentiate between different types of injuries and their mechanisms, or to put it 
another way, how the neophyte develops their own classificatory schema.  Whether 
by shadowing, lectures, textbooks, or most often a combination of all three, the 
knowledge and inferences transferred to the trainee are those of the contemporary 
forensic medical community.  The first thing to note about this statement is that the 
process is social: it is not nature, or the body of the complainer by itself, that imposes 
upon the learner the appropriate way in which the injury types should be classified; 
instead, it is the community of practitioners who provide the parameters by which 
phenomena should be grouped and labelled.  As Barnes states: 
Nature does not mind how we make clusters from the vast array of 
similarities and differences we are able to discern in it: all that is required of 
such clusters is that they constitute a tolerable basis for further usage.  The 
clusters are conventions: the similarity relations which concepts stand for are 
conventions (Barnes 1982: 24). 
 
The inferences that the trainee learns to consider appropriate do not, therefore, 
constitute the only way in which these injuries could be classified.  They are merely 
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the groupings considered correct by one particular social group, in this case the 
community of FMEs.
63
  This has an impact upon the way that the schema is 
transferred to the trainee: if the trainers were solely to use words and rules to educate 
the trainee on the appropriate classification of injuries, there would be no guarantee 
that the appropriate natural object would be classified correctly; an injury which the 
community agrees is an abrasion may be identified by the trainee as a bruise, for 
example.  Further linguistic rules outlining the colour and form of the phenomena 
would be required in order to ensure correct deduction.  Following on from this, the 
trainer and trainee may disagree upon the definition of the colour purple, for 
example; this would necessitate even further linguistic refinement, resulting in what 
Barnes calls an “infinite regress” (Barnes 1982: 27).  I have already noted that 
experienced FMEs, in their training of others, do not use deductive linguistic rules to 
educate their neophytes; instead, they employ direct observation during shadowing, 
or indirect observation via photographs.  The use of photographs avoids this infinite 
regress by homogenising the vision of the trainees.  Following Kuhn (1977) and 
Barnes (1982, see also Barnes et al. 1996), I will use the label learning by ostension 
for this highly visual form of training. 
Any act whereby a direct association is directly displayed or shown or 
pointed out between an empirical event or state of affairs and a word or term 
of a language will be called an act of ostension.  Our assumption is that the 





So, when the trainer or the textbook informs the observer/reader of an injury type and 
its mechanism of production, the trainee both sees the injury and learns the 
appropriate community-ascribed concepts which relate to it.  On being ostensively 
taught that a particular wound constitutes a bruise, the trainee adds the taxonomic 
group bruise to their cognitive schema (if this is the first “bruise” they have 
encountered, this particular case of a bruise will serve as the basis for the appearance 
and significance of the injury type bruise).  As the trainee observes more bruises (i.e. 
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 Barnes et al. illustrated the community based nature of classification thus: 
The taxonomies of the biological sciences, for example, are elegantly systematized 
hierarchical orderings of classes themselves, rather than of particular things.  Hence when 
these taxonomies are applied to particulars, nobody is surprised if scientists or groups of 
scientists find themselves having to agree to differ (Barnes et al. 1996: 48). 
64
 See Chapter Two for more traditional examples of learning by ostension. 
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they are informed that the wound they are looking at is a bruise) along with other 
types of injuries, they will begin to notice the similarities and differences between 
the different wound types, and so learn to discriminate one particular class of injuries 
from another.  The classification of each individual injury amends the trainee’s 
cognitive schema, as each injury will appear different to those seen previously; the 
trainer will express to the trainee that the particular injury they are observing 
constitutes a bruise, and even though it looks different to other previously observed 
bruises, the trainee will look for similarities to those past bruises and differences 
from other injury types.  By finding these similarities and differences, the trainee 
refines their own cognitive schema. 
This process, however, is not without its problems.  Importantly, no single act 
of ostension suffices to teach the correct application; for instance, even with 
pointing/arrows, can it be assured that the observer/reader is actually looking at the 
same thing as the trainer/authors?  Moreover, do observed objects only have one 
potential classification?  This is particularly relevant to mechanisms of injury.  It is 
not correct to say that just because the ostensively-taught black eye is the result of a 
punch, it follows that all black eyes must be caused by punches.
65
  Given these 
problems, the inter-relation of shadowing and self-directed learning via textbooks 
serves to increase the quantity of acts of ostension, and thereby provides the FME 
with numerous experiences of injuries.  This, in turn, allows the trainee to refine their 
classificatory schema and gives them greater and more useful criteria for future use 
in distinguishing between injury types and causes.  However, such learning is not the 
result of passive ostensive learning alone; it is also active. 
3.2.3 Exercises 
Shadowing, and self-directed learning using textbooks, both involve the performance 
of exercises by the trainee in order to test what they have learnt.  So as to help 
explain the importance of exercises to an FME’s professional development, I will 
commence my discussion with a continued analysis of The Color Atlas of Sexual 
Assault.  Chapter Five of the book contains a collection of case histories and forensic 
medical photographs taken from actual cases.  The purpose of the chapter is to 
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 I will discuss this further in Chapter Four. 
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provide a collection of exercises so that the reader can assess their own progress.  
The trainee looks at the photographs, having studied the account offered in the case 
history, and: a) labels the injuries; b) identifies the age of the injuries; and c) 
concludes whether or not the injuries are consistent with the account offered by the 
complainer in the case history.  For instance, in the first case presented: 
History: A 29-year-old sexually active Caucasian female clerk came to the 
emergency department 5 hours postassault.  She was on a date with a male 
friend in a hotel room.  They were drinking beer and watching cable 
television.  She denied having had consensual intercourse with him.  At 5 
AM, he awoke and attacked her, restraining her by his weight and with his 
arms.  He forced her legs apart and bruised her legs with the grip of his 
fingers.  While lying supine and on her side, he penetrated her vaginally with 
his penis and fingers, “two or three times”.  He unsuccessfully attempted 
rectal penetration with his penis.  He licked her breasts and the left side of her 
neck, and kissed her lips and breasts, saying, “Tell me you love me.”  During 
the examination, she complained of pain in her thighs and head pain. 
Laboratories:
66
 Rapid plasma regain (RPR) (nonreactive); Chlamydia 
trachomatis (negative); Neisseria gonorhea (negative); human chorionic 
gonadotropin (HCG) (negative) 
Photographs: On examination you find the following: 
1. External genitalia (Figure 5-1) (x15) 
2. External genitalia, after Toludine Blue dye application and 
decoloration (Figure 5-2) (x15) 
Conclusion: The physical findings (are/are not) consistent with the history 
and timing of the reported assault (Girardin et al. 1997: 130 emphasis in 
original). 
 
The photographs in question show various abnormalities, which the reader is meant 
to compare with the complainer’s account offered in the history and the examples 
encountered in the previous chapters.  They are supposed to label the abnormalities 
and construct potential causes, assess their age, and finally, conclude whether or not 
they are consistent with the proffered account.  Once these conclusions have been 
drawn, the reader turns the page to find out if their conclusions fit with how the case 
was actually reported.  The assumption is that the closer the match between the 
reader’s conclusions and the actual findings, the better. 
Actual findings and outcome 
Findings on Photographs: 
1. Laceration of the posterior fourchette; swelling and redness of the 
labia minora from 3 o’clock to 9 o’clock (Figure 5-3) 
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 In Scotland this information is never actually sent to FMEs. 
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2. Distinct Toludine Blue dye uptake confirming the laceration of the 
posterior fourchette; dye uptake from 3 o’clock to 9 o’clock on the 
labia minora indicates an abrasion of the labia minora extending to the 
posterior fourchette (Figure 5-4) 
Actual Conclusion:  The findings are consistent with the history and timing 
of the forceful penile vaginal penetration (Girardin et al. 1997: 132). 
 
In this example, the actual finding explains what should have been inferred by the 
reader: the injury types and their causes, as well as the conclusion that these findings 
are consistent with the complainer’s account.
67
  The normative assessment of the 
reader’s conclusions further illustrates the dogmatic nature of the training.  In such 
an uncertain and subjective area as the question of whether or not physical evidence 
appears consistent with the complainer’s account, there could be significant room for 
different interpretations of morphology.  However, the social milieu in which the 
trainee, textbook and forensic medical community exist results in equal authority 
being placed upon the labels and results of the textbook and the human trainer of the 
novice FME.  To this end, if the trainee classifies the cases in the exercises 
differently from the results found in the textbook, they are expected to disregard their 
own inferences and acquiesce in those presented within the text. 
 This description of exercises in a forensic medical textbook is similar to 
Kuhn’s description of textbook use in the training of physics students.  Kuhn (1977) 
noted that while students claimed to understand the text of a textbook chapter, they 
encountered difficulties when attempting to answer the end-of-chapter questions.  
These problems tended to disappear as soon as the trainee was able to recognise the 
similarities between the question they were answering and the given solution in the 
chapter.  After completing numerous exercises, the neophyte recognised the 
similarities between the new question and those previously attempted, and was more 
likely to answer the question in agreement with the answer in the textbook.  This 
process disciplines the trainee’s vision to that of other members of the relevant 
community, i.e. it allows the trainee to perceive and understand the world in the same 
way as other members of the field.  Problem-solving exercises, therefore, 
indoctrinate the trainee into the prevailing paradigm of the relevant community. 
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 The chapter contains photographic examples where the injuries have been classified as inconsistent 
with the case history as well (see Girardin et al. 1997). 
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Instead, these [text]books exhibit, from the very start, concrete problem 
solutions that the profession has come to accept as paradigms, and they then 
ask the student, either with a pencil or paper or in the laboratory, to solve for 
himself problems closely modelled in method and substance upon those 
through which the text has led him.  Only in elementary language instruction 
or in training a musical instrumentalist is so large or essential a use made of 
‘finger exercises’.  And those are just the fields in which the object of 
instruction is to produce with maximum rapidity strong ‘mental sets’ or 




Kuhn was, of course, discussing physics, but the outcome is the same in clinical 
forensic medicine; the trainee reads the text, and, after numerous attempts at the 
exercises, begins to see the similarities between the photographs in the previous 
chapter and those in the exercise section.  They will, over time, start to produce 
answers to the textbook exercises that match the “actual findings”.  In this way, the 
trainee’s perception and cognition is disciplined to be the same as that of their peers; 
they are indoctrinated into the paradigm.   
 As with textbooks, so with shadowing: during the second phase of the 
apprenticeship, roles are reversed and the trainer shadows the trainee while the latter 
conducts actual forensic medical examinations.  This in effect represents another set 
of exercises, as the experienced practitioner observes the trainee’s actions, 
behaviours and classifications and assesses them against the former’s own practices 
and decisions.
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  Here, the conclusion as to whether or not the trainee is correct is 
decided by the extent of the trainer’s need to revise the classifications made by the 
trainee.  The trainer does not correct at the time of the examination,
70
 but instead 
while the FME is writing up their casebook; at this time the trainer and trainee 
discuss the appropriate conclusions to be drawn from the examination.  During this 
process, the experienced practitioner might point out that the injury observed was 
(for example) not a laceration, but an incision (a very complex and often 
misclassified injury type, as I will discuss in the next chapter); or that while there 
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 Foucault (1977) also notes that exercises were initially employed by the religious group, the 
Brothers of the Common Life.  The Brothers used increasingly complex exercises as a method for 
neophytes to acquire knowledge, which in turn served as a means of developing and sharing a sense of 
community amongst initiates. 
69
 I mention actions as well as classifications, as the trainer will also be assessing the way that the 
trainee performs the examination and whether or not they are following “best practice”.  I will save 
this discussion for Chapter Six. 
70
 Doing so, I would imagine, would further distress the complainer, as it may lead them to believe 
that the examiner is not qualified. 
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may have been significant reddening, this could be consistent with consensual as 
well as non-consensual sexual intercourse.  As with the answers to the textbook 
exercises, the trainee accepts these responses unquestioningly, and either looks for 
reasons to change their classificatory schema, or is ostensively told why the injuries 
should be labelled thus.  This serves to reprogram the trainee’s perception in order to 
bring it further in line with that of the trainer.  As with the textbooks, significant 
correction may be necessary at the beginning of this secondary apprenticeship phase; 
however, with further practice, the trainee will become accustomed to viewing 
injuries in the same manner as her trainer, as well as other FMEs. 
At this juncture it is important to stress what is meant by the disciplining of 
vision to that of the existing community paradigm.  I discussed this theoretically in 
Chapter Two, and it has again been briefly touched upon in this chapter; however, as 
it is a recurring theme in both this chapter and throughout the thesis, I will briefly 
contextualise it in this context.  Essentially, the processes of ostensive learning and 
practice provide the trainee with the learned similarity relations of a particular 
community of practitioners, in this case the contemporary community of FMEs.
71
  
Through the processes of using textbooks and shadowing, the neophyte FME learns 
the correct similarities and differences between injury types and what those injuries 
represent, as accepted by the community of clinical forensic medical practitioners.  
Labelling an injury correctly during an exercise means that they have labelled it in 
the same way as would other FMEs.  Once the trainer judges that the trainee has 
performed correctly, then the trainee is said to have assimilated the paradigm and 
considered to have received the appropriate training.  An FME who is frequently 
employed as a trainer explained it thus: 
I’ve been involved with training a lot of young doctors, and our training [in] 
the last six months is very intensive before we ask the doctor to be involved 
with general aspects of the work.  If it’s, I’ve trained two doctors in the last 
year, and both of them have my mobile number, which, if they are involved 
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 I stress the temporal aspect, as during training only the current state of knowledge is transferred (not 
previously held knowledge, which may be inconsistent with contemporary knowledge). 
Nor is the science student encouraged to read the historical classics of his field – works in 
which he might encounter other ways of regarding the questions discussed in the text, but in 
which he would also meet problems, concepts, and standards of solution that his future 
profession had long-since discarded and replaced (Kuhn 1963: 350). 
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in a rape they have to come and ask me to come.
72
  In the beginning I would 
perform the examination and they were in the process of shadowing; now, 
I’m in a process of shadowing them, because I am not yet sure they are ready 
and of the prerequisite experience.  Now this will have to go on for quite 
some time, it is very time-consuming for ourselves, very tedious for me, but 
it’s very important that I don’t allow my police surgeons to be exposed to the 
stress of going to court and not being able to say that I have been properly 
trained (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
Dr. G is still unsure whether his current trainees have the requisite experience; this 
could mean that he does not yet believe that they have adequately assimilated the 
paradigm (i.e. whether they are able to discriminate appropriately between injury 
types, mechanisms, etc.).  This decision, i.e. the evaluation of whether a practitioner 
has reached adequate experience and competence, is my next focus. 
3.3 Assessing Competence 
3.3.1 Casebooks and the end of the apprenticeship 
After a number of months of shadowing of the trainee, it is likely that the 
experienced practitioner will start to consider (particularly given Dr. G’s comments 
about the process being “tedious”) whether or not the novice is close to becoming an 
independent practitioner.  While there was consensus amongst my respondents that 
trainees should be shadowed for a couple of months, it was considered that the 
trainer should base their judgement about the exact length of this process (made in 
conjunction with a team leader/training co-ordinator in some constabularies) upon 
the particular trainee. 
I think, I think they [trainees] should be shadowing for a couple of months 
minimum.  Depends on the experience of the individual and of the impression 
someone makes, sometimes they can easily get the work on their own, be a 
free examiner, whilst others need support and some of them will never learn 
it.  That’s the scope, between zero and one hundred, some of them are very 
keen, of the students and the trainees are very keen, some of them need 
training for ages.  They’ve simply got the wrong job (Dr. D, male, 
Constabulary 2). 
 
                                               
72 Due to problems with numbers of practitioners in Constabulary 3, FMEs are expected to conduct 
“fitness to be detained” and “fitness to be interviewed” examinations individually from an early point 
in their training.  When sexual assault examinations come in during the training, however, they are 
expected to call in their trainer. 
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The determination of whether or not a trainee is competent depends upon a 
combination of the trainee’s ability to learn, their previous experiences and the types 
of cases that they encounter during shadowing.  One example of a trainer making a 
judgement about the competence of their trainee, based upon the trainee’s previous 
experience, concerned an FME I interviewed.  She had previously worked as a 
Community Gynaecologist, and therefore had considerable previous experience of 
female genital pathology and the use of the colposcope.  Due to this experience, Dr. 
A was adjudicated by her trainer to be a competent practitioner, and was swiftly 
allowed to work independently. 
Some people pick up quickly and some don’t, and for me they started off with 
a rape examination, then suddenly they realised that I knew more than them, 
so after one or two they said “That’s fine, carry on” (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1). 
 
It may be considered that Dr. A’s example runs counter to my earlier argument that 
power and knowledge move unidirectionally (from the trainer to the trainee); 
however, I do not believe that this is the case.  Although Dr. A explains that her 
trainer “realised [she] knew more than them” due to her previous employment 
experience, this does not necessarily imply that any multi-direction knowledge 
transfer took place.  The above quotation does signify, however, that Dr. A was 
making the appropriate classifications and that her trainer, the authority, decided that 
she was competent enough (after a few observed attempts) to be able to perform 
those examinations independently.  The trainer still constituted the final arbiter.  
Moreover, we cannot tell from this quotation whether this signified the end of her 
training; it is unlikely that it did, as there are other aspects to being an FME of which 
Dr. A may not have had previous experience.  For instance, while she had experience 
of examining genitalia, she may not have had experience of explaining her findings 
in a legal context. 
As mentioned, there are many aspects to the training of new FMEs, and 
various phenomena with which they are expected to be familiar.  To demonstrate that 
they have this requisite experience, the novice FME keeps a casebook of all the types 
of cases that they encounter during the apprenticeship.  In the book, the trainee 
records the details of each case (with help from the trainer) in the same style that 
they will later use when required to report cases for the police, and also for Part II of 
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the DMJ (see below).  Once a month, the trainer reviews the casebook with a training 
co-ordinator.  During this review, they will evaluate what is missing from the 
trainee’s experience, the likelihood of that case/injury/procedure presenting itself in 
the near future, the trainee’s aptitude in the work, and whether or not the trainee is 
ready to work independently 
A lot of shadowing, and saying, and I’ve prepared that they [trainee] should 
keep a logbook of what they’ve seen and what they’ve done, and every 
person that’s shadowed, the trainer will sign off and then we see, and I will 
review at the end of the month and say where are the gaps and what we need 
to… And again we’ll discuss this, if we are training, three or four of us will 
be training somebody, and we’ll discuss this amongst ourselves, I will respect 
everybody, it’s not what I say goes, it’s what everybody says and if they feel 
doubts and fears, someone [trainee] does need extra, I don’t have any 
hesitation in saying to them [trainee] you’re not [ready] (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1). 
 
This meeting between the trainer(s) and the team leader/training co-ordinator 
constitutes an examination.  During the meeting, both the work of the trainee and the 
trainee’s casebook come under the supervisory gaze of the trainer(s).
73
  Trainers have 
an idea of the way that a competent examiner should behave (i.e. they know what is 
appropriate behaviour for one who has adequately mastered the paradigm), and they 
use this knowledge to judge whether or not the work of the trainee and the casebook 
have reached that standard.  If the trainee has a broad experience of the phenomena 
they will later encounter, and is classifying them appropriately, it is likely that they 
will be deemed competent and allowed to practise independently.  Conversely, if 
they have yet to experience a wide and varied range of objects of medico-legal 
significance, and/or are not acting appropriately, then they will not be judged to be a 
competent practitioner.  Therefore, this examination discriminates both qualitatively, 
in that it discerns whether or not a trainee is performing adequately, and 
quantitatively, as it assesses how soon the trainee will be ready.  It also places 
trainees in a hierarchical system based upon the similarity of the trainee’s behaviour 
to other (experienced) members of the community.
74
  This process of evaluating the 
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 The process of holding a group meeting with other trainers and a team leader is not followed in all 
Scottish constabularies.  In some cases, the trainer makes the decision independently. 
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 As Foucault (1977) put it: 
The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a 
normalizing judgement.  It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to 
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competence of the trainee FME, by means of the assessment of a casebook, continues 
after the apprenticeship as part of Part II of the DMJ. 
3.3.2 Casebooks and Part II of the DMJ 
As mentioned earlier, the DMJ is made up of two parts: Part I is the theory of 
forensic science, forensic medicine and the law; Part II is practical.  Part II is 
examined by means of a joint written and oral examination, as well as the submission 
of a casebook of ten cases completed independently by the examinee after they have 
been deemed a competent practitioner and have started performing forensic medical 
examinations independently (the examination must be applied for within three years 
of completing Part I).  During these early years, the FME compiles a list of ten cases, 
which they have conducted on their own and which demonstrate certain 
competencies.  For example, FMEs are required to demonstrate that they can 
competently use the colposcope, as well as other forensic gynaecological implements 
and methods. 
When I started we used a hospital facility… so we got access to the 
colposcopy suite.  That was a hassle… although that was of course coming 
round and that of course is another feature, forensic gynaecology is gaining a 
lot of credibility and actually they have to do that as part of the logbook as 
part of the training (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
The FME compiles these cases and (as with the apprenticeship casebook) presents 
them in report form. 
You present, in a book, ten cases where you have really done the work 
yourself and will have discussed these in terms of what the courts, what they 
would have wanted to have heard from you (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
The finished report records the complainer’s account, the procedures employed, any 
phenomena that were found upon examination of the complainer, any photographs of 
said phenomena, and finally the FME’s conclusions about the case.  The latter point, 
the FME’s conclusion or discussion, is to be informed by the appropriate literature 
on the topic.  This demonstrates whether or not the candidate is up-to-date with the 
relevant journal articles and textbooks, as well as any recent landmark legal cases 
concerning the types of phenomena observed.  While there are a certain set of 
                                                                                                                                     
qualify, to classify and to punish.  It establishes over individuals a visibility through which 
one differentiates them and judges them (Foucault 1977: 184). 
 79 
competencies which the candidate has to demonstrate, it is also recommended that 
the candidate picks cases that display a varied experience of injuries and case types 
(The Worshipful Society of Apothecaries of London 2007b). 
The FME appointed as assessor, upon receiving the casebook, first evaluates 
the range of cases.  She then asks questions such as: did the candidate employ the 
appropriate procedures?  Were their interpretations supportable?  How detailed were 
the discussions of the cases?  The examiner also looks at the language used in the 
casebook with regards to the clarity and conciseness of the reports, particularly with 
an eye to potential ease of understanding for police, prosecutors and juries.  In 
contradistinction to the apprentice’s casebook (which serves as a checklist of what 
has or has not yet been observed), the casebook of the DMJ candidate exists as a 
proxy for the work that they have carried out.  The casebook represents the capability 
of the candidate: the procedures they use, the strength of their claims, and their 
ability to express themselves to prosecutors.  The casebook therefore serves two 
functions: 1) as a record of the experiences of the candidate in order to justify any 
future claims, and 2) as a means by which the candidate’s practices can be examined 
by the community of forensic medical practitioners.  While the casebook process is 
certainly considered to be of benefit to new FMEs, some longstanding FMEs have 
expressed concern at the low number of cases that are requested as part of the DMJ.  
They suggest that it is far fewer than the number of cases needed in the past to 
signify expertise. 
The other issue of course is not just surgery but doctors now have their 
casebooks so they can justify they’ve seen so many unsupervised but the 
numbers they have there [DMJ casebooks] are far, far less than what you’d 
expect. (Dr. E, male, Constabulary 3) 
 
Nevertheless, the casebook containing ten case reports is an accepted record of the 
practice of the examinee, enabling the examiner to assess the quality of the 
candidate’s forensic medical work.
75
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 I have been unable to determine the specific reason as to why 10 is the required number of cases for 
the casebook, and why certain competencies are essential.  According to Dr. G, FMEs do not 
experience a large number of cases a year (the number being approximately 25 for him), and so it may 
be the case that those convening the DMJ believed that taking 10 cases out of a potential 75 would 
allow the FME under examination a broad range from which to pick the best cases to satisfy the 
competency requirement.  However, some constabularies do not have the same numbers of reported 
cases as others; rural constabularies tend to experience fewer cases than urban, and so 10 cases may 
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 The DMJ Part II is not solely examined by casebook; there is a formal 
examination aspect as well.  In the examination, the candidate is given particulars 
relating to a number of real cases (sets of photographs, the complainers’ accounts) 
and asked to draw conclusions about those cases.  In contrast to the casebook (where 
the examiner has to assume that the candidate has recorded all relevant information 
about the examinations), the examiner knows what should be commented upon in the 
formal examination format (which is similar to the textbook exercises), because the 
candidate’s remarks and conclusions should be congruent with the original forensic 
medical report.  The assessor’s job is to evaluate the level of similarity between the 
answers given by the candidate and the real forensic medical report.  When judging 
both the casebook and the examination, the assessor evaluates how “safe” the 
practice and conclusions of the candidate are: for instance, they judge whether or not 
unsupportable claims are being made. 
The examiner will have two roles, firstly to set out the basic standards, so in a 
general sort of way we review the examination, conditions, etc. and secondly 
we examine the candidates who are coming through, sitting the Part I or Part 
II of the examination… but they [the candidates] are, they are, as we say safe 
to appear as expert witnesses in the court, that’s it, that’s the acid test, are 
these people safe to appear as expert witnesses in a criminal court (Dr. B, 
male, Constabulary 2). 
 
The word “safe” in this quotation can be interpreted in two interesting and related 
ways.  On the one hand, “safe” could be read as meaning that the examinee will 
make the appropriate classifications based on the physical evidence, and is therefore 
suitable to give expert testimony; the examinee will provide evidence that is of value 
for the court.  On the other hand, the “safe” here could also be interpreted as “safe” 
for the community of practitioners.  By evaluating the claims made by the examinee, 
the community assures itself that her work fits within their parameters of acceptable 
practice and that the FME should not make any outlandish or unsupported claims that 
could be contradicted by their peers, thus undermining the FME community’s ability 
to claim that they produce incontrovertible evidence.  The determination of safety, 
                                                                                                                                     
also have been chosen as a small enough sample for those working in rural areas to collect easily 
within three years.  10 cases, therefore, appears to constitute a trade-off between the frequency of 
types of cases within constabularies and the need to demonstrate particular competencies. 
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therefore, does not only have a legal dimension, but also significance for the 
legitimacy of the entire community of practitioners. 
After assessing the casebook and the examination responses, if the examiner 
believes the candidate to be practicing appropriately, they pass the candidate and 
grant her the qualification D.M.J. (Clin.).  Holding the DMJ is considered to benefit a 
witnessing FME’s credibility quite significantly in a trial, as the status of having 
gained the qualification means that the FME has been deemed a competent 
practitioner by their peers. 
Someone who is an expert will have a long and wide experience, 
approximately five years, if you’ve not practised for five years in a particular 
area then you can’t be considered an expert… There’s academic 
qualifications, submitting yourself for rigorous assessment, and going 
through a few hoops with that (Dr. E, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
Of course, behaving appropriately and thus passing the DMJ actually means that (in 
a similar manner to the process of the training exercises) the candidate’s work has 
become similar to that of the rest of the forensic medical community; they have 
successfully been indoctrinated into the prevailing paradigm.  While there are issues 
relating to the ability of the individual FME to articulate their findings to interested 
parties, the question of the “safety” of the practitioner concerns their ability to make 
similar claims to their peers, and is therefore related to the correlation of the 
candidate’s classifications to those of other members of the community.  The 
examiners of the DMJ praise examinees whose casebook and examination responses 
are similar to their own; this is a further example of the practitioner’s perceptual and 
cognitive apparatus being shaped by authority.
76
  I will return to this point again in 
the summary, but before that I will briefly touch upon the FME’s continued training. 
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 During my research, I have not encountered anyone who failed the DMJ.  If a candidate fails Part II 
of the DMJ, they are allowed to re-sit, but only after re-sitting Part I.  An unsuccessful candidate for 
Part II is also able to appeal and receive a report on their performance in Part II, potentially making 
the examination easier second time round.  To this end (although I have no data to support this), I 
believe that failure of the DMJ first time round does not result in the new FME being dismissed, but 
instead in a fiscal punishment, as the candidate has to pay for admission to both Part I and Part II of 
the DMJ again, a combined cost of £750.  Furthermore, failure of the DMJ does not bar the 
practitioner from conducting examinations; however, it does mean that they cannot mobilise 
successful completion of the DMJ when attempting to construct their credibility in the eyes of jurors. 
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3.4 Continued FME Training 
During my data collection period, the professional body concerned with clinical 
forensic medicine underwent a change.  Previously titled the “Association of 
Forensic Physicians” (hereafter “AFP”), its role concerned the representation of 
forensic medical practitioners in cases of financial disputes or negligence claims, but 
also involved itself in maintaining the standards of FME work and the professional 
development of FMEs.  During the late 1990s, questions were raised regarding the 
appropriateness of the AFP being involved in both the financial interests and the 
education of their practitioners (Wall et al. 2007).  In response to such criticisms, the 
AFP decided that it was necessary to separate its representative and educational 
aspects and establish “an appropriately recognised professional and academic 
institution” (Wall et al. 2007: 1).  In response, possibly, to this call for a new 
institution, or in combination with other factors, the AFP Council approached the 
Royal College of Physicians (hereafter “RCP”) in 2000 investigating the possibility 
of forming a college within the RCP.  “[S]erendipitously” (Wall et al. 2007: 1), the 
AFP request was not the only approach made to the RCP by medico-legal 
associations at that time (including the association of medically qualified coroners), 
and so out of these various groups was established the Faculty of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine of the Royal College of Physicians (hereafter “FFLM”) in 2006.  With the 
chief focus of the FFLM being the education and training of FMEs,
77
 those involved 
in its founding were able to pass on the representation of FMEs to the British 
Medical Association (hereafter “BMA”), which (as Dr. E suggests) was considered 
appropriate as the BMA is a recognised trade union. 
Okay, the Association [AFP] was there to professionally support doctors and 
there was an education role, but there was also a representation role with 
terms and conditions of service, and what we’ve [FFLM] done, the 
negotiation role has been devolved to the BMA national forensic committee 
[cut for anonymity] but that is something I think quite rightly, we’ve handed 
over to the BMA because that is more of a trade union role and of course 
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 The three founding objectives of the FFLM were: 
• to promote for the public benefit the advancement of education and knowledge in the field 
of Forensic and Legal Medicine. 
• to develop and maintain for the public benefit the good practice of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine by ensuring the highest professional standards of competence and ethical integrity. 
• to act as an authoritative body for the purpose of consultation in matters of educational or 
public interest concerning Forensic and Legal Medicine. (Wall et al. 2007: 1) 
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BMA is a recognised trade union, so that’s fine.  And the education role, I 
think quite rightly we’ve separated the filthy lucre side from the education 
side and development and continuing professional development side, 
accreditation and licensing, all the stuff that’s coming through the GMC 
[General Medical Council] (Dr. E, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
It is important to note the movement to the FFLM, as it connotes a shift in the way in 
which training is supposed to continue after an FME’s early career.  While neither 
the AFP nor the FFLM explicitly used/use the language of Continuing Professional 
Development (hereafter “CPD”) as found in other medical specialities, both promote 
the idea that practitioners continue their education by attending national conferences 
and local seminars, as well as accruing further professional qualifications.  While the 
association was under the banner of the AFP, however, there was little in the way of 
governance of training, and these training events tended not to happen, as evidenced 
by some of my respondents’ comments: “Training in forensic elements is very 
limited” (Dr. K, female, Constabulary 3), or, more facetiously, “[Continuing] 
training, yes, what training would that be?” (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2).  While 
the inauguration of the FFLM has yet to find a way to guarantee that all practitioners 
continue their training, they have introduced recommendations regarding the amount 
of time each practitioner should dedicate to their development each year, and have 
introduced training days that would satisfy that minimum recommendation. 
There isn’t an official CPD but the FFLM recommend that you do about, you 
know, I think about 2 and a half days, like so many hours… So since they’ve 
[FFLM] been in place, there will be a lot more [training] coming into it (Dr. 
A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
There is the Society of Police Surgeons, which is now the Faculty of the 
Physicians of London, which have, which have, um, sort of study days, 
meetings, twice a year.  The Royal Society of Medicine also has a Faculty of 
Clinical and Forensic Medicine
78
 and they run at least two sessions, two 
weekend sessions a year, so those are the only ways (Dr. B, male, 
Constabulary 2). 
 
The focus of these training days is to keep practitioners up-to-date with the latest 
developments in the field (including what currently constitutes best practice), and to 
invite them to share accounts of interesting cases.  While all of my respondents 
                                               
78
 While Dr. B separates the FFLM from the Royal Societies Faculty, these are now actually the same 
organisation, as they merged following the dissolution of the AFP. 
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informed me that they had recently attended several conferences and workshops, or 
that they were looking forward to attending them, some expressed difficulty in 
finding the time given their work schedules. 
But no, there’s not, obviously there are conferences and those type of things, 
the reality is that most of us are working.  Conferencing is all very well if 
someone is happy to cover for you when you are away, but that is not the 
reality for us here; it would be nice to do it (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
Attending the meetings convened by the FFLM is a useful way to achieve the 
recommended training quotient; however, the FMEs’ workloads make it difficult for 
them to take the time off.  For this reason, among others, some constabularies have 
established local seminars. 
 Two of the constabularies I visited had developed their own ad hoc training 
days that take place a number of times a year.  One constabulary invited outside 
speakers to present to the FMEs approximately six times a year, and also invited 
procurators fiscal and senior police officers to attend.  This meant that at the end of 
the meeting, the discussion based upon the presentation was “multi-agency”: not 
only was there input from the clinical forensic medical practitioners, but also from 
those who would be using the reports of the FMEs; this enabled FMEs to gain advice 
from the latter.  Meanwhile, in the other constabulary, the team leader surveyed the 
doctors in preparation for the training day, asking which medico-legal areas they 
wished to be refreshed upon.  According to those working within the constabulary, 
there are fewer reported rapes in the rural districts, and so FMEs in rural areas are 
unable to gain the same experience as the doctors working within the city.  Because 
of this, the majority of the training days now take place in the rural areas. 
It [training day] can be a themed day or a general training day.  What we 
usually do is ask the doctors what topics they want refreshed on.  More and 
more our training tends to be in the outlaying areas where the doctors tend to 
be unable to carry out many examinations, so they don’t have the experience 
that the city doctors build up, so over the last couple of years the training has 
been outwith the [cut for anonymity] area.  We find that if we run training in 
[cut for anonymity] the outlying doctors don’t wish to come, but if the 
training is ad hoc, based on themes and near to them they will come, 
especially if the themes are suggested by themselves (Dr. G, male, 
Constabulary 3). 
 
As with the FFLM training days, the day (or weekend) features a series of lectures 
with numerous speakers, discussing the nature of “best practice” in the field for 
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which the doctors have requested training.  These days are primarily held for doctors 
working within the constabulary; however, the training co-ordinator also invites 
those from neighbouring constabularies to attend their sessions.  One FME from 
another constabulary mentioned that although the invitation was there, she did not 
feel very welcome. 
I mean people are talking about that, even just locally [Constabulary 3] is just 
starting off, you know, a series of meetings as a sort of regular updates.  But 
that still has the feeling that it is very [Constabulary 3] based and oriented, 
that’s the perception from this side of the water (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 
2). 
 
The FFLM’s project to encourage an increase in professional development is still in 
its infancy, and requires a further period of time before its success can be evaluated; 
however, there does appear to be a number of blocks, both institutional and 
constabulary-based, to practitioners’ success in achieving their development quotas. 
 While FMEs were sceptical about the logistics of training days and 
conferences, they were unanimous in their support of developing oneself by keeping 
up with the literature.  As with the DFM/Part I of the DMJ at the very beginning of 
the FME’s training, when the neophyte is required to “learn the books”, so it 
continues throughout the remainder of their career; if they do not keep up with the 
clinical forensic medical literature, then there might be repercussions if the FME 
were to undergo cross-examination. 
The defence bring in all the research, so are you keeping up-to-date with all 
the research papers that come up, what have you done, can you talk on that? 
(Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
The problems are doctors are inexperienced, doctors are too dogmatic, 
doctors don’t know their onions, they haven’t read the books and they get 
circles run round them in the witness box… If somebody is ranting and 
raving and saying “I’ve done this two hundred times, I think so, don’t bother 
me with books, don’t blind me with science, I say so, it must be so.”  That 
doesn’t hold any water with the jury (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
For FMEs, therefore, maintaining a relationship with the current clinical forensic 
medical literature is vital to their continued training and development, as this enables 
them to respond appropriately and with authority while under cross-examination. 
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Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the processes by which new FMEs come to be 
adjudicated competent practitioners by the relevant professional community, and also 
the measures taken by FMEs to maintain their appearance as expert and “safe” to 
testify before the court.  The training process commences with the apprenticeship of 
the neophyte to an experienced practitioner, who (via an ostensive process) 
introduces the trainee to the injuries and cases that they will later encounter in their 
own practice, and explains what they are, and what they represent (their cause, for 
example).  During this process, the trainee is wholly subordinate to the trainer, 
expected to attend whenever contacted and to accept the claims of the trainer without 
question.  At the same time, the trainee is required to study, and undertake an 
examination on, the basics of the forensic sciences and the judicature.  As with their 
learning process in the apprenticeship, the trainee accepts the information offered by 
the lecture course or the textbooks.  The trainee’s aptitude in following the lessons of 
the course or the apprenticeship is assessed by a series of exercises, which can be 
found in textbooks, as well as during the secondary phase of the apprenticeship.  The 
correct answers to these exercises equate to the classifications agreed upon by other 
FMEs (either the authors of the book, or the trainer), and the performance of this set 
of exercises by the trainee disciplines their perceptual and cognitive facilities to fit 
with the prevailing paradigm of the community.  The trainee learns to see the world 
(and thereby draw the same conclusions) in the same way as others in the 
community.  This is finally confirmed with the examination of the trainee’s work, 
and the assessment of the level of similarity between their interpretations and those 
of their peers.  If there is sufficient similarity they will be decreed a competent 
practitioner, “safe” to testify in court.   
 The training of FMEs and the assessment of their competency or safety 
(based upon their similarity to other experienced FMEs) is, of course, vital for the 
protection of FME practice and the credibility of their evidence as a whole.  The 
development of a shared vision amongst practitioners increases the likelihood of a 
consensus on FME claims, enabling the community to assert that their inferences 
concerning injury types and causes are not just opinions, but should be granted the 
status of facts given that they are agreed upon by all FMEs.  It is not the case, 
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however, that once a neophyte has been deemed competent or “safe”, they will be 
able to classify injuries or cases without problems or always agree with other 
members of the FME community; in fact, as I will discuss in the next chapter, the 
inferential manner by which FMEs learn to classify phenomena actually provides 
significant complications for future classifications (real world cases can be more 
complex than those previously experienced during training).  Nevertheless, the 
dogmatic training process that indoctrinates the practitioner into the community 
paradigm marks the first step in the development of community consensus on 
classifications, and is the first strategy by which FMEs can claim that the evidence 
they produce is credible and incontrovertible. 
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4. Injury Classifications and Consensus Management 
 
FME expertise resides in their ability to make claims about injuries.  In the previous 
chapter, I set out the situation from where such expertise initially derives: the 
assimilation of FMEs into their community’s paradigm during training.  FMEs are 
only labelled “competent” and “safe” examiners if they learn to interpret and infer 
from injuries in the same manner as the rest of the FME community.  Unfortunately, 
even when FMEs have mastered the communitarian paradigm, it is not the case that 
they are able to label and interpret new cases without problems.  “Members [of a 
community] cannot simply be given the conventions and left to ‘go on’ as though 
there is a railway track stretching out ahead of them” (Barnes et al. 1996: 54).  As 
training is based upon the development of an assemblage of experienced cases, it is 
always possible that a new one may undermine the FME’s classificatory schema.  
The potential exists, therefore, for an FME to break ranks with the community of 
FMEs and make claims that do not conform to the established views of the remainder 
of the community.  Such demonstrations of disunity amongst practitioners are highly 
damaging to the expertise and authority of FMEs, both individually and collectively, 
and so in order to continue with their claim that they produce incontrovertible 
evidence, FMEs are required to manage their practices and claims-making in order to 
avoid bringing the community into disrepute. 
 This chapter addresses the reality of FME claims-making regarding injuries 
in the post-training period, i.e. after FMEs have been deemed competent.  I will 
outline, in detail, the way that FMEs observe the body of the complainer, discussing 
the genital examination, the examination of the other aspects of the body (labelled 
the general examination), the process of looking for signs of injury, and the way that 
FMEs draw conclusions about the nature of the injury and its significance.  As such, 
I will also explore how injuries are described and recorded.  As mentioned, however, 
this is not an unproblematic process, and FMEs may hold differing opinions on such 
inferences, which can undermine their credibility.  Therefore, I will also explore the 
many processes by which FMEs manage their claims-making in order to ensure that 
their claims are accepted by the remainder of the FME community, and also the way 
that they have involved the COPFS and altered legal practices in an attempt to ensure 
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that demonstrations of practitioner disagreement are significantly diminished.  I will 
start with a description of the general examination. 
4.1 The General Examination 
FMEs separate the actual forensic medical examination itself into two sections: the 
general examination and the genital examination.  The general examination consists 
of a top-to-toe observation of the complainer, while the genital examination is an 
observation of the ano-genital region.  In both examinations the FME is looking for 
evidence of injuries; however, they differ in equipment and techniques employed.  
For this reason I will also separate the general and genital aspects of the forensic 
medical examination. 
4.1.1 Observing and Classifying Non-Genital Injury 
As its name suggests, the top-to-toe examination involves the FME performing a 
macroscopic observation of the complainer’s body,
79
 with the aid of a lamp for 
illumination.  Commencing at the head, and working downwards, the FME observes 
almost the entirety of the exterior of the body (excluding the external genitalia, as 
they are examined as part of the genital examination), including both front and 
back.
80
  The aim of this procedure is the “identification and precise documentation of 
all injuries (fresh or healed) or abnormal signs that might relate to the alleged 
incident.” (Rogers 2004: 91)  What the author of this quotation from a forensic 
gynaecological textbook means by “precise documentation” is the process of 
recording the type, size, location and colour of the injury under observation.  In fact, 
it should be noted that the process of observing an injury is intimately entwined with 
the process of describing and recording.  
Yeah, an injury is defined first, is it a bruise, is it an abrasion, the definition 
first.  Secondly you have to locate it somewhere so it is located from an 
anatomical point, fixed points, so you don’t locate it from the belly button, 
you locate it from sort of the… crest, the shoulder or some point, it has to be 
located in two-dimension, from the mid-line and against an anatomical point.  
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 Some FMEs choose to use a magnifying glass during the general examination; however, this is 
preference and not routine practice.  Conversely, a form of magnification is essential for the genital 
examination. 
80 It should be noted that during interviews, questions concerning the process of observation were 
generally answered using the illustration of a complainer.  To this end my discussion will also focus 
upon the examination of the complainer.  This same process also takes place upon the body of the 
suspect. 
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So you define it, you measure it, now you don’t measure it eyeball, you 
measure it with a ruler, okay, so accurate measurement of the area, and you 
may want to take trace evidence, if there is grit in it or if there is fibres in it, 
you swab.  So those are the four main things, definition, location, and indeed, 
swabbing.  At the end of the day, the main, the main, the main thing is, if I 
had no photograph of this can I visualise it? (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Therefore, an injury only becomes observed once it has been measured and defined.  
This recording process is a combination of descriptive measurements (location, size 
and colour) and a classification (the injury type).  These details enable further 
classifications to be made about the individual injury (age and mechanism).  In 
conjunction with other injuries, these details help the FME piece together a potential 
narrative of how the alleged attack took place (which I will later label the 
morphological account).  I will commence with a description of FMEs’ injury-
recording procedures, and then discuss how they make classifications.  For the FME, 
of course, such judgements as injury type, age and mechanism, which I have 
suggested are separate, take place contemporaneously.  In Bowker and Star’s (2000) 
language, they are invisible, meaning that the classifications take place instantly and 
generally unproblematically.  Here, I wish to make the invisible visible by describing 
the process by which an injury is judged and inferences are made concerning its 
cause and significance. 
As Dr. B says, the first act of observation is the classification of the injury 
into one of four types.  At the most basic level, non-genital injuries can be classified 
as ecchymoses, abrasions, lacerations or incisions.  Ecchymoses, commonly known 
as bruises (sometimes termed contusions) are discolorations of the skin caused by the 
rupturing of blood vessels due to the impact from a blunt object.  This rupturing 
enables blood to escape, infiltrating the surrounding subcutaneous tissues and leaving 
an observable mark upon the skin.  It is important to note that the skin is not broken 
by a bruise.  Bruises come in various shapes and sizes, which can have medico-legal 
significance.  For example, a particular type of bruise, the petechial haemorrhage, is 
typically less than two millimetres in diameter and therefore difficult to detect by the 
naked eye.  Groups of petechial haemorrhages can cluster into larger collections, and 
are thereby made visible.  These clusters can reproduce the ridge patterning from the 
object that caused them: for example, the sole of a shoe, a tire or the texture of 
clothing.  Moreover, petechial haemorrhages are also formed due to the suction of 
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the skin, and form what are commonly known as “love bites”.  A further type of 
important bruise is the circular or oval bruise, which is roughly 1-2cm in diameter 
and characteristic of fingertip or knuckle pressure (Crane 2000, Rogers 2004). 
 Abrasions, otherwise known as grazes or scratches, are injuries that damage 
the surface of the skin but do not penetrate deeper.  Abrasions are generally formed 
by the movement of the skin over a rough surface.  Closely related to the abrasion 
(and sometimes misidentified thus) is the laceration.  While the abrasion only breaks 
the skin superficially, a laceration splits the full thickness of the skin’s surface.  
Importantly, lacerations are caused by blunt force and so their edges are often 
bruised and abraded due to the crushing and tearing of the skin.  Incisions are created 
by incising implements like knives and razors.  Macroscopically, what differentiates 
incisions from lacerations is that in contrast to the rough and torn edges of the 
laceration, the incision is sharp and precise.  The distinction between the laceration 
and the incision becomes more complicated when dealing with a blunt weapon, as 
the blunter the incising weapon, the more likely the wound will appear as a laceration 
rather than an incision (Crane 2000, Rogers 2004).
81
  Even with these potential 
complications, the FMEs I interviewed did not consider the definition of injury type 
to be a problem; the decision was based on their previous experience of seeing and 
classifying, and that enabled them to label subsequent injuries correctly. 
 Once an injury has been labelled, it is then measured, located and its colour 
recorded. 
Number one, you identify what you are looking at, you describe it 
appropriately, bruise, abrasion, laceration, size, etc. because some of that 
determines causation or corroboration of what she says has happened.  So 
obviously identify what it is and then pretty much describe it clearly, it’s 
three by two centimetres, brown yellow bruise, overlaying the lateral aspect 
of the left upper arm, six centimetres above the elecron, bracket, elbow, close 
bracket (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
Both Dr. B’s and Dr. C’s statements illustrate how an injury is located; it is measured 
from fixed anatomical points: on the upper limbs, bony prominences like the elbow 
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 It should be noted that although I have taken these descriptions of injury types from clinical forensic 
medical textbooks, I consider them insufficient as a pedagogical resource for FMEs.  As I discussed in 
the previous chapter, neophyte FMEs need to be ostensively taught how to classify and interpret 
injuries.  I do consider them suitable in the present context to elucidate to my readers the similarities 
and differences between classificatory groups, as well as the difficulties faced in making an injury 
classification.  
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are used; on the head, the injury is measured from an eye, ear, nose or mouth; on the 
neck, the thyroid cartilage is used, and so on (Crane 2000).  Similarly, the size of the 
injury is measured in centimetres
82
 and its shape (circular, triangular, V-shaped, 
crescentic or irregular) is also recorded, along with the colour of the injury.  Finally, 
the injury is located and marked upon a standardised body diagram (I will discuss 
these shortly).   
 Once the descriptive details have been recorded, the FME can then begin to 
make inferences regarding the age of the injury and how it was made.  These 
judgements are either formed during the examination itself, or when the FME is 
compiling the report for the police.  When deciding the age of injuries, FMEs attempt 
to address whether the injury pre- or post-dates the timing of the reported assault 
(which will show whether or not it is relevant to the assault in question).  This 
process is possible with bruises, as they fade and change colour over time, and the 
speed of the change is considered to be consistent.  Forensic gynaecological 
textbooks often reference the Langlois and Gresham (1991) study, which noted 
colour change around the eighteen hour mark.  Red, yellow or blue bruises are 
considered to be recent injuries (i.e. less than eighteen hours old) while green or 
brown bruises tend to be older.  FMEs, however, did not find this distinction useful: 
[Sharp intake of breath] Bruising, yeah, gee, something we looked at in the 
early 90s with colour photometry in the dead and the living and all we could 
say was if it was red, yellow, purple, blue it was recent, if it was green or 
brown it’d be older and by recent I mean in the last week and older, more 
than a week.  I had a standard paragraph that I would incorporate into expert 
work.  You can certainly look at a bruise and say that it is compatible with the 
time stated… it’s like this business of saying if it’s yellow it’s more than 
eighteen hours, well you see, if you’ve had kids and you’ve actually seen an 
injury you know it’s not going to be more than eighteen hours old.  That said, 
I’ve got my knowledge and this is, I’m thinking outwith the box with this, um 
and I think some doctors don’t do this (Dr. E, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
The Langlois and Gresham scale is made more complex by many factors, including 
the location upon the body, the force of the blow, and any treatment that the 
complainer is taking (Crane 2000).  Any of these factors can alter the colour of a 
bruise.  Other injuries also have the potential to provide dating evidence: abrasions 
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 Some textbooks suggest centimetres and inches to ease jury understanding during the provision of 
expert testimony (Crane 2000).  
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are usually purple and excrete a serum which hardens to form a scab over the wound, 
while lacerations and incised wounds heal and leave scarring (however, the rates of 
scabbing and scarring are generally unknown).  Bruising, therefore, provides the best 
assessment of how long it has been since the assault - but only in recent assaults (i.e. 
within a few weeks), and even then, not without significant difficulties. 
 The final judgement the FME has to make when observing a single injury is 
how it was made.  This is very important later in the process, when the FME comes 
to determine whether force was employed (and if so, how much).
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  The 
determination of the mechanism is inherently linked to the previous descriptive 
inference concerning injury type.  I have already stated that certain injuries are 
classed depending on how they were produced; for instance, the example given 
above of how an incision differs from a laceration (in that one is produced by a sharp 
implement, the other a blunt instrument).  I also described how abrasions are 
produced by the skin coming into friction with a rough surface, while bruises are 
caused by the application of blunt force which does not break the epidermis; and 
mentioned that a certain type of bruise, the petechial haemorrhage, can actually 
cluster to form the imprints of ridge patterns or textures.  Therefore, if an FME were 
to locate a bruise on the upper arm, she would at least be able to claim that blunt 
force had been applied.  If there are a collection of injuries around the bruise, then 
the FME may be able to make a more specific diagnosis (for example, five small 
bruises around the upper arm could signify the act of grabbing).
84
  Although I have 
pointed to a reciprocal relationship between the labelling of an injury and its 
mechanism, I have yet to address exactly how FMEs make judgements about injury 
type or cause. 
 Chapter Three set out how new FMEs learnt to conduct a forensic medical 
examination, and how (via textbooks and an apprenticeship) they learnt to identify 
and diagnose injuries of medico-legal significance.  I would now like to take this to 
the next step and address how FMEs make judgements (when on their own) in 
practice.  Dr. D’s response to the question of how he classified and diagnosed 
injuries is as follows:  
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 This will be the focus of Section 4.3. 
84
 This, of course, takes us beyond our classification of the individual injury and into the relationship 
between injuries.  I will discuss this further in Section 4.3. 
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That’s from experience, from experience because we’ve got lots of cases of 
perhaps bruises at the head, especially in the mortuary, and sometimes the 
police are very concerned about these people, this deceased, but it’s nothing, 
they died and they hit the table as they fell and you must know about this and 
knowledge is the basis of all thing.  So you only see what you know about, if 
you don’t know about it, you don’t see it and this makes the work much 
easier, to avoid unnecessary work and investigations and that’s the same 
whether you have a young woman with an alleged assault, sexual assault 
perhaps, she has injured herself… when you have the experience to see it, and 
you have seen cases before, just in your experience then you can say that’s 
self-injurious behaviour (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 2, emphasis added). 
 
Dr. D’s conflation of seeing, experience and knowledge provides a useful way to 
begin an explanation of FME classificatory practice.  As I previously argued, FMEs 
learn to discriminate between, and provide mechanisms for, different types of injury 
by viewing cases (both in textbooks and as part of shadowing) and being informed of 
the appropriate classifications.  As such, we can understand how FMEs come to 
know via a combination of experience of previous cases plus authority derived 
inferences.  To this end, if we substitute “have experience of previous cases + 
authority derived inferences” into the highlighted sentence in Dr. D’s statement it 
would say So you only see what you have experience of previous cases + authority 
derived inferences about, if you don’t  have experience of previous cases + authority 
derived inferences about it you don’t see it.  In Dr. D’s first illustration, he presents 
the hypothetical case of bruises at the head.  Dr. D states that, due to his previous 
experiences of seeing injuries, he could ascertain that the injury was caused by the 
person falling and hitting their head upon the table; in other words, he is drawing an 
analogy.  Each FME has a finite set of previously observed cases which they have 
already classified.  The FME cognitively searches those past cases, looking for the 
case that most closely resembles the current injury, and when it is found, they apply 
the classifications from the past case to the one in front of them.  In the second 
hypothetical, Dr. D states that he knows the injury is an example of self-harm 
because it resembles a wound, or collection of wounds, that he had previously 
labelled as self-harm (or that someone else would have told him constituted the 
same).  He saw it before, it was classified thus, and so the new case will be classified 
thus.   
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 An important corollary of understanding acts of classification as analogies is 
that the FME requires previous experience of that injury or collection of injuries to 
be able to draw an inference, or as Dr. D put it, “if you don’t know about it you don’t 
see it.”  This was exemplified by Dr. F:  
It’s all, every doctor has to work within his area of expertise and the 
boundary of his experience, and if at any time any of us feel we’ve gone 
beyond my boundary here then I’d say call somebody else who has more 
experience in this particular field.  It all depends what’s been looked at at that 
point in time…  Mostly I am quite happy to say yes, this is the case, or no, 
this is not the case, but in this case that I have already mentioned [cut for 
anonymity] there was a constellation of injuries, the mechanism of which 
could have been, there could have been various causes [cut for anonymity].  I 
couldn’t say for sure what could have brought these injuries about [cut for 
anonymity] (Dr. F, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
In this case, Dr. F was examining a complainer that had a collection of injuries that 
did not resemble those from any of Dr. F’s finite collection of cases.  Although he 
could distinguish between the injuries, he was unable to pinpoint the precise 
mechanism for their production.  To aid in the examination, he called in an FME 
with a wider experience who was able to provide the mechanism.  This case served 
to extend Dr. F’s own collection of cases, and so if he were to observe a similar 
constellation of injuries in future, he would be able to generalise from this case to the 
new one.  Additionally, this continues to demonstrate the role of authority in the 
creation and expansion of classificatory schemata.  As with the process of educating 
trainee FMEs, it was only after the intervention of an authority figure who informed 




 It is possible to conclude from Dr. F’s example that he was lacking the 
requisite experience, and that at some point in the future Dr. F would come to 
observe the entire range of injuries and know their mechanisms.  To put it another 
way, experienced practitioners should have no difficulty making classifications.  
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 It should be noted that this expansion of cases can actually serve to problematise earlier acts of 
classification, by providing a mechanism that would have explained earlier cases; that is to say that 
the new explanation bears a closer resemblance to the previously classified case than the one that was 
actually provided.  To put it another way, “[n]o act of classification is ever indefeasibly correct” and 
“[a]ll acts of classification are revisable” (Barnes et al. 1996: 56/57).  Moreover, the addition of the 
new explanation may undermine other elements of the classificatory network; see Hesse (1974) and 
Bloor (1982). 
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While I agree that the case of Dr. F represents an example of limited experience, it is 
not my contention that there ever exists a time when the FME has such experience 
that she is capable of classifying injuries without any problems.  The explanation for 
FME classificatory practice thus far expressed has been drawn from Barry Barnes 
and David Bloor’s “meaning finitism”, which I discussed in Chapter Two.  In 
essence, the basis of finitism is that no system of knowledge is ever complete; our 
current state of knowledge is always built on a finite number of cases and so, as with 
Dr. F, any practitioner could be faced with a case that they cannot explain.   
There are times when we can’t, we really can’t say and that’s the bottom line.  
We look at the injuries and say it was blunt force but whether it was a finger 
caused it, a penis caused it, something else caused it, an instrument caused it, 
we can’t say.  Sometimes we can and when we can we are quite distinct, 
we’ll say diagnostic of such (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
This quotation is from a highly experienced and well-respected FME.  Even with the 
large number of cases observed throughout her career, there are still collections of 
injuries she is unable to provide precise mechanisms for.  The chief reason for this 
uncertainty is the multiplicity of possible causes for a particular injury/collection of 
injuries.  For example, bruises upon the face, notably periorbital haematomas (black 
eyes) do not always signify multiple punches to the eye areas; they can also be 
caused by trauma to the front of the scalp, or by a fracture at the base of the skull 
causing blood to drain and collect around the eye sockets under gravity (Crane 2000, 
Rogers 2004).  Multiple causality causes difficulties with discrimination for all 
examiners, not just inexperienced practitioners.  Interestingly, while Dr. F requested 
a more experienced practitioner to infer a particular mechanism, Dr. A, in her 
hypothetical case, preferred to limit her classification to one of blunt force trauma, 
claiming that the uncertainty provided by the potential number of causes could put 
her credibility at stake. 
[B]ecause that is when we lose our credibility, because we have to be 
absolutely… what we know and how much we know, and I do not stray out 
of that, and I think, you know, how do, a lot of times two people were there 
and nobody else, and if I can, and I’m absolutely confident, and I say what 
caused it, then I am certain that this would happen (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1). 
 
This quotation encapsulates a large part of the argument of this thesis: 
demonstrations of disagreement amongst FMEs can undermine their claims to 
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provide credible, incontrovertible evidence.  In situations of uncertainty, contrary 
explanations could be postulated, which could in turn result in such public 
demonstrations of disagreement.  In order to avoid this, FMEs limit their claims, thus 
protecting both their own credibility and that of their community.  Limiting claims 
(or requesting that other FMEs provide or support a classification) ensures that others 
in the FME community agree with the FME’s judgements (either because they have 
provided their own explanations, or because the claims have been limited to those 
agreed upon by all FMEs due to their training). 
 In summary, thus far I have explained how FMEs record descriptive 
characteristics of injuries, and also how they then use those characteristics to draw 
inferences about age and causality.  These inferences, or acts of classification, are 
based upon an FME’s cognitive search of her own collection of previous cases for an 
injury that resembles the one currently under investigation, and her subsequent 
drawing of an analogy from the old case to the current.  This process is not only 
complicated by variations between individual complainers, location, and the 
multiplicity of potential causes, but also by the different number and types of cases 
that each FME has observed.  Acts of classification based on resemblance necessitate 
that the FME has previous experience of the injury/injuries before they can be 
accurately classified.  Observing an injury (or constellation of injuries) not 
previously encountered serves to extend the FME’s finite selection of cases, as well 
as introduce new injury types and their explanations.  The new explanation derives 
from the intervention of an experienced examiner, who provides the community-
agreed explanation for that injury.  This does not mean that experienced examiners 
themselves have little difficulty in making classifications; they too have a finite 
selection of cases to draw upon and are sometimes uncertain about the precise 
explanation.  In such cases, FMEs limit their explanations to those agreed upon by all 
FMEs, as over-reaching (providing an explanation when the cause is contentious) 
could result in a “battle of experts” during the trial, potentially tarnishing the 
epistemic authority of FMEs in general.  Conversely, the limiting of claims to those 
agreed upon by FMEs serves to reinforce the consensual (and thereby factual) nature 
of FME evidence.  Despite these defensive strategies, however, FMEs can still find 
themselves in disagreement during trials, which, given my analysis of the 
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classificatory process (based upon practitioners’ differing experiences and the 
judgements of similarity resulting from those experiences, although shaped by their 
shared training), is not that surprising.  In Section 4.3, I will explore some further 
strategies employed by FMEs in order to limit demonstrations of disagreement; 
however, I will first continue to explain the way that FMEs record injuries. 
4.1.2 Iconographic Representation 
Once an injury has been observed and described, the FME plots its location upon a 
standardised body diagram (see appendix 4), eventually building up a pictorial 
representation of the injuries upon the complainer’s body.  The diagram is forwarded 
to both the science laboratory and the police, along with the remainder of the medical 
examination form, but its chief function is in helping the FME to draw conclusions 
about the case under examination.  The diagram functions as an aide memoire 
regarding the totality of the complainer’s injuries, as it documents the locations and 
combinations of various injury types.  This information can be highly significant 
when the FME is making a decision about whether or not an assault has taken place 
(and, if so, the level of severity); as I will elaborate upon in Section 4.3, the body 
diagram plays an important role in reminding the FME of the locations and quantities 
of wounds.  Here, I will discuss the other method of iconographic representation: 
photodocumentation.  Unlike the body diagram, which provides a representation of 
the entire collection of injuries, photodocumentation records each wound 
individually. 
Once the medical examination is complete, any observed injuries are 
recorded by photography.  In a similar manner to the body diagram, photographs of 
an injury are employed to remind the FME of how the injury looked at the time of 
the examination.  The accompanying police officer contacts the photographer, a 
SOCO, at the same time that she contacts the FME.
86
  During the medical 
examination the FME prepares a photographic schedule, based on the injuries she has 
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 Liaising at such an early stage ensures that photographs can be taken shortly after the examination. 
Although this is a complainer-sensitive practice, sometimes it can be counter-productive if the 
complainer has reported at such an early stage that certain injury types (for example, bruises) have yet 
to develop fully.  In these situations, the complainer has a photograph taken at the time of the 
examination and then returns to the police station the next day to have her injuries photographed. 
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observed and consistent with the order in which she observed them.  In this way, the 
FME’s notes of the examination fit with the photographs. 
So I have to check off on a photographic schedule and when I see I just put 1, 
2, 3, 4, and give this copy and the police officer will give it to the SOCO and 
they take the photographs.  They go in the same order so when we go into 
court we have the [FME case] book, we go inside with what our injuries are, 
injury number one is photograph A (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Once the medical examination is complete, the SOCO takes the photographs with the 
complainer still lying upon the examination couch.  Injuries located upon the face, 
arms, lower legs or back are not considered problematic to photograph, and therefore 
require no extra consideration.  On the other hand, areas that FMEs label 
“contentious”
87
 (such as breasts, buttocks and the tops of thighs), due to their close 
proximity to what FMEs considered to be sexual areas (anus, genitalia and nipples), 
require extra measures when taking photographs, in order to protect the dignity of the 
complainer.  
You can’t just say to somebody “take your clothes off”… so there are some 
areas that they need to cover with the bag: the genital area, the genital area 
they can’t take, the breast they can’t, and then they cover that area, and take.  
If it was like on a buttock, or something, whole thing would be covered by 
this thing, so it is not too exposed and then they’d take that (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1). 
 
Now the photographs are indeed restricted to non-contentious areas, what do 
I mean by that?  If you want to photograph a breast then a) the photographer 
has to be of the same sex as the victim, and that is done with specific consent 
from the patient…  So if I want to photograph a breast, a thigh, then I have to 
ask for specific permission and indeed have to have a photographer of the 
same sex (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
For photographs of contentious areas, extra consent is requested of the complainer,
88
 
and if a SOCO of a different sex than that of the victim has been sent to the medical 
examination, they will be dismissed and a SOCO of the same sex called.  Moreover, 
the photographs will be constructed in such a way as to record the injury of interest 
while protecting the dignity of the complainer as much as can be possible; thus in 
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 While I am aware that this is not necessarily the correct usage of the term “contentious”, as it is an 
actor’s-category I will use it.  The term appears to be used to mean “difficult for complainers” due to 
their close proximity to sexual areas. 
88
 With the more routine use of the colposcope, FMEs are increasingly required to ask for extra 
consent to record contentious areas at the start of the examination.  See Section 4.2.2. 
 100 
Constabulary 1, Dr. A mentions that they have a bag which covers the area, whilst in 
Constabulary 3, Dr. G explains that the complainer covers what they feel to be 
inappropriate: 
If there was physical injuries, general bodily injuries, if there were injuries to 
the inner aspect of the thighs or knees then we would photograph them.  Bite 
marks on the breasts, depends on the complainer, would have to give consent, 
I mean they are reluctant, you know I’ve seen complainers with their hands 
over their nipples and then a mark on the breast (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 
3). 
 
Forensic medical associations have paid more attention to the dignity of the 
complainer since the overhaul of the police doctor service in the mid-1980s.
89
  
Taking these precautions enables FMEs to get the photographs even though the 
complainers are (to use Dr. G’s word) “reluctant”.  In the final analysis, the 
complainer can still deny consent to having photographs of contentious areas taken, 
and the FMEs have to honour that; however, providing a range of mechanisms to 
make the complainer more comfortable provides a way for FMEs to negotiate 
consent.  This is important (as I will now explain) as photographs can be a very 
useful way of engendering trust in an FME amongst potential future jurors.  
 Photographs of injuries not only remind the FME of how the injuries 
appeared at the time of the examination, but can also form part of the prosecution’s 
evidence at trial.  Temkin and Krahé (2008) cite evidence from Bright and 
Goodman-Delahunty, demonstrating that visual representations of graphic material 
(such as photographs of injuries) can have a significant effect on juries, which leads 
to a greater likelihood of a guilty verdict.  Bright and Goodman-Delahunty compared 
mock juror responses to written and pictorially represented information (itself 
dissected into graphic and non-graphic) concerning a murder case. 
While the results showed no difference between the graphic and non-graphic 
material when it was presented in written form, mock jurors exposed to the 
graphic visual images were more likely to convict the defendant than those 
who had not seen any photographs.  This could be explained, at least in part, 
by the fact that they [mock jurors] experienced greater anger towards the 
defendant than participants who had not seen any photographs (Temkin and 
Krahé 2008: 57). 
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 I will expand upon some of the changes introduced by the police and the forensic medical service in 
the light of critical evaluations in Chapter Five.  
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While studies such as Bright and Goodman-Delahunty have demonstrated the 
usefulness of photographs in altering the emotional states of jurors, photographs can 
also make FMEs appear more credible to juries.  Unlike other sources of forensic 
scientific evidence (DNA samples, glass fragments, etc.), which require stringent 
procedures to ensure the chain of custody throughout scientific and legal processes, 
photographs (once developed) cannot be tampered with and provide a pictorial 
representation of the wound at the time of the examination.
90
  In this way, 
photographs, in combination with FME testimony, provide a means for the court to 
be imaginatively transported to the examination suite and “virtually witness” (Shapin 
1984, Shapin and Schaffer 1985, Jasanoff 1998) the body of the complainer at the 
time of the examination.  Photographs allow the jurors to see the evidence for 
themselves and “supplement… the imaginative witness provided by the words of the 
text [in this case the FME testimony]” (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 61).  Jurors have 
greater trust in the FME’s testimony when it is coupled with photographs, as they 
can, at least in their mind’s eye, believe that they are following the FME during the 
examination and draw their own conclusions contemporaneously with the FME.  In 
fact, the FME is educating the juror to “see”, or infer, what the FME herself has seen.  
This education of the jury is very powerful and requires skilful cross-examination to 
counteract.
91
   
Therefore, photographs of injuries, if available, can provide vital support for 
a prosecution case: they can alter the emotional state of the jury, and can help 
convince the jury of the FME’s conclusions. These factors explain why FMEs have 
developed mechanisms to enable photographs of contentious areas to be taken if 
complainers are reluctant.  However, photographs of what could be considered the 
most convincing of wounds (injuries to the ano-genital region) are not admissible to 
court, although some constabularies do iconographically record them.  It is to this 
that I now turn. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter Three, it must be noted that photographs are still constructions and 
therefore have various assumptions built in; they are close to naturalistic realism, but still remain 
mediated expressions of a given natural phenomena (Lynch 1985). 
91
 See Jasanoff (1998) for examples of successful challenges to expert interpretations of visual 
evidence  
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4.2 The Genital Examination92  
While the general examination is commonly a macroscopic examination,
93
 the 
genital examination, or more appropriately the ano-genital-oral examination, is 
microscopic.  The size and location of any potential injuries within the ano-genital 
area necessitates that both a magnifying device and a cool light for illumination be 
employed (Rogers 2004).  The FME commences by observing the vulval and/or 
perianal regions,
94
 looking for any abnormalities (injuries or evidence of sexually 
transmitted infection) or any trace material (semen, pubic hair, etc.) that may still be 
present.
95
  Once the exterior ano-genital regions have been examined, the FME then 
introduces a speculum to aid examination of the vagina, cervix, anus and rectum.  As 
with the general exam, observation of the genital examination is in part recording.  
Unlike in the general examination, however, the size and location of pathology make 
it impossible to measure the size of injuries precisely.  Therefore, in terms of 
descriptive characteristics, FMEs only classify injury type, colour (particularly any 
“reddening” of the skin (erythema) that may be observable), and location.  As far as 
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 Please note: as with the general examination, most of the textbook and interview data collected 
concerned examinations of female complainers, and so most of the data presented will relate to female 
complainers (although discussions concerning anal and oral examinations can relate to men as well as 
women).  Unlike the general examination, the genital examination of suspects differs somewhat from 
that of female complainers.  The FME’s role in the suspect genital examination is  
[T]o document any features that could assist with subsequent identification of the assailant, 
to note any acquired or congenital conditions that could make an alleged sexual act 
impossible, to describe in detail any injuries that could relate to a sexual act, and to retrieve 
any forensic evidence (Rogers and Newton 2000: 71). 
To this end, a penile examination consists of observation, recording any marks, classifying some as 
injuries (with all the processes already discussed in terms of the general examination) and others as 
means of identification (Reznic et al. 2004), and inferring whether any pre-existing biomedical 
phenomena could prohibit a sexual act (i.e. whether the suspect’s penis is too small/large to enact 
penetration or any congenital conditions that could stop him from achieving/maintaining an erection).  
Recent clinical forensic medical research, notably Wells (2006), has challenged the validity of these 
latter classifications, noting that both questions of size and impotence are irrelevant.  Wells states that 
although there is no medical evidence to support defences based upon size or impotence, they are still 
frequently employed, and he argues that FMEs should try and undermine such “rape myths”.  I will 
return to the topic of “rape myths” in Chapter Seven. 
93
 Supra note 79. 
94
 As I will discuss in the next two chapters, there is increasing ambiguity amongst FMEs about what 
is considered best practice, and the incorporation of guidelines.  While all the textbooks I have read 
state that FMEs have to maintain discretion over which ano-genital-oral examinations are conducted 
based on the complainer’s account, laboratories are requesting that all samples be taken regardless.  
This requires an examination of areas that the complainer may say have not been touched.  I will 
discuss this in greater depth in the next two chapters.   
95 It was once the case that a nuclear stain, Toludine Blue, was added to the vulval area as it 
highlighted lacerations (Rogers 2004).  None of the constabularies I visited employed this method due 
to the length of time it persisted upon the genitals, causing embarrassment and the stigma of the “rape 
mark”. 
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location is concerned, FMEs describe ano-genital regions as a clock-face with the 12 
o’clock position located under the mons pubis and the 6 o’clock towards the coccyx 
(Rogers 2004).  In describing the abnormality the FME states, for example, that a 
“laceration [was observed] on the posterior fourchette at 5 o’clock” (Girardin et al. 
1997: 70).  In addition to the ano-genital region, the genital examination also 
examines the mouth as a potential area for sexual contact.  Again using a form of 
magnification and a light source, the FME observes the lips, gums and the hard and 
soft palates, looking for bruises and lacerations.  Recording again focuses upon 
location (although without the use of a clock-face), type of injury and colour.  For 
instance “FIGURE 2-26 Upper lip laceration, abrasion, and redness, along the 
opposing surface of the upper left lip (x15). Laceration is at superior end of abrasion” 
(Girardin et al. 1997: 39). 
 An important difference between the genital and general examinations 
concerns iconographic representation; as I discussed above, once an injury has been 
observed during the general exam it is located upon a body diagram and later 
photographed.  Neither of these takes place, or at least not to the same degree, in the 
genital examination.  First, the body diagram: in all the constabularies that I visited, I 
only found evidence of a standardised genital diagram being employed in one. 
I’m good at talking like this, this thing [one-to-one interview scenario] is not 
a problem; put me in the witness box and then trying to tell clock-face and 
three o’clock and these things and I think “Oh my God” and all these pairs of 
eyes watching you… I’ve discussed it and they’ve [COPFS] agreed now, all 
the advocates, I can take this form [respondent holds up standardised body 
diagram] and show, because it is far easier to show this way, and even for the 
genitals… an outline diagram of the female genitalia and the male genitalia 
and explaining, because you’d be amazed, “Joe Bloggs” the public don’t 
know.  The first time I did this, I still remember, it had not been done before, 
but the procurator fiscal said “if you’re willing to, I’ll try it.” And the defence 
had no objections, so I brought it in and the judge said “Doctor, I do hope you 
are going to explain this!” and I thought “Oh God that’s coming from the 
judge!”… so it is easier to have a diagram and then point out and say “This is 
what we mean” so I find it easier to use that to show (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1). 
 
While Dr. A suggests that a genital diagram would be useful as a means of helping 
the trier-of-fact to understand what injuries were observed, and the AFP have 
released standard ano-genital diagrams (AFP 2004), these have not been added to the 
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documentation modules of most constabulary FMEKs.
96
  As already mentioned 
concerning the body diagram, its chief function is to act as an aide memoire for the 
FME when drawing conclusions about the case.  It also serves another function, 
however, and that is helping other medical examiners (employed by the defence, or 
during a peer-review process) to assess the work of the original FME.  Independent 
medical examiners (as those employed by the defence prefer to be labelled, even 
though both defence and prosecution examiners consider themselves independent) do 
not get the opportunity to examine the complainer themselves, and so rely on the 
report of the original examination.  A body diagram, therefore, acts as a surrogate for 
the complainer’s body to an independent assessor.  The body diagram enables the 
assessor to observe for themselves where the injuries were located, and so helps them 
form their own opinions.  Where genital examinations are concerned, however, 
clinical forensic medicine has appropriated a new technique that enables independent 
examiners to see the actual ano-genital examination for themselves.  FMEs in some 
constabularies are nowadays routinely employing the gynaecological instrument, the 
colposcope.  This enables the actual genital examination to be digitally recorded, and 
so acts as both an aide memoire and a record for FMEs working on both sides of the 
case, thus negating the chief function of the diagram.  Colposcopy, although yet to 
achieve “best practice” status within Scotland, is becoming more and more usual, 
and is routinely employed in a number of constabularies.  Due to its increased 
importance, I will devote the rest of this sub-section to an analysis of this new 
technique. 
4.2.1 The Colposcopic Genital Examination 
The colposcope, originally a gynaecological instrument developed to investigate the 
cervix and the tissues of the vagina and vulva after the return of an irregular pap 
smear,
97
 “is an instrument capable of projecting a light within a shaft or cylindrical 
area and magnifying an image upon which a powerful light source is focused” 
(Girardin et. al 2003: 419).  The colposcope, therefore, provides the required (and in 
fact improved) illumination and magnification essential for carrying out a genital 
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 See Chapters Five and Six for an in-depth discussion of FMEKs and their use. 
97
 The use of the colposcope has also been expanded to cover perianal, anal and rectum examinations 




  In addition to light and magnification, the colposcope offers one other 
benefit: attached is a 35mm camera that can record real-time video of the 
examination.  While the non-colposcopic examination relies upon the FME’s 
contemporaneous description of the observed abnormality, the colposcope provides a 
photographic representation of the entire genital examination, enabling both the 
original FME and any other assessor(s) to observe the ano-genital area and review 
the findings.
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  A combination of the improved vision and ability to review is leading 
some constabularies to use it routinely.
100
 
I always examine with the colposcope because the examination with the 
colposcope picks up, depending on how many studies you are looking at, 
about 10 to 30 per cent of the injuries that are not visible to the naked eye, so 
it is far better to have that.  If I see any injury then I would record it, if not I 
would just be using the colposcope to just look for injuries… as a light source 
and magnification (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
May I say though the trend is, again in [cut for anonymity] not elsewhere, to 
use the colposcope more routinely, more regularly.  We may not take 
photographs with it, but at least we use it for, as I say, value of illumination 
and magnification.  So it is being used more and more frequently, even in 
adults, of any age group, but no recording carried out, because that gives us 
the headache then of having to store the video and all the rest of it (Dr. B, 
male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Both quotations show that while FMEs in the two constabularies routinely employ 
the colposcope for its illumination and magnification properties, the act of recording 
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 Although colposcopes differ, they generally magnify to between the range of 5x-30x (Rogers 2004), 
whilst also allowing the FME to focus light upon particular aspects of the ano-genital region. 
99
 Brennan (2006), an FME from New South Wales (where colposcopy is prohibited in cases of adult 
sexual assault but encouraged for examinations of child sexual assault), argued that colposcopy could 
not only help in clinical accountability and peer-review, but also in developing training and further 
research.  Brennan based her argument upon the fact that such improvements have already been made 
in the case of child sexual assault where colposcopy is universally accepted as “best practice”.  
100
 Two constabularies out of the four I visited have chosen to use the colposcope routinely; when 
discussing the technique in Constabulary 3 (where they do not use it) I received the following 
response. 
It’s questioned frequently in court as to why video colposcopy has not been made available… 
big advantage of course is that the defence, the expert for the other side, can have a look at 
the video colposcope, it’s not as good as the naked eye examination, but it’s very good, it’s a 
two-dimensional as opposed to a three-dimensional, and it’s a dynamic recording (Dr. G, 
male, Constabulary 3). 
Dr. G’s claim that the colposcope is not as good as naked eye examination (as the examination is 
conducted in 2, not 3, dimensions) appears to contradict the majority of studies that appear to 
demonstrate that far more is actually observed with the colposcope than by eyesight alone.  He may 
have been drawing upon the potential for observer error that other analysts have discussed when 
critiquing colposcopy (see Brennan 2006 for a review of both the positives and drawbacks of the 
colposcope).  
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remains open to the FME’s discretion.  As with the case of photography of 
contentious areas, the FME is required to obtain extra consent from the complainer in 
order to record the colposcopic examination.  If given, a compact disc is inserted into 
the recording aspect of the apparatus to commence recording.  If there are no 
observable injuries, or if the FME judges the complainer to be of an age that she 
would expect to find pre-existing genital contusions, then the FME chooses not to 
record.  Dr. B continued in his explanation of when he would record the 
examination: 
Use the colposcope when you feel you are going to get more information; so, 
for example, if you are looking at somebody who has had six children and 
had sex last week, the chance of finding any injury are limited, so you 
wouldn’t bother with the colposcope, but if you are looking at somebody 
who’s 18, never had sex before, then you want to record the findings in 
minute, minute detail (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Not recording means that what Dr. B labelled the “headaches” of storing the CD are 
avoided.  FMEs are highly aware of, and sensitive to, complainers’ fear of how the 
recorded images might be employed: 
Absolutely, and some people, in fact most [inaudible whispering], I find some 
women feel that this [the colposcopic recording] is going to be brandished in 
court, NO WAY, we only allow another medical expert, the defence medical 
expert to see, they will come to us and I will not stay in the room it will be a 
police officer who will stay with them, they will see that this thing, see my 
report and then go (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Dr. B discussed the same process in more graphic terms for Constabulary 2: 
If we’re using colposcopy… then there is a CD now which is recording the 
examination, now that CD is not available to anybody but the doctor, doctors 
who’ve taken it…  So the Crown Office [COPFS], the courts, nobody, and 
we have an assurance from the Crown Office that they will not ask for it [the 
colposcopic recording] to be produced in evidence, as has been done in 
England, it has been used in evidence in England.  In Scotland we believe, 
there is a woman in the witness box and in the next minute you are showing 
“Glorious Technicolors” of her private parts, that’s not on.  Now you may say 
“Well, what about the defence?”  Now if the defence have their own experts 
they are allowed to see the video, together with the doctors who have 
removed it, taken it… And that’s how it’s done and we’ve had no problems in 
Scotland, the fact that we cannot produce it in evidence…  But that [the 
colposcopic recording] we guard with our lives almost, in no way is that 
going to be divulged, given to anybody (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
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If the examination is recorded, it has to be securely stored, and only other FMEs are 
allowed to view it: no other members of the investigatory team can access the 
recording.  This is done out of a duty of care to the complainer.  Brennan (2006) 
notes the similarity between recordings legitimately taken during the genital 
examination and pornography, and suggests that due to the numerous arenas that 
these images could potentially be displayed - “hospital records, a police station, a 
journal article, or a court room, with no clear boundaries as to who might get to view 
them” (Brennan 2006: 196) - control of the images is paramount.  The complainer 
consents to the images being used solely in a medico-legal capacity; their 
transference to other locations could lead to their use as something other than that 
which the complainer consented to.  Allowing only other FMEs to legitimately view 
the photo-document (i.e. permitting access only to those who would view the 
document in the same way) protects the complainer against any potential 
embarrassment and upholds the agreement to which the complainer has previously 
consented.  Similarly, although the defence FMEs do not view the colposcopic 
recording with the FME who recorded it, the FME working for the defence are 
required to go to the prosecution’s centre to view it. 
So if I’m the defence expert in a rape case, or in a sexual abuse case, I go to 
the other centre and say “Let me see the video.” “Yes, here you are, there’s 
the video machine, we’ll wait outside, give us a shout when you’re finished” 
(Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Colposcopic recordings are not entered as evidence into the trial, and so cannot 
reinforce FME authority in the same manner as (I have suggested) photographs of 
injuries can amongst jurors, but they can grant authority to the original FME’s 
interpretation via “virtual witnessing” in another manner.  The colposcope records 
the ano-genital area as seen by the FME performing the examination; as such, due to 
their shared ways of seeing (disciplined during training), the defence expert’s 
interpretation of the same images should be highly similar.  Of course, the viewing of 
the recording occurs in tandem with the reading of the prosecution FME’s report by 
the defence FME, and so the viewing of the recording with the original FME’s 
interpretation in mind could, in fact, reinforce those interpretations.  This is not to 
say that virtual witnessing ensures that there is always agreement between the 
defence FME and their colleague working with the prosecution; in fact, one of the 
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main arguments of this thesis is that differing practitioner experiences will inevitably 
produce differing opinions.  However, the use of the colposcope, with its ability to 
record, could potentially produce consistent reports of the ano-genital region, and/or 
result in an agreement of interpretation between the defence expert and the original 
FME.  I will conclude by explaining some of the other means by which the collective 
of FMEs are attempting to limit demonstrations of disunity in the courtroom. 
4.3 Force, Judgement and the Morphological Account 
Until now, I have focused upon the identification and classification of individual 
genital or extra-genital injury.  Post-examination, such judgements (the definition, 
age, etc. of particular individual injuries) are combined to provide the FME with their 
own “morphological account” of the events in question. 
Stating the reconstruction: so we’ve got hmmm an alleged assault and there is 
a victim and there is an accused and both of them give different versions of 
the incident but morphology doesn’t lie, um, so I take the morphology as a 
basis, what does the morphology tell me and many of the pathologists are not 
experienced and that’s a real deficit.  So they [police] ask us, I can tell you 
that there was a cut, or superficial wound, or in cases of rape, often there is no 
doubt about the sexual intercourse but how it came to that point, that’s the 
interesting thing, that’s most interesting that there was sexual intercourse, the 
man said “yes, she said yes” and the victim says “no, I didn’t agree”.  So 
that’s the account based on the morphology, because the morphology is a 
witness which doesn’t lie, that doesn’t lie. (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 2) 
 
The “morphological account” constitutes a collation of all the descriptions and 
judgements that have previously been made (during the general and genital 
examinations) about individual injuries (their age, their type, their colour) and 
provides the FME with, their own interpretation of the events in question.  In other 
words, the morphological account is a medical account of the events based upon the 
observed physical evidence.  The morphological account outlines the nature of the 
physical interaction between the complainer and the suspect(s) and therefore enables 
the FME to infer the severity of the attack, and address the related question of how 
much force was employed.  Dr. D’s colleagues similarly remarked upon the 
relationship between injuries, a medical account and judgements of severity. 
I think that just depends on a sense of how you decide the severity, and how 
you would, well, I think that depends on number of injuries.  You are looking 
at quantity…  You got to look at the whole thing, obviously you’re looking 
for patterning in the sense of, you’ve got fingertip gripping to arms and thighs 
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or anywhere else, marks around the neck, we’ve talked about injuries to the 
mouth; if the hands been held over the mouth, injuries to the back if they’ve 
been pushed onto a hard surface and scapula pressure points.  You’re looking 
for sexual contact perhaps; biting, scratching, hitting to the buttocks, injuries 
to the breasts, looking at all of that and obviously you can have all of that, 
you can also have significant blunt force trauma if they have been punched, 
kicked, slapped, hit with something.  So I mean, in terms of severity, looking 
at the overall injuries, type of injuries, whether they’ve actually, you know, if 
you see somebody’s head is out to a balloon then you know you’ve got 
significant blunt force trauma there (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
Well if there are patterns of injuries, for example grip marks, um punch 
marks, if someone’s been punched around the face or if there are bruises 
around the face suggesting strangulation, um anything around the face, then 
that in itself is very pertinent.  Finger mark bruising to the inner thighs, 
because you’ve got 5 bruises on the left and 5 on the right, then that tells its 
own story, doesn’t it (Dr. F, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Both quotations demonstrate how individual injuries are compiled to construct a 
larger account.  Dr. C’s quotation mentions how she is looking for scratch marks, 
bite marks, and injuries to the breasts, while Dr. F provides the example of finding 
five small bruises upon the inner thighs and explains how they can be classified as 
being indicative of forceful pushing apart of the thighs.  The individual injury gets 
combined with others to provide a morphological account.  The compiling of this 
account is aided by the body diagram, upon which the FME has previously recorded 
each individual injury they have observed.  As already mentioned, the body diagram 
helps the FME to construct the medical report by acting as an aide memoire of all the 
contusions observed upon the body.  Therefore, if the FME notes that there are a 
collection of scratches or cuts upon the extensor and ulnar surfaces of the forearms 
and hands, these can be combined and together classified as defensive wounds, 
where the complainer has attempted to protect herself from attack (Crane 2000).  The 
FME thus creates their own narrative (or range of narratives) from the spread and 




 The move from individual injury to morphological account exemplifies the 
interesting aspect of the sexual assault examination from a finitist perspective.  If 
individual injury classification is a judgement based upon previous experiences of 
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 Such comparison will be the focus of Chapter Seven. 
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injuries, as opposed to determinate deductive reasoning, then it is ultimately open-
ended and revisable,
102
 open to multiple interpretations based upon the past cases of 
the individual practitioner.  For example, in terms of injuries observed during a 
genital examination, the classification of the amount of force necessary to produce a 
certain collection of injuries will be based on one particular FME’s analogy between 
the current case and her own personal collection of earlier observed cases.  Other 
FMEs may disagree with the judgement; one FME’s threshold for force could vary 
drastically from her colleagues (due to differences in their collection of previous 
cases), and lacerations that signify considerable force to one examiner could 
represent “tiny lacerations” (Bowyer and Dalton 1997: 619) to another.  I have 
already explored two methods by which FME disagreement is diminished: the 
minimising of statements to only those claims agreed upon by all FMEs, and the use 
of images (photographs and colposcopic recordings) and “virtual witnessing”.  Even 
with these strategies, however, there is still scope for disagreement, particularly as 
FMEs are aware that they will likely be asked in a trial to provide an opinion on the 
amount of force necessary to produce such injuries, and as such are required to 
construct a “morphological account” in order to compare the physical evidence to the 
complainer’s account.  As such, FMEs do construct “opinions” regarding the severity 
of the attack (based upon the collected “facts” of individual injuries)
103
, and also 
attempt to construct a medical version of events, although these are both 
controversial areas and the statements could be contradicted by other FMEs.  Due to 
this potential for contradiction, FMEs have put pressure upon the COPFS to 
introduce procedures that limit the extent to which contradictory FME evidence is 
presented at trial. 
                                               
102 Similarly, as part of his study of the history of the Laboratory of the Royal College of Physicians of 
Edinburgh between 1887 to 1920, Steve Sturdy said the following about the construction of medical 
explanations: 
[the act of medical explanation] involved far more than just a series of deductive inferences.  
It also involved a large measure of hermeneutic reasoning and inductive generalization.  It 
was necessary to consider the case and its comparators holistically and analogically, in order 
to identify meaningful dimensions of similarity and dissimilarity.  Moreover, the very 
imputation of such meaning involved imagination; specifically, it involved the construction 
of a coherent narrative that tied the various facts of the case together in a web of cause and 
effect (Sturdy 2007b: 668) 
103
 Here, I am using the definitions of both FMEs and the law when discussing facts and opinions, and 
not my own interpretation, which suggests that both are in fact judgements and are therefore the same. 
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FMEs frequently expressed concern that they did not receive the defence 
expert’s report until the morning of the trial, and so had little time to consider why 
there were differences in the interpretations. 
[T]he other thing that they’ll [the defence] start on is the defence medical 
report… two days, one day before the actually [sic] start [of the trial] and I’ve 
said… they should fax the defence report, there’s nothing worse than actually 
giving it to you in court (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Nine times out of ten nobody bothers their backside to speak to you about 
your evidence in advance, you turn up on the day, you’re presented with the 
fact that an expert report has been produced that nobody has bothered to give 
you in advance, you can’t, you know, your supposed to respond to it there 
and then, and then people wonder why evidence is not of the quality that it 
might be.  Do I sound cynical? (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
As it currently stands the defence are not required to disclose their evidence to the 
prosecution; however, following FME pressure, the COPFS review of rape 
investigations in Scotland suggested the following concerning disclosure of defence 
expert reports. 
Experts stressed to us the need to ensure that Crown expert witnesses have 
had the opportunity to consider the impact on their evidence of any opinion 
evidence provided by defence experts.  The evidence of the Crown expert at 
trial is weakened or undermined where that expert has not had the 
opportunity to consider properly or comment on any contradictory evidence 
provided by a defence expert.  Similar considerations apply in asking 
permission of the court to allow Crown experts to remain in court to hear and 
comment upon evidence which the expert for the defence may provide to the 
court.  We [COPFS] considered, therefore, that a re-statement of best practice 
was required in all training and guidance to prosecution staff, emphasising 
the importance of providing expert witnesses with sufficient opportunity to 
assess any defence expert evidence and ensuring that the Crown expert is re-
precognosced thereafter (COPFS 2006: 120). 
 
Having received or heard the defence expert’s evidence, the prosecution’s FME can 
(re-)present their evidence, explaining the differences between the interpretations, 
and explaining where there are elements of consensus.  Similarly, FMEs have also 
called, as the COPFS quotation suggests, for more precognition. 
 Dr. C’s quotation and the COPFS report allude to the fact that FMEs wish to 
be questioned about their report before the trial, i.e. to be precognosced about their 
report.  The precognition process is a peculiarity of Scots law and concerns the 
interviewing of witnesses (before the trial) by both the defence and the prosecution.  
 112 
Precognition interviews are conducted by either a procurator fiscal or a Precognition 
Officer
104
 for the prosecution, or a Precognition Agent or a member of the defence 
team for the defence (depending on the severity of the case: more severe cases will 
be precognosced by the defence team).  In terms of the defence, the aim of the 
precognition is to interview the witnesses (although the interview is not conducted 
under oath) so that the defence are aware of the strength of the prosecution’s case 
and can advise their client accordingly (Christie and Moody 1999).  Prosecution 
precognition, although rarer, similarly allows the prosecution to ask questions of the 
witnesses so to expand and clarify upon the statements taken by the police.  FMEs 
are very supportive of the prosecution precognition, as it provides them with a space 
to assess alternative interpretations of the evidence. 
So first the precognition officer will start with the Fiscal Service [COPFS], 
for the prosecution and they go through the report that we have produced, 
what it means, what we say, what our qualifications, what our background is, 
so that they know.  Then they start pulling it apart and then they start, it’s 
very good, often you think “Oh my God, I said left there I meant right, can I 
take that back please?”  “Okay it’s already been lodged, we’ll bring it up in 
court”, and they will, these little things will come up, so it’s important to do a 
precognition.  It’s very well to say to someone can we make sure everything 
is ready, we all make mistakes, so they go through that.  Then they say well 
the defence, they may throw x, y and z at you and how do you feel, could this 
be this?  It has taken years for me to say “actually, yes it could be that, that’s 
a scenario I never thought of” because that’s why it’s important, it’s nice to 
see both sides, just now I think, after all this time that’s what’s good, because 
we see both, then we can turn around say “Good gosh no, there is NO WAY 
this could be self-inflicted” and that is also possible to say, so that’s where we 
thrash out everything.  And the defence come, I tell them my report and just 
answer the questions, I don’t go volunteering telling them anything, they 
don’t volunteer different (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Undergoing precognition pre-empts any potential alternative interpretations that the 
defence expert may produce.  The FME during the interview can review her own 
interpretation against potential others and either make amendments to her own 
testimony, or provide evidence to refute contradictory testimony.  As precognition 
was considered to be so beneficial, the COPFS advocated that it should be conducted 
in all cases of rape and penetrative sexual assault: 
                                               
104
 Pecognition Officers or Agents are generally either employees of the procurator fiscal service, ex-
police officers or law students, however; anyone can act as precognoscer (Christie and Moody 1999) 
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It is evident from our exploration of this area that precognition of forensic 
and medical experts requires particular skills and knowledge of the subject 
matter, bearing in mind the continual advancements in these areas.  There is 
clearly a need to ensure that forensic and medical experts are precognosced as 
a matter of routine, including cases where the expert’s report does not appear 
to support the Crown case (COPFS 2006: 119-120). 
 
The two strategies introduced in the COPFS report (at the request of FMEs) are very 
useful for the maintenance of the authority and credibility of FME testimony.  As I 
have already made clear, FMEs’ claims to provide factual evidence for the court are 
based upon the belief that there are certain matters upon which all FMEs agree, and 
therefore their statements upon such matters should be considered as facts and not 
opinions.  Public demonstrations of disagreement undermine such claims, and so 
FMEs are at pains to avoid them.  As questions of severity and “morphological 
accounts” are not considered facts by FMEs, but instead opinions drawn upon facts, 
practitioner disagreement upon such matters is deemed legitimate; however, they still 
prefer to limit courtroom displays of differences of opinion ( to continue the pretence 
that the “morphological account does not lie”).  To this end, examining the defence 
expert’s report, and/or being precognosced, provides space for the FME to consider 
other potential interpretations of the evidence and explain in court the reasons behind 
any disagreement.  Disagreement constitutes a breach of FMEs’ appearance as a 
consensual collective who produce facts; however, an FME providing testimony can 
repair this breach if they demonstrate adequately the reasons for the disagreement, 
based upon medical reasoning (i.e. explain that there are legitimate professional 
reasons for the difference of opinion, not suggest that the other FME has an interest 
in the case due to being paid by the defence).  The provision of legitimate (medical) 
explanations for differences of opinion fixes any breaches to the epistemic authority 
of FMEs that may result from contradictory testimony. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented a meaning finitist explanation for the way that FMEs 
interpret signs of injury, and also the way that they assess severity and construct 
medical narratives (“morphological accounts”) for an alleged assault.  Finitism 
stresses the inferential nature of classification; FMEs will have gathered a finite 
collection of cases of injuries during their experience, and when they come to 
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classify a new case (be it a particular injury, or a complete morphological account), 
they will draw upon those previous cases in order to make a new classification.  As 
each FME has a different set, there is considerable scope for variant interpretations.  
Demonstration of such diversity of interpretation is problematic for the community 
of FMEs, however, as it limits their ability to claim that they have the expertise to 
supply incontrovertible evidence to the court.  To this end, FMEs have established 
strategies to ensure that their practitioners do not disagree upon certain matters, and 
also that when disagreement is unavoidable (for instance, if there is discussion of 
“opinions” such as the amount of severity necessary to produce an injury or 
collection of injuries), it is minimal and there is space to mend any breaches (caused 
by contradictory testimony) to the authority of FMEs.  The first of the mechanisms 
that I mentioned was the limiting of statements concerning the cause of injury.  There 
does not appear to be disagreement amongst FMEs about types of injuries (a result of 
their shared training), and so an FME’s identification of an injury constitutes 
incontrovertible fact.  The cause of injury, or the amount of force needed to make 
such an injury, can sometimes be challenged and contradicted, and so FMEs either 
choose to consult another FME about the possible cause (collaboration granting the 
claim more authority), or avoid making such claims, preferring to stick to statements 
that will definitely be corroborated by other members of the community.  Moreover, 
the imaging of injuries not only provides FMEs with considerable authority in the 
courtroom, as the members of the jury “virtually witness” the body of the complainer 
via photographs, but can also result in the agreement of defence experts with the 
interpretations of their peer when they view the colposcopic recordings, again 
“virtually witnessing” the conduct of the examination and drawing conclusions in the 
same way as the original FME.  Such practices, therefore, reinforce the credibility of 
the individual FME’s evidence, and the collective authority of FMEs as a whole. 
 Sometimes it is not possible for FMEs to limit their claims, however, and 
they are required to form opinions in order to perform other facets of their work.  
Such is the case with questions of severity and force and the “morphological 
account”.  The “morphological account” is essentially a compilation of previous 
judgements (injury type and cause); as it can be contradicted by other practitioners, it 
constitutes an opinion in the eyes of FMEs, and this is also the case with severity.  
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While opinions constitute legitimate spaces for disagreement, FMEs still prefer to 
limit divergent judgements as they can be harmful to the credibility of FMEs’ 
expertise.  To this end, FMEs have requested that the COPFS introduce strategies 
that provide practitioners with space to explore and explain the reasons for 
differences of opinion.  Providing such an explanation maintains the belief amongst 
FMEs and the court that FME interpretations are based on consensus.  This is similar 
to Roger Smith’s finding in his study of pathologists: 
[B]elief among forensic pathologists that there is a potential consensus of 
opinion even if doubts are visible in court, enhances their group self-
confidence and hence ability to project a sense of authority (Smith 1989: 67). 
 
There is one other method by which FMEs’ interpretations of injuries, particularly 
“morphological accounts”, receive the status of credible evidence in courtrooms, and 
that is via the construction of “neutral reports”.  I will not explain these here, as they 
are not the focus of this chapter.  In Chapter Seven, I will explain how FMEs take the 
judgements encapsulated within the “morphological account” and compare them to 
the complainer’s allegation that they have been raped.  Such a comparison constitutes 
a significant problem for FME claims-making, consensus and authority.  Before 
turning to that, however, I will first explore a number of other classifications that 
FMEs are required to make: classifications concerning the correct procedure to 
follow during the forensic medical examination. 
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5. The Incorporation of “Best Practice” and Guidance 
into Clinical Forensic Medicine 
 
Not only are FMEs expected to observe and classify injuries during the forensic 
medical examination; they are also expected to classify cases and identify and collect 
other types of evidence, including biological trace material and information about the 
complainer that may be of benefit to both their own assessments of the case and 
those of forensic scientists.  In the past, police doctors (the precursors to FMEs) were 
criticised for not collecting some of this procedural evidence, and so forensic kits 
were introduced by the professional associations concerned with clinical forensic 
medical work in an attempt to improve the rate of evidence collection.  In this 
chapter, I will provide an account of the introduction of those kits, and also describe 
the contents of the kits themselves, identifying the purpose of some of the artefacts 
found within.  Importantly, this chapter will introduce a discussion of the relationship 
between guidance artefacts and actual FME evidence collection procedure, which 
will continue in the following chapter.  Here, I will also explore the organisational 
relationships between the differing professions who compile the kits, and their 
divergent attitudes towards the accountability of FME work to guidance artefacts.  
This question is particularly salient to the opening decade of the 21
st
 century, as the 
late 1990s saw a boom in both Evidence-Based Medicine and Evidence-Based 
Policy; this has had an effect on clinical forensic medical work, particularly the 
continuing development of the early kits and documentary artefacts, which now 
explicate FME practice in significant detail.  To this end, in addition to addressing 
the content of the early kits, I will outline the effect that the discourse of Evidence-
Based Medicine has had upon the forensic medical kits. 
 In this chapter, I will also provide a preliminary explanation for the role that I 
believe guidance artefacts play in maintaining the authority of FME work and the 
evidence that they produce.  As already mentioned, the fact that the kits were first 
introduced after a period of sustained criticism of police doctor practice sheds some 
light on the function of guidance documents: they are there to legitimate FME work 
in contentious circumstances.  This argument will first be sketched out during the 
current chapter, and fully expressed in the next.  I will start, however, with an outline 
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of the origin of guidance in forensic medical work: the construction, and APS 
endorsement, of the Forensic Medical Examination Kit (FMEK). 
5.1 The Introduction of the Forensic Medical Examination Kit 
5.1.1 Criticisms of the Forensic Medical Examination 
Influenced by the growing academic, political and public concern surrounding the 
treatment of women who had reported a complaint of rape,
105
 the Scottish Office’s 
“Social Research Study Group” conducted a study of the police’s processing of rape 
complaints during 1980-1981.  Published in 1983 as Investigating Sexual Assault 
(Chambers and Millar 1983), the study reviewed all facets of the police’s 
investigation of reported sexual assaults in Edinburgh and Glasgow.  They reviewed 
everything from the tactics employed in the interview of the complainer through to 
methods of evidence collection and corroboration.  As part of the evidence collection 
and corroboration aspects, “special attention” was paid to the medical examination, 
“because of its crucial importance in providing forensic evidence in rape cases but 
also because it was a procedure about which complainers expressed a lot of concern” 
(Chambers and Millar 1983: 96).  The study discovered that medical examinations 
were generally conducted in an ad hoc fashion, with considerable discrepancies 
between regions and practitioners. 
In analysing case records and in discussions with police surgeons about their 
job, the researchers were struck by the number of references to what seemed 
to be inadequacies or inconsistencies in the procedures and practices 
surrounding the medical examination and the collection of forensic evidence 
(Chambers and Millar 1983: 106). 
 
Chambers and Millar found significant disparities, both between regions in general 
and individual practitioners in the same region.  These disparities concerned the level 
of care given, the attitude of the examiner, the questions asked by the examiner, and 
the number and types of samples collected.  The authors concluded that these 
“inadequacies and inconsistencies” were the results of: a) inadequate training or 
experience: 
Case No 1064 
The police surgeon noted in his written report that he was not sure whether he 
had conducted all the relevant procedures concerning the collection of 
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 See Chapter One for a brief discussion of these critiques. 
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specimens and swabs as this was the first time he had conducted a medical 
examination (Chambers and Millar 1983: 106); 
 
b) lack of the requisite instruments: 
Case No 1100 
The police surgeon noted in his report that it was not possible to take the 
necessary blood sample as there was no phial for holding the blood among 
the instruments provided. (Chambers and Millar 1983: 106); 
 
or c) weak delivery links in the chain of evidence: 
Case No 1139 
The case papers noted that the police ‘lost’ the collection sheet on which the 
complainer stood while she removed her clothing.  (The purpose of the 
collection sheet is to ensure that any debris, dirt, or other items which fall 
from the complainer or her clothing as she undresses can be retrieved and 




In Chambers and Millar’s opinion, medical examinations of sexual assault victims 
were performed poorly because of the inexperience and lack of training of police 
doctors, as well as the fact that the locations in which they were taking place were 
frequently inadequately stocked (i.e. they failed to have the supplies necessary for 
conducting sexual assault examinations).  Chambers and Millar concluded that while 
they were critical of the apparent inadequacies and inconsistencies observed in the 
medical reports, they did not advocate routinising medical examinations; when the 
authors had interviewed victims about their experiences during the medical 
examination, the interviewees expressed “dissatisfaction” with doctors who had 
treated them “routinely” i.e. following a process and paying little consideration to the 
individual needs of the complainer.  As I will show, this balancing act between 
routinisation (of the examination) and providing a bespoke service tailored to the 
needs of the individual complainer is a frequent and ongoing problem for the 
associations concerned with forensic medical examinations. 
At the same time as the Chambers and Millar study, similar criticisms of 
medical examinations were levelled at police doctors by members of their own 
profession.  In the APS’s own journal, The Police Surgeon, articles were published 
that questioned the completeness of the medical examinations and the skills of the 
practitioners. 
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 See Chapter One for some of Chambers and Millar’s other criticisms of the medical examination. 
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But we know that it can happen that a woman makes a complaint and is 
treated unsympathetically by the police, is not believed, and is seen by an 
unsympathetic and even worse, an unskilled, police surgeon many hours after 
the alleged offence and is examined in a clumsy and incompetent way in a 
rather grubby and dingy medical room which always seems to be situated 
next to the clanking iron doors of the cells; where there may be no proper 
instruments or lighting, no clean sheet on the bed, sometimes even no soap 
and towel. 
The medical examination may be incomplete or the wrong swabs may 
be taken.  Quite likely the vagina will not be properly examined with a 
speculum, small injuries and marks of great significance may be missed and 
the woman may be even more distressed by the examination than she was by 
the original offence. 
 She is unlikely to receive advice about pregnancy, V.D. or counselling 
help and after the examination will continue to be interviewed by the police 
without being able to scrub herself clean; although this is one of the first 
things a woman wants to do when she’s been raped (Roberts 1984: 78). 
 
Another police doctor, Dr. Smith, was also highly critical, arguing that the 
insufficient skill of some doctors resulted in loss of evidence, and that the 
unsympathetic manner of some of his colleagues came close to appearing hostile 
(Smith 1980).  Against this groundswell of negative public and professional opinion, 
the APS needed to do something.  Their response was to produce a booklet that 
aimed to guide and inform police doctor practice without constraining it. 
5.1.2 The New Police Surgeon: Rape and the Metropolitan 
Laboratory Sexual Assault Examination Kit 
In 1983, the APS “agreed to compile a booklet setting out a clear description of the 
medical examiner’s duty when confronted with a case of alleged rape.” (McLay 
1984b: 5)
107
  However, the booklet produced (The New Police Surgeon: Rape
108
 
(McLay 1984a)) did not set out to outline hard and fast rules on the correct 
comportment of the police doctor, as 
the attempt to cover every variation, to tie the officer’s hand, will not improve 
the rate at which cases are cleared up, nor increase the satisfaction of the 
victim.  In practice, each case presents individual problems which may not 
easily be anticipated, or they would not be problems.  What is not in doubt is 
the need to promote standards of care, consideration and competence in all 
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 It is noteworthy that the author chooses to use the antagonistic word “confronted” in this context, 
to infer “presented”. 
108
 The New Police Surgeon: Rape was produced within a series of other APS The New Police 
Surgeon publications, for example The New Police Surgeon: A Practical Guide, which was published 
in 1978, slightly earlier than The New Police Surgeon: Rape. 
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official dealings with those complaining of sexual assault (McLay 1984b: 8 
emphasis in original). 
 
Rather, the booklet aimed to create a baseline standard to which all doctors 
performing medical examinations of sexual assault complainers could adhere.  To 
this end, the booklet is a collection of articles drawn from The Police Surgeon, and 
represents what was then considered the most up-to-date work in the field.  The 
chapters were written by practicing police surgeons, with the exception of the final 
chapter, which was written by a forensic scientist.  The booklet commences with a 
chapter on the law of rape written by the (then) editor of The Police Surgeon journal, 
W. D. S McLay, who attempted to present a unified, British approach to the law of 
rape; however, as McLay worked in Strathclyde, the discussion is mostly based upon 
Scots law.  McLay’s chapter is followed by a discussion about how the examination 
room should be set up and which equipment should be available.  This chapter is 
followed by a discussion of “The Clinical Examination” (Burges 1984), which 
outlines the role of the examination and offers advice on which instrument(s) to use 
for each part of the examination, which precautions to take when collecting certain 
samples, and the preferred order in which to take each sample.  Chapter Four is a 
short critical article that aims to outline criticisms of medical examinations of sexual 
assault victims.  Chapters Five and Six provide two examples of Sexual Offence 
Examination Kits: one from the Metropolitan Police and the other from The College 
of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba, Western Canada.  Finally, the last chapter 
is written from a forensic scientist’s point of view and explains the preferred manner 
in which forensic scientists choose to receive the samples.  Again, particular 
emphasis is placed upon the usefulness of sexual assault examination kits.  By 
breaking down the chapters, I have demonstrated that over half of the chapters in the 
booklet were devoted to equipment, particularly the introduction of the Sexual 
Assault Examination Kit. 
 Both Chambers and Millar and the police surgeons writing in The Police 
Surgeon mentioned that a frequent cause of sample omission was a lack of the 
equipment required to store or collect trace material.  At the same time that these 
criticisms were aimed at police doctors, various organisations, both nationally and 
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internationally, were developing standardised Sexual Assault Examination Kits.
109
  
During 1977-78, a total of four kits were displayed at the APS Annual Conferences; 
these included the U.S. Naval Investigative Service Sexual Assault Kit, the 
Lincolnshire Sexual Assault Kit and the Metropolitan Laboratory Sexual Assault 
Examination Kit (Clarke 1984).  While there were subtle differences in the contents, 
all kits had the same objective: to provide the police doctor with a standard set of 
instruments that were deemed appropriate for collecting all available trace evidence 
from the body of the complainer.  As evidenced by the breakdown of the contents of 
the booklet, the APS clearly advocated that each constabulary should develop their 
own kits in order to aid police doctors in collecting trace material from the body of 
the complainer.  The booklet frequently reiterates that the kits improve the chance of 
performing “successful” examinations. 
Experience has shown that a successful examination is more likely to be 
accomplished if the doctor has available a prepared sexual assault 
investigation kit.  Vital specimens are less likely to be omitted and the 




The standardisation of basic equipment for use by the Police Surgeon should 
lead to an improved rate in the recovery of forensic evidence, particularly in 
those police areas where the facilities and the equipment supplied are 
inadequate (Clarke 1984: 82). 
 
It is difficult to discern what the authors meant by a “successful examination”; it 
would appear to connote an examination in which all vital trace material is collected 
and delivered to the forensic scientists without disruption.  While the APS stated that 
they did not wish to “tie the [police doctor’s] hand”, it does appear that by 
advocating the incorporation of a standardised kit into the medical examination, with 
a normative expectation of what signified a “successful examination”, they were 
suggesting that, while the examination should not ultimately be standardised, a 
certain routinisation of work should be introduced.  This is clearer when one 
investigates the exact type of kit that the APS was advocating. 
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 Sexual assault examination kits were already being used in parts of Canada by the time the booklet 
was produced (Du Mont and Parnis 2000, 2001, Parnis and Du Mont 2002).  The Netherlands were 
also routinely using kits by 1982 (Toom forthcoming). 
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While four different kits had been displayed at the APS’s Annual 
Conferences in 1977 and 1978, the authors of the booklet decided to devote a chapter 
to the Metropolitan Laboratory Sexual Assault Examination Kit (hereafter 
“Metropolitan Kit”) alone.  The authors make it clear that although it is up to each 
particular police force to assemble their own kit in discussion with their local 
forensic science laboratory, the Metropolitan Kit is the model upon which the APS 
prefer the kits to be based.  As well as containing “the basic essentials for the 
obtaining of forensic evidence in sexual offences” (Clarke 1984: 82), there are two 
novel elements to the Metropolitan Kit, a reporting form and a brown sheet (although 
it is clear from Case No. 1139 above that the latter was already part of the 
examination in parts of Scotland by the time of Chambers and Millar’s study).  These 
new elements were preferable as they enabled improved collection and securer 
transference of material between medical examination and the forensic science 
laboratory.  For later reference I will list the contents of the Metropolitan Kit.
110
 
The kit is presented in a stout cardboard box measuring 1¾” x 8” x 12”.  It 
contains the following items:- 
List of contents and instructions for their use and general notes on the 
examination. 
Two copies of sexual offences examination form. [appendix 2] 
Sheet of brown paper measuring 45” x 28” folded in polythene bag. 
[Blood] Grouping Pack – 10ml. syringe with 21 G x 1½” needle. 
Linton Towelette and Elastoplast dressing.  Glass bottle for blood 
sample.  Glass bottle for saliva sample. 
6 plain style cotton wool swabs. 
2 polythene bags for fingernail samples. 
2 combs, each in polythene bag, for head and pubic hair combings. 
3 polythene bags for pulled hair samples. 
Roll of sellotape 4m. x 2.5cm. 
Pair of disposable polythene gloves. 
Drugs/Alcohol Analysis Pack – Glass bottle with fluoride and oxulate 
for blood sample.  Glass bottle for urine sample. 
 
Included in the kit submitted for examination was a strip of 16 adhesive 
labels 1½” x ¾”.  The glass bottles each hold 30 mls. and are fitted with 
screw tops.  Each bottle, polythene bag and swab is labelled with an exhibit 
label and also a small separate adhesive label. [The kits also contain a 
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 Each kit was designed to be used in one examination.  After the kit had been used, the parts that 
were used would be forwarded to the laboratory, while the parts not used would be recycled into more 
kits. 
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disposable white gown and a pair of disposable white pants] (Clarke 1984: 
82/3). 
 
It is possible to recognise some form of prescription within the elements of the 
Metropolitan Kit.  The kit provides the practitioner with the instruments to take two 
blood samples (one to find the blood group of the complainer, the other to test for 
drugs or alcohol), saliva and urine, along with pubic and head hair (one sample of 
head hair combed out, the other pulled out), fingernail samples and samples from the 
ano-genital areas (taken with swabs).  While the authors of the booklet claim that 
they do not wish to remove discretion from the doctors, and that the articles in the kit 
are there to enable the doctor to collect whichever samples they deem appropriate, 
there is an extent to which the instruments within the kit already designate which 
samples ought be taken: for example, 2 x blood, 1 x saliva, urine etc.  The elements 
unused in the kit would remind the doctor of samples that had not been collected but 
possibly should be, meaning that the leftover items might result in the doctor 
questioning whether or not they should collect such samples.  Such guidance was 
also given by the sexual offences form and, most explicitly, by guidance notes. 
The Metropolitan Kit was the first to introduce a form upon which to record 
which samples had been taken and to provide any case-specific information that may 
be of use to the forensic scientist (for instance, the amount of time that had elapsed 
between the alleged assault and the medical examination, or any signs of STD) 
(Davies 1984).  Prior to the Metropolitan Kit, it was up to the accompanying police 
officer to transfer the samples to the laboratory, with no oversight regarding which 
samples had been collected and delivered (see Case 1139 above).  As far as any case-
specific information was concerned, it was thought that the police officer was “not in 
a position to give clear and concise details, but the form provides the doctor with an 
opportunity to convey these direct to the scientist” (Clarke 1984: 84).  As well as 
facilitating the transmission of information, the form also outlines a set of questions 
or further observations that are required from the police doctor.  Using the form, 
doctors are expected to ask and record the following: whether lubricants or 
contraceptives were used, whether there were signs of bleeding, whether there were 
any signs of STDs, whether the complainer had bathed, etc.  As such, as well as 
providing a form of governance over the safe transfer of samples to the laboratory, 
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the form also acts as a checklist of questions that the doctor should ask, and any 
preliminary observations that should be made, before performing the examination.  
While the form provides a modicum of guidance, it is not as explicit as the notes of 
guidance. 
 The guidance document is added to every kit, and sets out the exact manner 
in which the medical examination should be conducted and recorded: a list of things 
for which the doctor should be looking before conducting the medical examination 
(the complainer/suspect’s mental state, their state of development, their apparent age 
in comparison to their stated age, etc.); an explanation of the observation process; a 
description of the samples that should be taken, the reasons for using particular 
swabs and the method by which the samples should be collected; and finally, the 
manner in which each sample should be labelled and transported to the laboratory.  
As with the rest of the Metropolitan Kit, the guidance notes are there to inform and 
educate police doctors, with particular attention to what is actually required from the 
medical examination by the other actors within the investigation (forensic scientists 
and police), with the aim of improving the quantity and quality of samples collected 
and their transportation to the laboratory.  Importantly, this guidance document (like 
the kit itself) was not produced by police doctors, but instead by other actors 
involved in the investigative process: namely forensic scientists and the police. 
The main purpose of these notes is to provide doctors with guidance as to the 
various items, specimens and control samples which are necessary for further 
examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory and at the same time give 
some indication of the type of information which is required to assist the 
Police with their investigations and if necessary form the basis of evidence 
which is to be adduced in Court (Home Office Forensic Laboratory, 
Chepstow, cited in Clarke 1984: 84/5). 
 
To this end, both the kit and the guidance notes signify a potential challenge to the 
autonomy of one profession (namely police doctors) by other agencies (in this case, 
the police and forensic scientists) over the control of the former’s work, which falls 
under the jurisdiction of police doctors.
111
  Due to this potential interference (but 
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 I use the term “jurisdiction” in the sense that Andrew Abbott (1988) uses it, i.e. to identify the way 
in which a professional group comes to appropriate a particular function (e.g. collecting evidence from 
someone reporting a complaint of rape) as their own, and the ability of a particular professional group 
to prescribe the way in which they perform that work.  This jurisdictional relation between a 
profession and the content of its work has been a frequent source of contention within the sociology of 
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mostly out of a duty of care to the complainer), the authors of the booklet, whilst 
advocating the Metropolitan Kit as the template for other constabularies’ sexual 
assault kits, strongly defend police doctors’ right to use their discretion and conduct 
examinations on a case-by-case basis, without following to strict precision the 
routines of the form or the guidance documents. 
Instruction booklets and the various medical protocols should not be 
interpreted literally so that the victim is assailed by an unimaginative 
catechism (Burges 1984: 29). 
 
The introduction of the Metropolitan Kit certainly signifies an important moment in 
the history of the rise of guideline-based forensic medicine; it was the first time that a 
standardised technology was advocated by the APS in order to improve the quality of 
the work performed by police doctors, and the introduction of the form and the 
standard equipment within the kit, did result in some uniformity in the work of police 
doctors.  As I will explain shortly, however, while the introduction of guidance 
served the purpose of improving the conduct of examinations (i.e. ensuring that the 
police doctor had all the materials necessary), its more important function was to 
counter the criticisms aimed at FMEs, and thereby improve the credibility and 
authority of police doctor evidence.  The next twenty years saw the APS taking more 
control over the production of guidance and protocols for police doctors. 
5.2 Evidence-Based Medicine, Best Practice and Clinical 
Forensic Medicine 
The introduction of the Metropolitan Kit was the first step in an effort to ensure that 
police doctor work was of a certain standard.  In the years that followed, the APS and 
its later incarnations, the AFP and the present-day FFLM, would put more and more 
emphasis upon kits and guidance, eventually resulting in the “National Medical 
                                                                                                                                     
professions.  Freidson (1975, 1993) argued that doctors have “Professional Dominance” over their 
work, meaning control over the way in which they conduct such work and the work of others who 
enter within their domain.  On the other hand, Donald Light (1989, 1993, 1995) argues, similarly to 
Abbott, that professions are not a monolithic category but instead a fragmented and competing 
collection of actors, and, using Galbraith’s concept of “Countervailing Powers”, suggests that when 
one profession becomes too prominent (as medicine did in America in the 1950s and 60s), other 
professional groups react to redress the balance.  Light suggests that the rise of an administrative 
professional class and the introduction of guidance for doctors (even though, in the American context, 
doctors have the ability to write their own guidance) represent a redressing of the balance of power 
and a decline in the “sovereignty” of the medical profession.  As I will show, the conflict between the 
police doctor profession, the police and forensic scientists is still ongoing. 
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Examination Kit Working Party”.  This committee was founded in 1998; its function 
was to advocate a certain level of homogenisation of kits throughout Great Britain, as 
well as to evaluate the professional association’s guidance to FMEs in light of the 
best available evidence (Newton 2004).  This shift to the discourse of “best practice” 
did not happen in a vacuum, and is a consequence of broader shifts that had taken 
place within medicine (as well as in other fields, notably policy creation) at 
approximately the same time, most notably the rise of “Evidence-Based Medicine” 
(hereafter “EBM”).  To understand the shifts in forensic medical work, it is necessary 
to spell out these broader changes, with particular attention paid to EBM. 
5.2.1 What is EBM? 
It was not just clinical forensic medicine that found itself under attack during the late 
1970s; medicine in general was placed under a similar critical gaze, and for similar 
reasons.  Both observers and members of the medical profession
112
 commented that 
medical practitioners were carrying out unnecessary and inefficient practices.  As a 
result of varied practices, it was recorded that there were differing standards of care 
across geographical areas, coupled with inconsistent levels of cost not justifiable by 
social demographics (Timmermans and Berg 2003, Mercer 2008).  Towards the end 
of the 1980s/early 1990s, in order to counter the observed levels of practice variation 
(and the medical profession’s critics), and in the wake of a highly influential book by 
Marilyn J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, Clinical Practice Guidelines: Directions for 
a New Program, EBM was born. 
With spiralling health care costs, more emancipated patients/consumers, 
increasing attention to medical practice variations, an information overload, 
and an overall critical scrutiny of the role of experts and professionals in 
society, the medical profession felt it had to take unprecedented action to 
maintain its position as exclusive safe-keeper and wielder of medical 
knowledge.  “Unexamined reliance on professional judgement,” it is argued 
[by Field and Lohr], will no longer do.  “More structured support and 
accountability for such judgement,” in the form of evidence-based guidelines, 
is required to ensure trust in the medical profession (Timmermans and Berg 
2003: 16). 
 
                                               
112
 The extent to which one can talk about a homogenous medical profession, of course, is debatable.  
See Mol & Berg (1998). 
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The acronym, EBM, is most commonly used to represent the integration of clinical 
practice guidelines into the decision-making of medical work.  The role of the 
guideline, or protocol, is to “offer pre-defined, stepwise, optimal paths through 
complex or troublesome medical situations” (Berg 1997: 4).
113
  Practice guidelines, 
therefore, are tools that the healthcare practitioner can draw upon in their decision-
making.  Importantly, as the “Evidence-Based” in the title EBM indicates, the pre-
defined paths written into the guideline derive from what has been agreed by the 
guideline writers to represent the best scientific evidence at the present time.  The 
guideline provides the healthcare practitioner with a summary of the most up-to-date 
literature on a particular medical procedure, and identifies which actions represent 
contemporary “best practice”.  Providing these guidelines, it is argued by proponents, 
will limit practice variation, ensure that all patients are provided with the best (and 
most up-to-date) quality of care, and make certain that the most cost-effective 
treatments are routinely employed.  An advocate of EBM put it like this: 
The primary aim of a good clinical guideline is to ensure that all the right 
things and none of the wrong things are done when a patient presents with a 
particular clinical problem.  This regardless of which health care professional 
sees them and regardless of the part of the country or time of the day they are 
being seen.  This is also referred to as uniformity of care.  It is not aimed at 
somehow limiting excellence, but is aspiring to ensure excellence for all… 
The development of a guideline requires consideration of the evidence 
available about the most effective way to manage a condition.  This must take 
account not just of which treatment is most clinically effective, but which is 
most cost-effective (Tuffnell 2002: 21/2). 
 
5.2.2 The ASP/FFLM, The National Medical Examination Kit 
Working Party and Guidelines 
With the rise of EBM, FMEs began to talk about the necessity of an evidence-base 
within their own work. 
And indeed a wish to have proper Evidence-Based Medicine practised in 
clinical forensic medicine and that is what we see as the role of the faculty 
[FFLM], to raise standards by educational means and again have the journal 
[Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine] to publish and encourage research 
(Dr. E, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
                                               
113
 It should be noted that protocols are not the only form of decision-support tool; there exist 
computer-based decision-support systems and clinical decision analysis also, but these will not be 
discussed here; see Berg (1997). 
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Further evidence of the growing importance of EBM in forensic medicine, 
particularly in terms of sampling decision-making comes in the form of the title to 
Rogers and Newton’s (2006) article in the special issue of the Journal of Clinical 
Forensic Medicine; the title being “Evidence-Based Forensic Sampling – More 
questions than answers”.  As its name suggests, it is an evaluation of the effect that 
EBM has had upon clinical forensic medicine, particularly in terms of sample 
collection.
114
  The discourse of EBM, therefore, appears to have entered into forensic 
medical work and was an influencing factor in the APS’s decision to form a 
“National Medical Examination Kit Working Party” (hereafter “working party”), 
whose role would be to create and evaluate kits and decision-support tools for police 
doctors.  The original working party was headed by prominent members of the APS, 
but also contained members of the Association of Chief Police Officers (hereafter 
“ACPO”) and the Forensic Science Service (hereafter “FSS”) (Newton 2004).
115
  As 
mentioned, one of the two functions of the working party was to develop a template 
FMEK and, in addition, institute guidelines and a pro forma for its use.  The other, 
more long-term function was to evaluate those artefacts.  Evaluation was to centre 
around two aspects: first, the issue of whether or not practitioners found the artefacts 
useful, and secondly, the issue of whether or not the artefacts still constitute best 
practice in light of the most up-to-date clinical evidence.  As mentioned in the 
discussion of EBM, the chief function of a guideline is to provide the healthcare 
practitioner with that which is considered to be best practice based upon the best 
clinical evidence at the present time by the authors of the guideline (Hill 2006).
116
  
The working party’s role was (and still is) to sift through all the latest studies and 
then produce the kit, protocol and relevant guidelines that streamline all the available 
literature and provide FMEs with a (set of) document(s) that encapsulates 
contemporary “best practice”.  Therefore, the role of the guideline is to ease the 
intellectual workload of the FME by removing the requirement of the latter to digest 
and remember every article written about clinical forensic medicine.  Instead of 
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 Likewise see Guy Norfolk’s (2006) response to charges made in the Guardian about problems with 
police doctors’ evidence collection and claims-making processes (Dyer 2006). 
115 Since then, other organisations have become members of the working party, including the 
Laboratory of the Government Chemist (LGC), the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), 
and, most recently, Key Forensic Services Ltd. 
116
 Alongside the most cost-efficient practices. 
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applying those individual articles to their decision-making, they use the most up-to-
date best practice as already set out in the guideline. 
 Having outlined the aims of the working party, I shall now turn to their 
products.  As far as the kit is concerned, very little has altered since the introduction 
of the early Metropolitan Kit discussed above.  For the working party, the imperative 
facets of the kit are:  
• a documentation module, which contains sexual offence forms and guidance 
notes for the FME as well as information for the complainer (relating to the 
medical itself, the court case, how the complainant might be feeling post-
assault, and the investigative and judicial processes);  
• a cover for the couch on which the examination will take place; 
•  a brown sheet for the complainer to undress upon;  
• disposable clothing;  
• a body outline diagram module;
117
  
• a mouth collection module, containing a screw-top phial and two swabs;  
• a hair sample collection module, containing scissors, a comb and tamper 
evident bags;  
• a fingernail sample collection module, containing fingernail clippers and 
tamper evident bags;  
• a swab module, containing 6 specially selected swabs and an ampoule of 10 
ml of sterile water for moistening;  
• an alcohol and drug urine module, containing a 20 ml plastic collection 
beaker;  
• an alcohol and drug blood module containing 2 x needles and a 10 ml phial;  
• and a DNA 2 buccal kit, containing 2 swabs (Newton 2004).
118
   
While little was done to change the instruments found within the kit, the working 
group did drastically alter the forms. 
 Turning first to the sexual offences form (appendix 3), the first thing one 
notices upon viewing it is its length.  In contrast to the original one-page document 
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 See Chapter Four for more on the body outline diagrams. 
118
 I will compare this hypothetical kit suggested by the working party with the contents of an actual 
FMEK in Section 5.3.1. 
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found in the Metropolitan Kit, the current form, advocated by the FFLM, runs to a 
total of thirteen pages and, as a result, requires far more information than the form in 
the Metropolitan Kit.  In even greater detail than its predecessor, the pro forma takes 
the FME through each facet of the examination.  It is also worth noting at this stage 
that this form is only to be used on adults, complainers in particular; there are other 
forms for children and suspects.  The form commences with a request for the details 
of all those in attendance; this includes the names of the doctor(s),
119
 the 
accompanying police officer, any other attendees there to support the complainer 
(social worker, friend, relative, etc.) and, of course, the details of the complainer.  
Only the latter’s details were originally requested by the form in the Metropolitan 
Kit.  The attendees’ details are then followed by another new addition, the consent 
page; on this page, the complainer verifies that the FME has informed them of the 
due examination process and the way in which the material collected (both 
specimens and photo-documents) can be used in the course of a future trial, and also 
gives consent to undergo such a procedure.  The consent page is followed by four 
and a half pages of questions relating both to the account and to the medical history 
of the complainant.  Now, it should be noted that the FME herself does not take a 
statement from the complainer; it is considered best practice that the FME receive the 
account from the accompanying officer, who has already questioned the complainer 
and gathered the account.
120
  The doctor notes down the person from whom they 
received the account, their contact details, and additionally the person(s) who were 
present at the time the account was given.  The FME then proceeds to record the 
location of the assault, any specificities that they feel may be of use to the forensic 
science laboratory (or to themselves when assessing the allegation), and a breakdown 
of the events of the assault (i.e. whether there was attempted or successful anal 
penetration, whether there was ejaculation, if so, where, etc.).  Following the account 
of the allegation, questions are asked pertaining to any substances that the 
complainer may have consumed before or since the assault, along with other 
pertinent post-assault questions; it is recorded whether or not the complainant has 
bathed, changed clothes, etc.  Finally, a detailed medical and a ten-day sexual history 
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 Of course, other doctors can be present during the examination in a training capacity; see Chapter 
Three. 
120
 I will develop this point in the following chapter. 
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are collected from the complainer, including information about previous surgical 
procedures, any psychiatric diagnoses, allergies, menstrual and contraceptive 
histories, and any short-term genital or abdominal symptoms that may have 
developed since the alleged assault.  Criminal investigators are increasingly wary 
about the quantity of sexual history information collected, due to its potential to 
embarrass and incriminate the complainer in court; therefore, information relating 
only to sexual intercourse within the last ten days is recorded, as this may be relevant 
to the forensic scientists’ work and the FME’s latter decisions.  As with its 
predecessor, the contemporary pro forma provides the FME with a set of questions 
and observations to ensure that they collect all information required both by FMEs 
themselves (for when they later come to draw conclusions about the medical 
evidence) and the forensic scientists in the laboratory.  It is clear, however, that in 
contrast to the half page set aside in the Metropolitan form for questions about sexual 
and medical history, the contemporary pro forma explicates in greater detail the 
questions that are most necessary.  It was Dr. E’s opinion that this list of questions 
was beneficial to the practicing FME. 
Well yeah again, I think you have to say, you have to put it into context, you 
have to say some people do bruise relatively easily, one of the things you 
have to be asking if you have a protocol is do you bruise easily, I would ask 
about alcohol consumption and suchlike and so hopefully if there was an 
obvious cause for excessive bruising you’d have that there.  So I think that is 
one good example of having a rigid protocol, ensuring you ask certain 
questions (Dr. E, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
 The next section outlined in the pro forma is the general examination.  The 
pro forma leaves space for the FME to record height, weight and hair colour, as well 
as more subjective conditions such as the complainer’s demeanour and level of 
hygiene.  The locations on the body which the FME should examine are next 
labelled, and the FME records whether or not there are signs of injury; if so, it is 
recommended that the injuries should be labelled, both on the pro forma and on a 
separate body diagram.  With the genital examination, the form likewise has space 
for the FME to record the position in which they examined the complainer, and 
whether colposcopy or other forms of magnification and lighting were employed.  
Following this, the FME records any injuries found upon the areas outlined on the 
left-hand side of the form, which has its own ano-genital diagrams. 
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 The form next addresses forensic samples, but in contrast to the rest of the 
pro forma, it does not outline which samples should be taken.  The reason for this is 
that there is a whole other guideline within the FFLM template kit that explains how 
and when to take samples; I will address those guidelines separately.  More 
important to the present discussion is the final page, the instructions for after-care.  
Unlike its predecessor, the contemporary form has a dedicated page to the 
therapeutic and after-care aspects of the forensic medical examination.  While the 
page is not entirely prescriptive in describing which therapeutic elements to apply to 
the complainer, it does provide the FME with a checklist of the types of after-care 
that they should be providing.  Does the complainer need emergency contraception, 
antibiotics, or other medication?  Do they need an appointment at a GUM clinic, or 
other support service (for example psychiatric)?  While this page allows the FME 
considerable discretion in prescribing this care, it does serve to remind the FME of 
all the services that they should be providing to the complainer in addition to the 
forensic aspect of collecting samples, and certainly addresses one of Robert’s earlier 
critiques of police doctors: that complainers are “unlikely to receive advice about 
pregnancy, V.D. or counselling help… after the examination” (Roberts 1984: 78). 
 As well as the pro forma, the working party also produced guidelines on the 
manner in which forensic samples should be taken and the timing of these samples, 
as well as how to transport them (appendix 3).  The appropriation of DNA 
technology by those involved in fighting crime hastened a change in forensic sample 
collection, particularly in relation to the importance of timescales.  Although ano-
genital-oral swabbing had been a significant aspect of the medical examination for as 
long as the examination had existed, prior to the late 1980s it was essentially only of 
value in order to demonstrate that sexual intercourse had taken place.  The tests were 
not individuating enough to be incriminating (Davies 1984).  The advent of DNA 
fingerprinting (and more importantly, the development of increasingly sophisticated 
tests), coupled with the development of the National DNA Database (hereafter 
“NDNAD”), led to a greater significance being placed on the amount of time that had 
passed between the attack and the examination.  If the attacker was unknown to the 
complainer, then the suspect could be identified either by searching the NDNAD 
(providing that the suspect’s profile already existed on the database), or by a later 
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identification in relation to further investigations or other crimes.  Moreover, if the 
complainer did know the attacker, the individuating power of DNA would confirm 
that sexual contact had taken place between complainer and suspect.
121
  The 
importance of the exact amount of time since the attack is evidenced within the 
“Guidelines for Collection of Specimens” (hereafter “guidelines”); with regard to the 
decision of whether or not to sample the ano-genital-oral areas; the guidelines 
expressly suggest the time when it is appropriate to take each swab.  For a vulval 
swab, for instance, the FME is expected to take two swabs (one wet, one dry)
122
 if 
there has been “vaginal intercourse within 7 days; anal intercourse within 3 days or; 
ejaculation onto vulva/perineum” (Rogers 2007: 2), and that is to be labelled “First 
female genital sample”.  A combination of the account given by the complainer and 
the length of time since the alleged attack becomes the criterion upon which FMEs 
make decisions regarding whether or not to take samples, and those decisions are 
heavily informed by guidelines, which are themselves the result of the most recent 
research into the degradation rates of trace material (including semen) upon different 
bodily surfaces or within orifices.
123
  It is also clear that certain swabs are to be 
collected whenever there is any form of ano-genital contact within the last three 
days, for example the perianal swab. 
As with ano-genital-oral swabs, the same applies with more mundane sample 
collection, for example nail-clippings and hair; the guidelines explain the reasons to 
take fingernail samples or head/pubic hair from the complainer, in “Removal of 
foreign objects, e.g. glass; Removal of foreign hairs or fibres” or “Detection of body 
fluids, e.g. semen” for instance.  While the guidelines explain the reasons for 
collecting such samples, they are not explicit about the instances where they are 
necessarily appropriate.  The guidelines have been left curiously open-ended, and do 
not time-bar collection like the ano-genital samples.  The FFLM guidelines outline 
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 As I will explore in Chapter Seven, however, such evidence is of little help in the majority of 
contemporary rape cases. 
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 The introduction of the double swab technique (one wet followed by one dry) is itself the result of 
Evidence-Based practice.  Sweet et al.’s (1997) study demonstrated that more trace material (in their 
case saliva) could be recovered from the body if a swab tip was first moistened and then rotated over 
the area of the skin, this is then followed by a dry swab which collects all the moisture from the first 
swab. 
123
 See Rogers and Newton (2006) for a review of the most recent evidence-base upon which the 
authors have drawn in preparing the current sampling guideline. 
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the correct way to take those swabs, the way in which they should be labelled, and 
the way in which they should be packaged and stored in preparation for 
transportation to the forensic science laboratory.   
It should be remembered however, that while the working party’s kits and pro 
forma are there as a template for what is considered most appropriate, and can be 
purchased in bulk from “Scenesafe” (the corporate end of the FSS), the working 
party does not require that all constabularies conform to their particular model; as 
with the 1984 booklet, the FFLM still consider it suitable for individual 
constabularies to prepare their own kits, in discussion with their forensic science 
laboratory, but with due regard to the template kit.  In the next section I will discuss 
the contents of an actual kit used in a constabulary I visited during the fieldwork, 
which was developed in negotiation between the constabulary’s FMEs, forensic 
scientists and the working party’s templates. 
5.3 Kit and Guideline Use in Scotland 
Appendix 4 illustrates the contents of an actual kit as used in one of the 
constabularies I visited (along with photographs of the contents of the kit).  While the 
constabulary’s kit is very similar to that of the working party, there are four key 
differences in its contents that are worth flagging up.  Firstly, the constabulary’s kit 
does not contain a “brown sheet” as standard; however, FMEs I interviewed from 
that constabulary stated that the complainer did sometimes undress on a brown sheet. 
We, there are two ways of looking at clothing, clothing is removed before 
they come to the interview, by the police, if they haven’t come, if they 
haven’t removed their clothing, then when they get undressed, each item of 
clothing is separately bagged and they get fresh clothing to wear before they 
leave, okay.  Again, this is done in a standardised fashion, the person will 
undress on a big brown paper sheet, every item is removed separately, every 
sock, every shoe (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Complainers change their clothing before coming to the medical examination in most 
cases, and so FMEs only need a brown sheet in certain circumstances.  A somewhat 
similar omission is the couch cover.  As in hospitals, the couch in the medical suite 
has a roll of blue paper attached to the bed; this can be pulled across, and a separate 
strip ripped off for each complainer, thus making a separate couch cover module 
unnecessary.  Thirdly, the fingernail module does not contain nail clippers for the 
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collection of fingernail samples.  This is quite a significant difference, as it illustrates 
a considerable divergence from the working party’s kit.  The constabulary’s 
fingernail kit contains “4 Tetra – small stain swabs”, connoting that in contrast to the 
FFLM-approved fingernail collection strategy of removing a section of the fingernail 
for analysis, in the constabulary in question, they choose to swab underneath the 
fingernails for trace material. 
 The fourth and final difference between the working party’s kit and that of 
the constabulary concerns the examination pro forma (appendix 4).  The 
constabulary has chosen to reduce the thirteen pages of the working party’s 
document to three, plus a body diagram.  In the same way as with the kit, while there 
are many similarities between the recommended document and the constabulary 
form, there are also significant differences and omissions.  The first difference to 
note is that unlike the working party pro forma, the constabulary’s is a singular 
document that is to be used for all examinations: both adults and children, both 
complainers and suspects.  Using the same pro forma is an attempt to ensure that, for 
reasons of justice and fairness, both complainers and suspects are treated the same.  
“But there is no question at all, the suspect needs to be examined, needs to be 
examined to the same high standards as the victim” (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2).  
Use of the same examination protocol provides a way to treat both complainer and 
suspect equally.  In relation to the actual elements of the form, it should be noted that 
interesting aspects of the complainer’s information have been omitted on the 
constabulary’s form.  Unlike the FFLM, the constabulary do not ask about the 
complainer’s religion, marital status, living arrangements or occupation.  The 
omission of these details upon the constabulary’s form does beg the question of why 
the FFLM appears to require so much detail.  A speculative answer can be found 
when one takes clinical forensic medical journals into consideration, as their studies 
tend to classify complainers by such sociological cleavages as class and religion.  
These details may, therefore, be recorded in the working party’s form in order to 
enable future research.  Conversely, Temkin (1998), in her study of police doctors, 
argued that FMEs were asking for too much information from complainers and that 
there was no convincing reason for collecting this level of detail, particularly if it was 
taken into account that some information, if disclosed to the defence, could be 
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devastating for the complainer’s case.  This is certainly the case with regard to 
questions of distress and the complainer’s demeanour at the time of the examination 
(a recent point of contention has arisen over whether or not distress is a potential 
means by which prosecutors can determine mens rea; see Chambers (2004) for more 
on complainer distress).  It appears that the constabulary are negotiating the 
requirement to gather as much appropriate information (although they do leave space 
on the form for “other pertinent information”) as possible, without “poking [their] 
nose in” (police doctor cited in Temkin 1998: 832).  Furthermore, whilst ethnicity is 
not requested on the constabulary’s form itself, this information is requested on the 
blood grouping form; this is to enable the correct databases and statistics to be used 
in the forensic laboratory analysis. 
There are three other intriguing omissions from the constabulary’s form: 
there are no pages on consent, medical history or after-care, which provide such 
important reminders for the FME in the FFLM pro forma.  While there is space on 
the form to add notes on the case relating to the medical history of the complainer, 
and there are indeed a few questions upon the form whose answers may result in a 
broader medical history (for example: time of last medication, pregnancy history, 
whether or not there is any vaginal discharge), these are not as explicit as the ones set 
out in the FFLM form.  Another point to note is that there is nothing on the form that 
would help the FME to remember to provide the full range of after-care services.  It 
could be the case that because such factors as consent, the collection of medical 
history and the provision of appropriate after-care form significant aspects of the 
routine work of medical doctors (particularly GPs), the constabulary do not feel it 
necessary to outline these aspects of work upon the form.  Moreover, these aspects 
could originally have been placed upon the “Guidance Notes” that are mentioned at 
the top of the first page of the form (normally found upon the reverse of the kit 
contents page).  Unfortunately, the kit that I was allowed to borrow did not have the 
guidance note, so I could not confirm whether or not that was the case.  As the kit 
was taken from a pile ready to be used, I suspect that such an omission of the 
guidance page is commonplace and that this was not a one-off error.  Either way, the 
form does not explicate to FMEs that they are to request consent, take a medical 
history or give the complainer after-care following the examination, all as a matter of 
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routine; however, this information is frequently emphasised in medical textbooks that 
deal with the appropriate way to conduct a medical examination. 
 The final difference between the constabulary and FFLM forms concerns 
their different approaches to specimen collection.  The FFLM’s form is rather limited 
on the question of sampling, in contrast with the rest of the form which is more 
detailed (however, as I have already mentioned, this is because it is to be used in 
accordance with the FFLM’s guidelines on sampling); the constabulary’s form on the 
other hand is far more explicit about the type of samples that it is necessary to take, 
and is in fact highly similar, in that respect, to the Metropolitan Kit’s original form.  
In a similar manner to that of the Metropolitan Kit, the constabulary’s form alerts the 
FME to the range of samples that are considered by the form compilers to produce 
the most valuable sources of evidence.
124
  Interestingly, the list of samples does not 
contain a section for “skin swabs” or “perianal swabs”; in the latter case, the 
“Guidelines for Sampling” suggest that they should be taken in all cases where 
intercourse has taken place within the last three days.  The constabulary’s form does, 
conversely, have space for “Other Specimens”, and so allows these swabs to be 
collected if the FME considers it appropriate.  Leaving room for such professional 
discretion, for instance allowing the FME to determine for themselves the 
appropriate time to take certain samples, is approved of by professional associations.  
However, it is not the case that all those involved with the construction of kits and 
guidelines agree that space for discretion should be left.  In the final section, I will 
turn to the importance of discretion in the development of kits and guidelines and the 
ways by which outside agencies are attempting to make FMEs more accountable to 
guidance artefacts. 
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 The constabulary’s form is not identical to the Metropolitan Kit and differs in that: a) it no longer 
requests the FME to “tick if taken”, b) the new form combines penile and oral swabs (as penile swabs 
would only be taken from the suspect), c) hair samples are now separated into six sections, as opposed 
to two, based on the manner in which the sample was collected, and d) blood is now separated into 
serology, alcohol and DNA or drugs, rather than just blood. 
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5.4 Standardised Artefacts as Legitimation Devices and the 
Question of Accountability 
5.4.1 Discretion and Legitimation Crises 
It is important to note that guidelines and pro formas allow a certain level of 
discretion.  While kits were initially developed to routinise police doctor work, they 
have always allowed significant room for individual practitioner judgement.  The 
working party’s documents are examples of this; at the top of both their pro forma 
and their guidelines are statements demonstrating that the final decision about which 
samples are necessary is down to the practicing FME: 
This form has been designed for use by Forensic Physicians…It is provided 
to assist the examining doctor in the assessment of an adult complainant of 
sexual assault.  It is regarded as an aide-memoire and it is therefore not 
necessary for all aspects of the proforma to be completed.  On completion 
this form is the personal property of the examining doctor (pro forma). 
 
The forensic physician must decide which samples are relevant to a particular 
case (guideline). 
 
These documents exist to remind the FME of the totality of questions they could ask, 
the samples they could take and the after-care they could give; however, it is up to 
the FME to decide which of this range of services should be performed, judging by 
the situation of the particular complainant.  This, at least, is how the FFLM and its 
predecessors viewed them, and it is not surprising; as Timmermans and Berg put it: 
When professions engage in guideline formation, they bring authority to the 
guideline but even then their members look at guidelines more as options 
rather than as true standards.  The profession itself does not enforce 
adherence to guidelines or reward guideline-following behavior from its 
members.  Compliance to guidelines depends upon the fit between the 
standards and the goals and demands upon the individual healthcare provider.  
To qualify as practice guidelines for a profession, standards need to retain 
flexibility in clinical decision making (Timmermans and Berg 2003: 96). 
 
Making the guidelines and the pro forma flexible and useful to the practitioner, 
rather than an impediment, helps the professional association to increase practitioner 
use of guidelines and pro formas.  However, if there are impediments to the use of 
guidelines, and if it is the case that the relevant associations do not enforce them or 
consider them “true standards”, what role do guidance artefacts play in forensic 
medical practice?  I will not answer this question in full here, as a complete answer 
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necessitates a discussion of the way that FMEs employ guidance artefacts when 
conducting medical examinations (which is the focus of the following chapter).  
However, I can provide a preliminary response.  In a study of large-scale 
technological accidents including the Challenger Launch disaster (see also Vaughan 
1995) and the Abbeystead Methane Explosion (see also Wynne 1989), Brian Wynne 
(1988) argues that in an effort to reassure the public after such disasters, the scientists 
and technologists involved typically introduce rules even more constraining than 
before with regards to the operation of the procedure that went awry.  The disaster 
itself constitutes a legitimation crisis, i.e. the technology that caused the disaster is 
considered unsafe or unfit for purpose.  In order to make the technology in question 
appear sound once more, formal rules are introduced to reassure the public that such 
a disaster will not happen again.  The introduction of rules does not necessarily make 
the technology any safer, as rules can never fully account for all the potential aspects 
that could go wrong, but they serve the purpose of re-legitimising the once-maligned 
technology.  The introduction of the Metropolitan Kit would appear to be a similar 
response.  Police doctors were undergoing a legitimation crisis, and responded by 
producing the kit (which also included guidance documents).  While the introduction 
of kits certainly introduced a degree of routinisation into the examination, those who 
advocated it also argued for the maintenance of practitioner discretion; as such, while 
police doctors had access to all the materials within the kit, there was no guarantee 
that the introduction of kits alone would fundamentally alter police doctor practice.  
In fact, it is likely that some police doctors’ attitudes and practices remained the 
same, even following the introduction of the kit.  The introduction of the kit did 
however serve the purpose of making police doctor work credible again, as it 
represented a response to the challenges that feminist groups, other police doctors 
and particularly Chambers and Millar had laid against them. 
Likewise, the development of the kits and guidelines under the working party 
can also be explained in terms of legitimating FME practice.  During the 1990s, the 
cultures of both medicine and the law were shifting towards the Evidence-Based 
movement, with its focus upon objective work derived from the following of rules or 
guidelines (Timmermans and Berg 2003, Mercer 2008, see also Porter 1995 for a 
discussion upon the relationship between rules and objectivity, and Berg et al. 2001 
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for an appropriation of Porter’s work to legal medicine).  Given this, in order for 
FMEs to continue claiming that their work was objective, they had to demonstrate 
that their evidence collection procedures drew upon an evidence-base, and were also 
required to construct codified rules or procedures that outlined FME decision-
making.  In this light, the introduction of guidelines and pro formas can be 
understood as a mechanism for maintaining the legitimacy of FME work (and the 
evidence they produce) against a set of work-based cultures that favour Evidence-
Based rules.  If the introduction and development of guidelines serve the purpose of 
legitimating FME work to non-FMEs, then there is no actual imperative for FMEs to 
follow those guidelines to the letter, and, as has already been mentioned, the 
professional associations themselves do not choose to enforce the instructions set out 
by the guidance documents.  I will explore the relationship between guidance 
artefacts and actual FME decision-making, and also expand upon this preliminary 
response to the question of why guidance artefacts were introduced, in the next 
chapter.  First, though, I will conclude by outlining the reasons that some professions 
are not overly keen on the amount of discretion maintained by FMEs. 
5.4.2 Forensic Scientists and the “Total Collection Strategy” 
As I have shown, the professional associations concerned with forensic medical 
examinations (initially the APS, then the AFP and currently the FFLM) have all 
added to the content and number of standardised kits, guidelines and pro formas.  
While an Evidence-Based approach to FME work has certainly spread since the late 
1990s, the relevant associations have not enforced strict homogeneity over 
practitioners, and indeed allow constabularies to develop their own kits with their 
own forms, in collaboration with the artefacts produced by the association and the 
relevant forensic science laboratory.  While the associations and the FMEs 
themselves approve of this discretion, others do not.  The key actors who are 
attempting to make FMEs accountable to the content of guidelines are forensic 
scientists, particularly in relation to the collection of samples. 
 As has already been noted, reporting forms and kits since their earliest 
incarnations have been compiled with the agenda of improving the quality and 
quantity of samples, both in terms of their collection and transportation, to the 
science laboratory.  When tests were not discriminating enough to provide significant 
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corroboratory evidence, forensic scientists were satisfied with allowing the police 
doctor to choose which samples to collect, and did not involve themselves in the 
collection procedure apart from providing the forms of guidance I have already 
discussed.  More recently, forensic scientists have taken a far more proactive 
approach to biological sample collection, and are now informing practicing FMEs of 
the exact samples to collect and the instances where it is best to take them. 
As far as best practice is concerned the scientists invite us along to quite 
regular meetings and they give us some feedback on the quality of samples 
that we’ve been producing for them and the type of samples, and that will go 
in tandem with perhaps a representative from the fiscal’s office to tell us, you 
know, it would be more helpful if you could get this sort of sample as well, so 
together that sort of input does direct us in dictating what sort of samples are 
required in an evidential format and also how best to take those samples… 
And adding to that the scientists will also tell us when it is pertinent to take 
those samples as well… when I started (cut for anonymity) we had a cut-off 
of eighteen hours for, for example, blood; alcohol, drugs in the blood, 
someone’s claiming that they’ve been drugged and sexually assaulted, um, 
but that has been opened out and we are now taking blood samples up to ten 
days (Dr. F, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
It is no surprise that the advice given by the laboratory scientists generally matches 
the advice provided by the FFLM guideline, given that the guidelines produced by 
the FFLM (particularly the “Guidelines for Sampling”) were partly produced by the 
FSS, and also given that they are evidence-based (i.e. based upon known degradation 
and recovery rates).  Even when there is some discrepancy between the guideline and 
the scientist’s advice (as in Dr. F’s example - stating that the scientists have advised 
that blood alcohol samples should be taken up to ten days when the guideline states 
that they should be taken only up to three days), the guideline still states that the 
laboratory is the final arbiter in such a decision: “If in doubt consult the Laboratory 
for advice” (Rogers 2007: 3).  It is of interest that while the guidelines were certainly 
produced by drawing upon a particular evidence-base, FMEs often stated that the 
advice offered was couched by the scientists in terms of technological advancement 
and the capability of the new machines and practices in finding material.  For 
example, Dr. F continued the above response by stating “Well they’re [forensic 
scientists] looking at rates of metabolism and also their analytical machines are 
picking up drug levels” (Dr. F, male, Constabulary 2).  Likewise, another FME stated 
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that the scientists are becoming more involved in the collection process because of 
the current ability to collect DNA from a single cell. 
Yes, there are instructions given by the police lab, they want everything, 
because now they are in a position to extract, be able to extract DNA from 
one cell and that’s a problem as well as these methods are so sensitive, 
because of the contamination, possible contamination, you have to keep it in 
mind the contamination, when you have it, the possibility to get the DNA 
pattern from one single cell (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Leaving aside Dr. D’s concerns regarding contamination, what is notable from this 
quotation is the assumption that the police labs “want everything” and, taking Dr. 
D’s quotation in parallel with that of Dr. F, who both work in the same constabulary, 
it is possible to presume that scientists are explicating this point to FMEs during 
face-to-face meetings; this marks a significant moment in the relationship between 
scientists and FMEs.  Forensic scientists’ request that FMEs take “everything”, based 
upon a mixture of biological material prevalence data and technological 
advancements resulting in a greater likelihood of finding the smallest amount of 
identifying material, is considered quite abhorrent by FMEs and conflicts massively 
with the therapeutic motivation for the forensic medical examination.
125
  Asking 
FMEs to collect “everything” also removes their discretionary capacities and reduces 
their status from that of a decision-maker to that of a technician routinely collecting a 
standard set of samples.  There have been cases however, where FMEs discretion has 
meant that useful material has been missed; these examples pose a third justification 
for forensic scientists requesting, what I will call a “Total Collection Strategy”. 
Interestingly, I must take this up with the lab again, again, I don’t know if it’s 
an issue with people who are less experienced, but sometimes happens you 
only get, well, you only get so much of the story perhaps at the initial time 
and what has happened in a couple of cases, a dozen is that two or three days 
later someone will say “well he anally penetrated me as well”…What’s 
happened then, what I was going to say was that less experienced people 
have… directed their samples on what they were told, and therefore 2 or 3 
days later further evidence has come to light which has been missed.  So the 
lab have actually said, in all cases we want you to take everything, that’s their 
approach (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
                                               
125
 See Chapter Six for examples and an explanation of how FMEs negotiate the evidence-gathering 
and therapeutic aspects of the forensic medical examination at the level of practice. 
 143 
FMEs and SOLOs/accompanying officers were quite forthcoming about the extent to 
which they assumed that the complainer’s account was partial, and FMEs stated that 
extra work was necessary during the examination to ensure that the account they 
received constituted the fullest expression of what happened.
126
  This extra work is 
necessary because decisions about the samples that should be taken (as categorically 
stated in the guidelines) should be based upon the complainer’s account.  In the cases 
mentioned by Dr. C, what she labelled “less experienced” examiners have taken the 
complainer’s account at the time of the examination at face-value, and that account 
has been found to be limited at a later date, resulting in material with the likelihood 
to provide incriminating evidence being lost.  As such, alongside the degradation 
evidence and the improved technology, forensic scientists are requesting that FMEs 
perform a “Total Collection Strategy” in order to ensure that alterations in the 
complainer’s account during the investigation and prosecution processes do not 
result in a loss of potential evidence. 
 The important point to note from forensic scientists’ attempts to influence 
FME sampling decision-making is the manner in which they are trying to invoke 
change.  There may be some confusion between the quotation of Dr. F and those of 
Drs. C and D (Drs. C and D suggest that scientists have requested that FMEs “take 
everything”, whilst Dr. F claims that scientists have instead advocated that FMEs 
maintain some discretion, and make sampling decisions based upon the length of 
time since the attack; of course, such confusion could be a result of a simple 
difference of emphasis –Drs. C and D might understand decision-making based that 
is based solely on timescales to be the equivalent of a request to “take everything”), 
but it is clear that forensic scientists from the laboratory are approaching FMEs 
directly and attempting to influence their practice.  While there is a tradition of 
interaction between FMEs and scientists in order to facilitate the discussion of the 
best ways to collect evidence (such as the objects necessary to form a kit for 
example), the current situation appears to be quite different; instead of working 
together to decide on the best courses of action, scientists have requested that 
practitioners relinquish their discretion over the assessment of the case using the 
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 I will discuss both FMEs’ and SOLOs’ attitudes to complainers’ accounts and the strategies 
employed to enlarge them in Chapter Six. 
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basis of the particularities of the individual case and suggested instead that FMEs 
should only make decisions concerning the length of time between the alleged 
assault and the examination (with the scientists themselves prescribing the exact 
samples to take for each given length of time).  FMEs at the practice level, of course 
tend to ignore such requests (see Chapter Six, particularly the problems with basing 
decisions upon timescales alone) and so the level of emphasis that should be placed 
upon such interaction between FMEs and scientists is, for the moment, uncertain; 
nevertheless, this development is certainly of importance to the authority of the 
professional associations and the construction and employment of guidelines.  
Forensic scientists, it appears, are no longer content with the level of discretion 
provided for FMEs in the artefacts produced by the working party (even though the 
FSS are part of said working party), and so are attempting to influence FME work 
directly; not only do they wish to make FMEs accountable to the language of the 
guidelines and protocols, but they are going further and trying to remove the 
discretion written into the artefacts.  In terms of professional authority, therefore, it 
could be concluded that scientists are attempting to wrestle jurisdiction over evidence 
collection away from FMEs. 
Summary 
The question of the desired level of standardisation of the forensic medical 
examination has plagued police doctors and FMEs since the time of Chambers and 
Millar’s study of police doctors in Central Scotland and the introduction of the 
Metropolitan Kit.  While the professional associations concerned with medical 
examinations have realised the importance of holding FMEs to a particular standard 
through some degree of routinisation of examination work, they have never wished 
to “tie the officer’s hand” (McLay 1984b: 8) by denying the doctor discretion 
regarding the manner in which the examination is conducted (the samples taken, the 
questions asked, etc.).  The adoption of standardised kits was an attempt to mediate 
the dialectic of autonomy versus routine by providing all the materials necessary to 
conduct an examination, including notes for guidance and a document for recording; 
however, in the final analysis, the Metropolitan Kit always enabled the police doctor 
to tailor the examination to the particular case.  During the 1990s, clinical forensic 
medicine did not remain untouched by the EBM movement, and the APS produced 
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further guidelines and pro formas, based upon the best available clinical forensic 
medical evidence.  However, these documents (like their predecessors) were not 
intended to constitute strict rules, but instead to allow the practitioner discretion in 
their conduct, and stipulated that the individual FME was free to omit aspects as the 
case required.  Similar discretion was granted in the use of the kits that the APS 
produced, allowing constabularies to develop their own kits depending on the local 
situation.  The degree of discretion provided by the kits and documents begs the 
question of why they are necessary.  A tentative answer to this (which I will expand 
upon in the following chapter) is that while they do provide a modicum of guidance 
and routinisation to the forensic medical examination, the guidance artefacts serve 
the larger purpose of legitimating FME practice.  If faced with any critical challenges 
FMEs can draw upon the guidance documents to justify their practice (and 
particularly the evidence they have produced) as authoritative and based upon the 
guidance of the professional association. 
The maintenance of discretion has not been welcomed by all parties involved, 
however.  Citing the increased specificity and discriminatory power of forensic 
scientific technologies, and the fact that complainers do not always tell the whole 
truth at the initial time of reporting, forensic scientists have recently chosen to 
intervene in FMEs’ sample collection strategies, proposing that a “Total Collection 
Strategy” be employed in order to ensure that no evidence is overlooked.  While the 
artefacts produced by the APS and constabularies have certainly moved towards 
standardisation, their proponents have always asserted that the documents and kits 
constitute aides memoires for the practitioner and that they would not advocate total 
standardisation of practice.  The direct request for FMEs to perform a “Total 
Collection Strategy” it could be argued, constitutes an attempt to wrestle control of 
sampling work away from FMEs at the local level; however, such a request is 
generally ignored by individual FMEs practicing in constabularies.  It is to their 
actual decision-making that I will turn in the next chapter. 
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6. FME Sampling in Practice 
 
The previous chapter focused upon the introduction of guidelines and protocols into 
forensic medical work and the content of those artefacts.  While it was mentioned in 
the latter half of the chapter that there were differences in opinion amongst diverse 
groups involved in the writing of the guidelines, concerning the accountability of 
FME practice to the guidelines (for example, those representing the professional 
association of FMEs consider guidelines to be far more discretionary than do 
forensic scientists), little mention was made of the attitudes or the practice of FMEs 
themselves, i.e. the way in which FMEs actually employ the guidelines in their day-
to-day decision-making.  This chapter will directly address that issue.  Focusing on 
the way that FMEs choose which medical samples to collect for forensic scientific 
analysis, or the questions they ask of the complainer, illuminates the factors 
considered by FMEs to be influential towards their decision-making.  FMEs find 
themselves in a complex of tensions when performing the medical examination; on 
the one hand they have to ensure that all available incriminating evidence is 
gathered, on the other, they are concerned with the dignity of the complainer, and 
moreover the amount of work feasible for the forensic scientific laboratory.  Some of 
the methods for negotiating these tensions are laid out within guidance documents; 
however, as I will show, FMEs do not determine their practice by these documents, 
but instead base their decision-making upon phenomena less tangible than a 
guideline or a kit.  It is my contention that FME decision-making is determined by a 
shared praxis that is initially distributed during training, but also amended and built 
upon via interaction.  It is this shared practice that determines the evidence that the 
FME collects, and this consensus, alongside the production of guidance documents, 
that perpetuates FME credibility and discretionary authority.  Before explaining this, 
however, I will provide evidence of the ambivalent attitude of FMEs towards 
guidance artefacts. 
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6.1 FME Attitudes towards Guidelines 
The FMEs I interviewed had differing opinions about guidelines and protocols, 
including denial of their existence: “[t]here is no standardised guideline at all, full 
stop” (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2); downright dislike:  
Guidelines, guidelines, guidelines; when you are interested in your job and 
you are interested in doing a good job you don’t need guidelines, that’s it.  
When you are not interested and you are stuck to the guidelines, that’s not a 
good job (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 2); 
 
and finally indifference: “[u]se a sexual assault pro forma which outlines which 
samples should be taken.  Pro forma is a checklist and results in an exam that could 
be carried out by any doctor” (Dr. H, male, Constabulary 4).  While FMEs expressed 
diverse (although mostly negative) opinions, it was clear that there was considerable 
uniformity in the work that they conducted and the samples they collected.  Dr. B (of 
the “no standardised guideline” opinion) said the following: 
Standard sampling is as follows: groins, pubic hair if it is matted, you cut off 
the pubic hair if it is matted, you take two external vaginal swabs, and after 
you introduce a speculum, you take two internal vaginal swabs… So those 
are the canon: the gamut of groins, pubic hair, external vaginal, internal 
vaginal, external anal and internal anal (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Such consistency in sampling strategies amongst practitioners has, of course, been 
helped by the introduction of the forensic medical examination kits and their 
accompanying forms, which serve (as Dr. H alludes to) as a reminder to the FME of 
the samples that they have yet to collect; in fact, Dr. B’s “canon” maps onto the 
sexual offences form for his constabulary (appendix 4).  Likewise, Dr. G says: 
We do, we have what is known as a “rape kit” where almost all the 
equipment we’ll be needing to conduct an appropriate examination is 
available.  They come in sealed boxes and if on occasion there is something 
that is not available in one box you open another, say you’re looking for a 
fine tooth comb you open a box and that box is always disposed of.  So 
there’s a box with everything you need and we have a forensic science 
laboratory form which gives us a wee pro forma that is a double-sided page 
where you tick off all the samples that you have taken and so there is a degree 
of guidance (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, neither the pro forma nor the sampling 
guidelines from the FFLM advocate that FMEs take all samples regardless of the 
particulars of the case they are examining; whilst professional associations have 
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promoted an increase in the routinisation of forensic medical examinations, they 
have not attempted to remove discretion from the individual FME regarding 
sampling strategies.  While the pro formas and the guidance documents are available 
as a reminder for the FME about the entire breadth of samples that could potentially 
be taken, the FME performing the examination is still the final arbiter over the 
samples that they consider appropriate for the case in question.  According to the 
guidelines, decisions concerning sample collection should be based upon the length 
of time since the attack and the complainer’s account.  However, decisions based 
solely upon these two criteria are not without their problems, and FMEs take other 
factors into consideration when deciding where to sample.  Such additional decision-
making criteria are the focus of the following section. 
6.2 Problems with Guideline-Based Sampling 
Deciding where to sample purely on the basis of the complainer’s account and the 
length of time since the alleged attack would fail, in the first instance, to take into 
account the feelings of the complainer; samples would be taken without thought as to 
whether such sampling would further embarrass or upset the complainer (although it 
should be noted that all types of sample-taking are, in their own ways, invasive and 
distressing).  Moreover, these decision-making criteria are based upon an assumption 
that there is a full account enabling the FME to discern which samples are 
appropriate.  As touched upon briefly in the previous chapter (I will elaborate upon 
this further shortly), FMEs are always aware that the account they have been given 
has the potential to be partial; it is this that has led to forensic scientists requesting 
that FMEs perform a “Total Collection Strategy”.  In response, FMEs have 
developed their own strategies to negotiate the problem of partial accounts, which 
further ensure that the dignity of the complainer is maintained.  I will discuss these 
strategies as well as another factor that influences decision-making - the economics 
of analysis - in the following sections. 
6.2.1 Ensuring the Totality of the Complainer’s Account 
It is considered contemporary “best practice” that the FME avoid questioning the 
complainer about the events of the alleged attack. 
There are two ways of getting the account of the incident, the one way we 
use… is the police officer who has taken the interview will give us a blow-
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by-blow account of what has been said in the interview before the 
examination, so that will lead us into what areas we will want to go into.  In 
[cut for anonymity] the doctor will also take a history from the victim, from 
the complainer, a full history, we don’t do that for two reasons, why?  One, 
because it upsets the victim quite a bit, and two, it also raises some dubiety in 
her mind… that the police didn’t believe them, so they are going over the 
evidence to make sure they do not trip over or make any mistakes (Dr. B, 
male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Dr. B’s remarks are echoed in a textbook chapter, “Sexual Assault Examination” 
(Rogers and Newton 2000), in A Physician’s Guide to Clinical Forensic Medicine 
(Stark 2000).  In that chapter, not only do the authors acknowledge that having to 
repeat the account might potentially distress the complainer further, but they also 
suggest that repeated accounts could result in varied and conflicting statements 
which might place the complainer’s case in jeopardy: 
If the complainant has already provided the details of the allegation to 
another professional, e.g., police officer, it is not necessary for them to repeat 
the details to a forensic practitioner.  Indeed Hicks notes that the attempts to 
obtain too detailed a history of the incident from the complainant may 
jeopardize the case at trial because at the time of the medical examination the 
patient may be disturbed and, consequently, the details of the incident might 
be confused and conflict with subsequent statements (Rogers and Newton 
2000: 41). 
 
The FME, therefore, relies upon the accompanying officer for information regarding 
the complainer’s version of events, and also (as Dr. B hints at with his “what areas 
we will want to go into”) the samples and other evidence that will be required.  FME 
concerns about the account provided by the police officer can be summarised by two 
problems: 1) it could be that the accompanying officer was not the one who 
performed the interview, or perhaps performed the interview but did not ask the full 
complement of questions; and 2) it is difficult for the FME to be sure of how to 
proceed in the case that the accompanying officer and/or the FME believe that the 
account they have received is partial.  I will turn to each problem individually. 
With regards to the first problem (that of the accompanying officer attending 
without the requisite information), Dr. C expressed the problem most clearly: 
What the ideal scenario is then is the officer who has taken the statement or 
interviewed the woman must be there.  NOW I GET REALLY ON MY 
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HIGH HORSE ABOUT THIS,
127
 I throw my toys out of the pram on this 
one, at the police sometimes, because there is nothing WORSE than “Oh I 
just got given the job doc, I was just to bring her here”, well that’s not good 
enough.  Somebody has spent four hours taking a statement from this woman, 
I need that information, because I then have to ask her all kinds of 
questions…  Ideally you have the officer who has taken the initial statement 
etc. etc. what I’ll then do is get a narration from them, some of which will 
appear in my report, some of which won’t “So-and-so went out and had six 
vodka and cokes and couldn’t remember and then she remembered this” and 
so you get the whole narration of the evening vis-à-vis what the complainer 
has said to the police.  Obviously that starts to focus your mind on what’s 
happened, what I’m thinking about here, obviously there’s been this, that, 
whatever… where’s the locus of this?  Is it someone who’s known, she’s 
been in the flat anyway, that reduces the, you know, hairs are going to be 
there anyway, you’re thinking without being aware (Dr. C, female, 
Constabulary 2). 
 
The problem of complainers being accompanied to the forensic medical examination 
by an officer who has not been a member of the interviewing team has been limited 
by the introduction, in some constabularies, of specialist SOLOs, who have been 
specially trained to interview vulnerable witnesses and complainers, and whose role 
is to liaise with and support the complainer through the early stages of the 
investigatory process; likewise, specialist sexual assault divisions (like the Amethyst 
sexual offences team in Lothian and Borders), who only work upon sexual offence 
cases, have been trained in what the police consider “best practice” when dealing 
with the peculiarities of sexual assault cases, and their officers also liaise with the 
complainer throughout the investigatory period.  Both strategies (SOLOs and 
specialist divisions) have limited the likelihood of complainers being accompanied 
by an officer who is not acquainted with the details of the case; however, as Dr. C 
(who works in a constabulary where one of these strategies has been implemented) 
continues to say: 
sometimes it’ll still happen, I would say it’s a lot better, but it still happens, 
you still get somebody literally got a sheet saying “can you take x to the 
medical” (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
These specially trained officers have reduced the necessity for FMEs to question 
complainers directly about alleged attacks; however, there are still occasions when 
the accompanying officer cannot provide the full complement of information, and in 
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 Capitals signify the respondent’s raising of voice for emphasis. 
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these cases the FME is either required to ask about the content of the assault 
themselves, or, as with Dr. G, ask that the accompanying officer return to the 
complainer and gather the relevant information. 
Yeah and I will say, they [accompanying officer] will say look there was 
penile-oral intercourse was attempted, penile-vaginal intercourse was took 
place, penile-anal intercourse was not.  If they tell me that, I do not wish to 
pry.  If however, I wish to know when did they last have intercourse, “Oh I 
haven’t asked that”, “Then would you like to ask and then come back to me?”  
If it is a young girl, has she ever had intercourse before, has she had, you 
have to ask indelicate questions, has she had a boyfriend who has performed 
digital stimulation, we have to ascertain that because we have to know 
whether anything has been in her vaginal orifice; I’ve got to know whether 
she uses external sanitary towels or whether she uses tampons, so I would 
prefer a female police officer to have all that information, if not I say go and 
get it (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
In this hypothetical example, Dr. G states that while the accompanying officer has 
supplied the rudimentary elements of the assault (which types of assault were 
attempted and which were successful), they have not supplied all of the necessary 
information, and so Dr. G has asked the officer to return to the complainer to retrieve 
the extra information.  For the FME, asking direct questions of the complainer and 
requesting that the accompanying officer ask supplementary questions are two 
workable strategies for negotiating the problem of securing an account; however, 
neither strategy solves the second problem, i.e. ensuring that the account they have 
generated before the examination covers the totality of the attack. 
 As already alluded to in some of the supplied quotations, as soon as an FME 
has received an account, they start deciding what samples will be of potential benefit.  
Such decision-making based solely upon the account does cause a significant 
problem; as one SOLO put it: 
In addition to that you often find that once you've had contact with a SOLO 
as a victim, they realise they are going on to a medical examination, you must 
realise that not everyone tells the police the truth, then you get the feel that 
this is going to happen and it is really not a good thing to go through as you 
could probably imagine, then you may get a different version of events as 
well (SOLO A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Choosing where to sample on the basis of the complainer’s account (including the 
types of sexual acts that are said to have been attempted or successful) can be 
problematic.  The complainer may only provide a partial account – for instance 
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“[a]lso I think you’ll find the victims of oral sex, if you don’t ask they won’t tell, not 
because of anything, because they are shy” (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1) – which 
can result in samples not being taken, the result being that potential corroboratory or 
incriminating evidence is missed.  This could also mean that the FME does not 
examine areas where the complainer has said that no contact was made, resulting in 
medical complications. 
[T]hat is so important and sometimes what happens with anal is that it goes 
into a spasm the injuries can go right up and you can’t see so that is why it is 
better to take [swabs] and we’ve been caught out (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1). 
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, forensic scientists have suggested that FMEs 
solve the problem of missing samples by performing “Total Collection Strategies”, 
thereby avoiding the uncertainty produced by partial accounts.  FMEs follow the 
logic of this argument, and in fact do take the full range of samples when the 
complainer is unable to provide an account due to being unconscious or intoxicated: 
“there are times when full samples are required as the complainant may not have 
remembered accurately due to sedation or distress” (Dr. M, male, Constabulary 3). 
If someone says to me “I was so drunk I can’t remember” or “I was drugged, 
I can’t remember” then I would automatically, not just examine or take 
specimens from there and that is whether she says yes or no because that is so 
important (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Most cases if you are in any doubt you take it [sample] because you’re a one-
stop shop, you don’t have the opportunity to go back, you can’t go back 5 
days and said I should have actually taken your pubic hair, or something like 
that.  So there is a slight blunderbuss, less than scientific approach on 
occasion.  Interestingly I must take this up with the lab again, again I don’t 
know if this, it’s an issue with people who are less experienced, but 
sometimes happens, you only get, well, you only get so much of the story 
perhaps at the initial time and what has happened in a couple of cases, a 
dozen is that two or three days later someone will say “well he anally 
penetrated me as well” okay, well that shouldn’t affect anything because I 
personally will always ask the complainer quietly, when I’ve got a bit of 
confidence, they’ve relaxed, I’ll ask “did anything else happen that you 
haven’t mentioned?” so you don’t get caught out (Dr. C, female, 
Constabulary 2). 
 
These quotations demonstrate the logic that prevails on the occasions that FMEs feel 
it is appropriate to perform a “Total Collection Strategy”: this can happen either 
when the complainer is unable to provide an account of the examination due to 
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intoxication, or when the FME is doubtful that the account is complete due to 
“sedation or distress”.  Dr. C’s quotation is interesting, as it demonstrates (in cases 
where the complainer has been able to provide an account) how she asks additional 
“quiet questions” during the examination in order to tease out other elements of the 
assault that may not have been given to the police.  Dr. C continues: 
You’re doing all that but certainly taking samples as you go and certainly 
chatting and that’s the time you can start asking, behind the curtain the 
slightly more and often, I do not know what others have said to you, certainly 
I’ve done hundreds and thousands of these now, you often get a really good 
rapport… And I will specifically say did anything happen, did anything 
happen orally, your back passage, in a kind of understanding, and sometimes, 
you know, they will say “Actually, uh yeah” and of course they felt 
embarrassed, and sometimes it’s a male homosexual assault and so there’s all 
that dynamic (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
Other FMEs also stated that they employed “quiet questions” to ascertain the fullness 
of the account from the complainer. 
Regardless of what they’ve said , even though what the police have asked, we 
ask our own questions, medical questions of health and pain, any bleeding, 
any injuries they are complaining of and often sometimes when they are in 
such a distressed state they won’t tell you about the injuries, you notice 
anything “Oh my goodness there’s a bruise there” “Oh is there” and I’ve seen 
umpteen cases where the girl is bleeding and she couldn’t tell because she is 
so frightened and she stood up and the police officer said “Oh my God, there 
is blood” and it was the police that told me she was bleeding and the girl just 
stood there looking (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
I never ask about the incident and we ask diagnost[ic] - medical questions; 
medical history, pregnancy, um - anti-conceptive medication, um pre-existing 
diseases diabetes, epilepsy, drugs, alcohol, but never about the assault. 
Me: Never specifics, or are you in pain, discomfort those kinds of medical 
questions? 
Of course, but it’s not done as an interview before, usually but during the 
examination, to hide the questions a little bit.  It’s better to hide it, to include 
it in the entire examination process.  So when you are going to take the 
samples from down below you can easily ask “do you feel uncomfortable?  Is 
there something I should be aware of?  Do you feel pain?”  So just include it 
in the whole examination process (Dr. D male, Constabulary 2 interviewer 
speech in italics). 
 
While contemporary statements about “best practice” specify that FMEs should 
avoid asking the complainer directly about the incident, FMEs find that it is 
sometimes necessary, in order to ensure that they have collected all the relevant 
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evidence.  There is always uncertainty over the fullness of the account, so if the 
examining FME does not ask these extra questions and instead bases their sampling 
decisions purely upon the account given via the accompanying police officer, there is 
the potential for important evidence to be missed, as well as future medical 
complications.  To convince themselves that the account is near enough complete, 
FMEs ask “quiet questions” of the complainer once they have developed a sufficient 
level of rapport.  The answers to these questions, which are posed as purely medical, 
give the FME a better idea of the nature of the alleged attack, the types of evidence 
that will still be needed, and hence the locations that they should swab and examine; 
in addition, it provides a basis for further pertinent questions, and gives an idea of the 
therapeutic treatments required, etc.  Asking “quiet questions” gives the FME the 
confidence that they will not make substantial omissions without having to go to the 
lengths of collecting all samples.  FMEs generally wish to avoid collecting 
unnecessary samples for two reasons: the dignity of the complainer, and the fiscal 
issue.  I will address these matters in the following two sections. 
6.2.2 Genital Sampling and the Complainer’s Dignity 
Having gathered an account, the FME next decides which samples are appropriate on 
the basis of that account; they customise their sampling strategy to that which has the 
likelihood of generating the greatest quantity of evidence while limiting the distress 
to the complainer: 
YES and the circumstances and the circumstances may vary from case to case 
and it’s the, I think that’s the main problem and you can only be a good 
pathologist or forensic medical examiner when you can hmm, assess the case, 
the actual case and make the appropriate decisions that’s, that’s the secret 
[it’]s not I have my guidelines, I go according to my guidelines, no it’s not 
like this, I HATE THIS, I hate everything that has to do with bureaucracy: 
fold it, punch it, file it away…it depends on the case, when you have a female 
victim, totally upset you can easily victimise her for the second time, or for 
the third time; so interview by the police is the second rape, examination is 
the third rape and referral to the GUM clinic is the fourth rape, so every time, 
it’s again and again and again.  I think we have to focus on the benefit to the 
victim, if the victim says no we have to respect it (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 
2). 
 
FMEs are wary of taking unnecessary swabs, particularly if they are to be taken from 
areas which could embarrass or further upset the complainer.  Most notably, the 
FMEs I interviewed mentioned that they consider anal and oral sampling to be highly 
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upsetting, and that they actively attempt to limit the collection of such swabs.  The 
FME decides whether anal or oral
128
 swabs are required based upon the complainer’s 
account; if the complainer states that there was anal and/or oral contact then they will 
swab, but if the complainer is adamant that those forms of assault were not attempted 
then FMEs will not sample those areas. 
I’m involved with some introductory training to the CID officers and I’ll 
explain to them that you should only take samples, you should only 
undertake, how’s best to say this, only undertake procedure, unless there is a 
valid reason and you’re going to get um, an appropriate end result.  If a 
complainer, normally female, the vast number are female, if she says quite 
clearly and categorically that he’s been nowhere near her back passage, 
nothing has been near her back passage, then there is no way I’m going to 
examine somebody’s back passage, because I’m not going to humiliate them 
further and I make that quite clear although it says on the pro forma from 
forensic science, “anal swabs”, I won’t do anal swabs unless there’s good 
reason for it, uh, some people may think that is inappropriate but I make it 
clear when I’m doing the introductory, if the complainer has been so 
intoxicated or under the influence of a drug and they don’t know what has 
happened to them, if they have no recollection whatsoever, then it is my 
responsibility to have a look just to make sure, but if they say to me 
“Definitely not” then we’ll not take the samples (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 
3). 
 
Here, Dr. G is echoing a number of his colleagues by arguing that if the complainer 
is unaware of what has taken place, then it is his “responsibility” to perform a 
complete examination and collect all samples; however, when the complainer has 
provided an account to the police, and has maybe been asked some “quiet questions” 
by the FME to determine whether other acts have taken place, and the FME is happy 
to accept that anal and/or oral contact was not made, then those areas will not be 
examined or sampled, as the FME does not wish to upset the complainer any more 
than they believe necessary.
129
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 It is not the case in clinical forensic medicine, as it is in other aspects of the criminal investigatory 
process (see for example Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006), that a buccal 
swab will be taken for an elimination or identification DNA sample.  This is because of the potential 
for suspect DNA to be present within the mouth: 
Now the reason for not taking the elimination sample as a buccal DNA in that scenario is oral 
sex, if there has been any oral contamination by the suspect in the mouth it could still be 
there, therefore you want blood (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
129
 In a similar vein, if the complainer’s account states (and the FME is convinced) that only oral 
penetration was attempted/successful, they will not perform vaginal/anal examinations. 
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6.2.3 Non-Genital Sampling and Other Trace Material Collection 
It’s a question of per individual case, you work out what you need to keep, 
what you have in the kit is anything you require to take all you may wish to 
take, but for example, in certain instances, you may wish to swab certain 
parts of the skin, in other instances you do not. In certain instances you may 
wish to scrape the nails and in others you don’t, in some instances you may 
want to take the hair, it’s a question per individual case and tailoring your 
taking of evidence, trace evidence in relation to a particular case, what you 
know of it, what you found on examination, and uh, taking as much as you 
can (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
In addition to the collection of genital samples, FMEs are expected to collect any 
other trace material that could provide corroboratory or incriminating evidence.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter (and echoed in Dr. B’s quotation here), the FMEK 
contains instruments and documents that outline a broad spectrum of potential 
samples, and the FME decides which of those samples could potentially provide 
corroboratory evidence, based on a combination of the account of the assault and the 
physical attributes of the complainer.  To illustrate this point, doctors often 
mentioned the decision to swab under the fingernails to search for the suspect’s skin 
or blood cells.  Many FMEs explained that they would not take this sample if either 
the complainer did not state that she scratched him, or the appearance of the 
fingernails were such that they did not indicate that trace material could be found; 
this judgement was based upon whether nails were long or short and the amount of 
dirt embedded within. 
Nails again, unless she’s scratched or has long nails then I don’t think, 
[Constabulary 1] men seem to bite their nails, so they’re so sharp, so if there 
was anything but dirt then yes I would, but if they hadn’t not so much then 
they were clean.  We have to use a little bit of you know, rather than going 
through the complete routine, use a little bit of common sense on these things 
as well (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
T-t-they depends on the case, we don’t do it [taking fingernail swabs] in 
every case.  If you don’t have nails like I don’t, it’s no use swabbing them.  If 
the girl says “I never touched him, I never scraped him or scratched him” you 
are giving the lab work that costs money, in terms of equipment, reagent, 
personnel and you are wasting their time.  Now we can’t have that (Dr. B, 
male, Constabulary 2). 
 
Dr. B’s quotation makes it quite clear that FMEs’ decision-making regarding 
sampling is not only based on whether there is the potential for evidence to be 
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discovered, but also on the related issue of the economics of labour.  FMEs appear to 
make decisions about which samples to collect based upon a cost-benefit analysis: 
whilst taking all samples and collecting all trace material may ensure that no 
potential evidence is missed, it does add a significant burden to the budget of either 
the police or the COPFS,
130
 and puts pressure upon the laboratory to analyse all the 
samples that are sent to them.  FMEs, being aware of this, strive to work efficiently, 
gathering as much evidence as possible in the smallest number of samples.  
“[T]here’s no point in cluttering their [forensic science laboratory] fridges with 300 
samples that they don’t need” (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
To address the efficiency problem, FMEs have developed a selection of 
strategies; one shared by most of the FMEs interviewed was the use of clothing.  As 
part of the examination, the doctor is expected to look for and swab any foreign 
material found upon the body; this could be material (for example, fibres from the 
locus) found in a wound or injury, or the result of sexual practices (for example, 
saliva from the biting or sucking of breasts, or semen from ejaculation onto the upper 
torso) that could be of benefit to the investigation.  While taking an individual swab 
for each of these signs of trace material would certainly be of use, it would result in a 
significant future workload for the laboratory, and, in all likelihood, would only 
serve to reproduce the same information that would be found upon the clothing that 
the victim was wearing at the time of the assault.  To limit the workload of the lab, 
therefore, FMEs rely on clothing as a substitute for upper torso sampling.
131
 
You have to balance that [swabbing the upper torso] against the work that has 
to be done in the lab.  So you have to use the lab to the best of resources.  We 
could swab the whole body as we do with a post-mortem in a murder, in a 
murder every bit of the body is swabbed, but can’t do that with a living 
person, the lab would not be able to cope.  We have to narrow, okay our, and 
remember there’s the clothing still, and the best way, the best swabs of skin 
are the clothing because the saliva, any other secretions, the clothing is going 
to soak them up.  If someone’s been grabbed by clothing, there’s skin there, 
so clothing is much more useful (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
                                               
130 The decision over which body is responsible for paying the cost of the forensic scientific analyses 
is based upon whether a suspect has been “detected” or not.  If the police are still searching for a 
suspect, or do not have enough evidence to lay a formal charge, it is their responsibility to pay for the 
analyses.   
131 Assuming the assault is relatively recent the police would have already received the clothing either 
via retrieval from the complainer’s home, or because she had brought the clothes to the police herself.  
If the complainer is still wearing the clothes in which she was assaulted, these would be removed in a 
routine fashion on a brown sheet; see Chapter Five. 
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Another FME commented: 
And the same thing, as you said, the upper torso, bite marks, the swabs that 
you take for saliva, even if they are not washed with soap and water, that 
would remain even on the clothes that you are wearing and taken off, it is still 
there so you can take from that (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
As clothing retains identifying material (even, if we are to believe Dr. A, after it has 
been washed), taking further upper-torso samples would be repetition of work and 
duplication of material.  With the aim of limiting the future work of the laboratory, 
FMEs believe that clothing (if available) serves as a surrogate for the multiple swabs 
that the FME would be required to take for all observed trace material observed upon 
the body.  Of course, if clothing is not available then the taking of these swabs 
becomes imperative.  FMEs, therefore, make a cost-benefit judgement about which 
non-intimate samples have the greatest potential for producing incriminating and 
corroboratory evidence, and only collect those that they feel will be useful to the 
investigation. 
The final factor involved in an FME’s decision to reduce the number (and 
type) of samples concerns the length of time that occurs between the alleged assault 
and the examination; this, of course, affects the potential to gather useful evidence, 
and it is to this issue that I turn next. 
6.2.4 Time Since Alleged Assault 
The authors of the FFLM sampling guideline place considerable significance on the 
length of time that has passed between the alleged assault and the examination.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, such importance has been placed on the timescale 
because clinical forensic medical studies have investigated and reported the 
prevalence/degradation rates of different trace materials upon bodily surfaces, and so 
the time parameters in which it is possible to collect trace material which will be of 
use have been specified.  Such empirical results form an evidence-base upon which 
(it is hoped) FMEs will draw when deciding whether or not a sample is appropriate.  
Dr. A, while very aware of these reported timescales, was nevertheless highly 
sceptical of their relevance. 
Um, for vaginal examination, ten days is reported [meaning that extracted 
DNA can still be useful] depending on whether they’ve had a bath or shower, 
if they shower you can still get something, bath you obviously lose more, 
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again, the ideal thing is less than 24 hours, up to 72 hours you are still going 
to get after that, every hour you delay you are going to get less and less, but 
still the chances are, and after about 5 days I would say not just taking high 
vaginal swabs you’d have to take endo-cervical swabs… and for the anus is 
about 5 days, but the reality is that bowel movements within 2 days you are 
going to lose, same thing with the mouth, they [guidelines] say 2 days but the 
reality is 6 hours because body produces saliva (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 
1). 
 
Dr. A problematises the timescales explicated in the guidance documents by stating 
that both bodily functions and any bathing by the complainer after the assault will 
result in a loss of material, and so although the clinical evidence suggests that 
material would still be present for up to ten days after an assault, in reality it would 
be lost.  Dr. A did not make clear the exact manner in which she incorporated such 
scepticism about timescales into her actual decision-making; nevertheless, it is not 
outside the realms of possibility that she would reduce sampling in the case of a 
greater length of time between the alleged assault and the examination.  A similar 
argument was put forward by Dr. D, which I will explain shortly; however, I would 
first like to comment on Dr. D’s rather interesting attitude towards timescales.  Given 
what Dr. A says about the importance of hours and that “every hour you delay you 
are going to get less and less”, it is indeed remarkable that Dr. D believes that in 
some cases it is preferable to wait until the next day to perform the examination. 
Yes the process is that I check, when it’s during the night time whether it is 
urgent or not, whether the situation of the victim, it should, the main process 
must be focused on the victim for the benefit of the victim and when the 
victim is not in a situation for an examination during the night time, I would 
do it during the daytime, because when there’s no shower, no bath, there’s no 
danger for loss of evidence.  Um depends on, depends again on the situation, 
and again the night time is not the best time for examination due to the 
[body’s] own internal rhythm (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
It is clear from this quotation that Dr. D prefers that the complainer not be examined 
during the night out of a duty of care and compassionate attitude to the complainer; 
however, if it is decided that the complainer will not be examined until the following 
day, then they are asked to refrain from cleaning themselves, and as Roberts (1984) 
pointed out in The New Police Surgeon: Rape, “this [cleaning] is one of the first 
things a woman wants to do when she’s been raped” (Roberts 1984: 78).  There 
seems to be some disagreement between Dr. D and reported “best practice” over the 
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best interests of the complainer, and I think a great deal of this stems from Dr. D’s 
perception of the exact time that complainers tend to report.  Dr. D believes it is not 
often the case that complainers report within “a couple of days” of the alleged 
assault; instead he claims that the report and the subsequent forensic medical 
examination usually take place some time afterwards. 
I think if it is later than one week, it doesn’t make sense to take all the 
samples but um semen might be present even after one week so it depends a 
little bit.  It is now, according to the guidelines, all the samples should be 
done, but it is rare that we see victims after a couple of days, it’s rare, but 
then I think I’d like to reduce because I can only do and propose what I am 
convinced of, and if it doesn’t make sense why upset the victim again (Dr. D, 
male, Constabulary 2). 
 
There are a number of points I wish to draw out of this quotation, beginning with a 
continuation of the previous point; as Dr. D appears to assume that the majority of 
cases will report outside of the window within which useful samples will be 
available, then it follows that it is unnecessary for them to be examined at night.  In 
cases where the complainer has reported shortly after the alleged attack (and so there 
is a good probability that there will be recoverable useful evidence), Dr. D does say 
that it is important to collect the samples as soon as possible: “but when it’s urgent, 
um I would make contact, then we would meet at four perhaps, four o’clock in the 
morning” (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 2).  Dr. D does not dismiss the necessity of 
performing examinations or taking samples at night; he will make a decision on the 
urgency of the examination on the basis of the length of time since the alleged assault 
and the perceived value in taking immediate samples.  If the case is deemed urgent, 
i.e. if the alleged assault took place within a number of hours, or a few days, he will 
meet the complainer during the night; if it is not, he will put off the examination until 
the next day. 
 The other point raised by Dr. D’s quotation concerns his decision about the 
particular samples that should be collected.  We can see his strategy from the start of 
the quotation: “I think if it is later than one week, it doesn’t make sense to take all the 
samples”.  As I hypothesised with the quotation from Dr. A, it appears that it is 
generally taken for granted that while (as Dr. A stated) prevalence studies have 
discovered that semen can still be found for up to ten days, the likelihood is that such 
material would not actually be present, and so Dr. D would decide not to take the 
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sample in such a case.  As he says, “I can only do and propose what I am convinced 
of”; i.e. he only takes samples that he is convinced are likely to produce useful 
evidence.  Interestingly, he takes such a stance out of a duty of care to the 
complainer; if he is not convinced that samples will be of use, then there is little 
reason to perform another invasive act upon the victim.  While most FMEs share this 
victim-centric approach, it is certainly not universal; a different FME, Dr. B, from 
the same constabulary, said the following: 
A swab costs tuppence, so we take it and throw it away if we don’t need it, so 
we tend to err on the side of caution.  If it’s a week, five days over, we’ll still 
carry out an examination and sometimes we’re surprised to find that some 
things [trace material] remained.  So we don’t time-bar the examination (Dr. 
B, male, Constabulary 2, emphasis added). 
 
It is difficult to say whether it would be the case that Dr. B would continue to take 
genital samples if the intervening period between the alleged assault and examination 
were over a week, and so there may not be as much difference between the 
statements of Dr. B and Dr. D as there appears to be at first glance, but Dr. B does 
certainly suggest that they do not “time-bar the examination”, preferring to take 
samples regardless of whether he is convinced useful material will be present or not.  
This expressed method on the part of Dr. B introduces an element of uncertainty 
regarding the uniformity of FME practice, as usually it appears that FMEs make their 
sampling decisions on the basis of their own experience of material degradation and 
out of a duty of care to the complainer; however, as I have already alluded, there is 
an extent to which the differences between Dr. B and Dr. D could solely be a matter 
of emphasis, based upon length of time; I will return to this in Section 6.3.2.3 below. 
 The previous sections have expounded FME accounts and justifications of the 
ways in which they gather evidence during the forensic medical examination.  It is 
clear that FMEs only perform a “Total Collection Strategy” when there is significant 
uncertainty over the events of the alleged assault, i.e. when the complainer cannot 
remember (due to intoxication, for example) what has taken place.  Generally, FMEs 
tailor their sampling strategy to the particular case being examined, on the basis of 
the complainer’s account.  While there is always some uncertainty about the fullness 
of the account, FMEs convince themselves of this fullness by asking “quiet 
questions” of the complainer and make their decisions accordingly.  Such decisions 
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appear to be based upon three factors: 1) the dignity of the complainer (the FME will 
try to avoid taking samples from areas where there is said to have been no contact); 
2) the future workload (if it is possible to get useful evidence from another source 
such as clothing, then extra bodily samples may not be taken); and 3) the length of 
time since the attack (a decision is made about whether a certain sample has the 
potential to provide useful evidence on the basis of the likelihood of the material 
having degraded).  By making these decisions, FMEs are able to reduce the number 
of samples that they need to take, thereby helping to limit both the indignity to the 
complainer and the amount of work needed at the laboratory.  All of this goes to 
show that while there have been attempts to routinise and standardise FME 
examinations of sexual assault complainers, FMEs still rely heavily upon their own 
discretion and experience in determining what is best practice in each particular case.  
This, of course, does not run counter to the sampling guidelines or protocols of the 
“working party”, which make it quite clear that FMEs are to decide for themselves 
which samples are relevant to each case, but are instead to consider them as aides 
memoires. 
I personally see it [pro forma] as an aide memoire on occasion, because no 
matter how many of these you’ve done, there’s always something you forget 
to ask, you know, and I don’t often forget with the victims, I more often tend 
to forget with the suspects to ask when did you last have a bath, so I find it 
quite useful often in that set-up rather than the victims, I don’t know why… 
But for me it’s an aide memoire, I think the primary information is for the 
forensic labs, but obviously it is a source of information for me that I’ve been 
forced to write down and very useful for me when I have come to compile my 
report because I have taken their height and weight and noted the other bits 
and bobs that are relevant (Dr. C, female, Constabulary 2). 
 
There is something of a quandary here, therefore: on the one hand, it is clear from the 
evidence presented that the guidance documents and protocols do not determine 
practice; however, those artefacts (guidance documents, protocols, etc.) do actually 
represent an articulation of that practice, and FMEs do state that they employ them 
(the evidence collection forms in particular) as aides memoires.  Given this 
quandary, how can we explain FME practice in relation to these guidance 
documents?  In the next section I will provide two explanations for the relationship 
between practitioners, guidance documents, kits and practice; one is expressed in the 
work of Deborah Parnis and Janice Du Mont, while the other explanation is my own.  
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To sum up my interpretation briefly: there is a community of FMEs who have 
developed shared practices for decision-making which are explicated to a certain 
extent within the documents and the kit; however, although FMEs have access to 
such protocols, they do not actually determine their practice.  In fact, the guidelines 
are underdetermined, and the FME requires the conventions of their community in 
order to know the correct way to follow them.  Before outlining the minutiae of my 
argument, I will first discuss Parnis and Du Mont’s interpretation. 
6.3 Evidence Collection as Rule-Following 
6.3.1 The “Dual-Role” Thesis 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Du Mont and Parnis (2000, 2001) and Parnis and Du 
Mont (2002, 2006)
132
 were the first to perform a systematic review of the SAEK 
employed in Ontario, Canada, since its inception in the late 1970s.  Developed and 
established in similar circumstances to the Metropolitan Kit (see Chapter Five), the 
SAEK was introduced with the intention to standardise the medical examination of 
sexual assault complainers (Parnis and Du Mont 2002).  As the SAEK was 
developed with the same intention as the Metropolitan Kit, its contents were (and 
still are) highly similar (see Du Mont and Parnis 2001 and Parnis and Du Mont 2002 
for a breakdown of the SAEK’s contents) and were produced with a similar agenda: 
“the SAEK was implemented with the belief that ‘if prescribed procedures [were] 
followed, it [would] be less likely that the acceptability of [such] evidence [would] 
be questioned in court’” (Provincial Secretariat of Justice, Ontario cited in Du Mont 
and Parnis 2001: 69).  However, as Parnis and Du Mont’s quotation continues, “we 
have begun to discern that the professionals who administer the kit may not 
consistently follow the guidelines set out in the protocol” (Du Mont and Parnis 2001: 
69-70).  Conducting two survey-based studies (consisting of questionnaires and 
qualitative interviews including focus groups) with FMEs, Sexual Assault Nurse 
Examiners (hereafter “SANEs”) and forensic nurses
133
, Parnis and Du Mont 
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 As in Chapter One, I will continue the convention of using Parnis and Du Mont to signify both the 
2002 and 2006 publications, as well as the Du Mont and Parnis publications, unless citing from a 
specific publication. 
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 SANEs are specially trained nurses who can conduct sexual assault examinations without the aid of 
a doctor.  While these practitioners have been successfully incorporated into clinical forensic medical 
work in the United States, Australia and Canada, their introduction into the United Kingdom is still at 
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discovered that practitioners did not conform to the guidance outlined in the SAEK.  
For instance: 
The kit guidelines include instructions that the evidence collection “should be 
directed by the history of the assault,” and explicitly delineate the questions 
to be asked of the victim (e.g., “Was last previous intercourse within one 
week prior to the assault?”; “[Were] any marks left on the assailant, e.g. by 
biting, scratching, kicking, etc.?) and that the specified are to be taken in a 
particular manner (e.g., collect URINE for drug and alcohol analysis and 
place approximately 10 ml. URINE in container 3-1”: “Take ORAL SWAB 
[thoroughly rubbing along gum and teeth margin] using swab 2-A1, place 
swab in tube 2-A1”) (Parnis and Du Mont 2002: 848). 
 
Regarding the first instruction, i.e. “determine the appropriate samples based upon 
the complainer’s account”, Parnis and Du Mont found in their first (smaller scale) 
study that 40 per cent of the sample reported that they adhered to this instruction “all 
of the time”, with 11 per cent stating that they “never” based sample collection upon 
the account and 21 per cent reporting that they used the account “some of the time” 
(Du Mont and Parnis 2001).  Furthermore, in the second (larger) study, FMEs were 
asked:  
“How often would you say that you deviate from the standard criteria in the 
kit (e.g., requested samples or specimens are not collected, additional samples 
are taken)?”, of those 143 professionals who responded, 84% of doctors, 80% 
of SANEs, and 65% of nurses stated “all, most, or some of the time” (Parnis 
and Du Mont 2006: 84). 
 
Parnis and Du Mont’s finding that FMEs do not rigidly follow the directives outlined 
in guidance documents certainly concurs with my own findings; however, our 
analysis of the data does differ somewhat (although there is also much that is 
consistent).  For the remainder of this section I will review Parnis and Du Mont’s 
argument before outlining my own. 
 Parnis and Du Mont draw upon the work of Kathleen Kelly (1996, 1998) and 
Stephen Savage (1997) to explain their data.  Kelly and Savage argue that police 
doctors exist in a state of role-conflict during the medical examination (evidence of 
                                                                                                                                     
an elementary phase, with only some SARCs choosing to employ SANEs.  The United Kingdom 
Home Office commissioned a report into the feasibility and usefulness of SANEs; see Regan et al. 
2004.  Likewise, forensic nurses are nurses who have received more training than most of their 
counterparts and so are allowed to help out in sexual assault examinations in some jurisdictions, but 
are not able to perform examinations single-handed unlike SANEs. Neither SANEs nor Forensic 
Nurses are used in Scotland at present. 
 165 
which is embedded in the profession’s past title, the “police doctor” or “police 
surgeon”).  On the one hand, the “doctor” is supposed to play a medical role, tending 
to the therapeutic needs of the complainer and ensuring the patient’s confidentiality.  
On the other hand, the “police” aspect serves to remind that the examination is more 
than just a therapeutic consultation: the doctor is there to gather evidence, and so 
must conduct their work in a disinterested manner, collecting any material relevant to 
the investigation, whether or not it is harmful to the complainer, and whether or not 
the information is confidential.  Although they only provide limited empirical 
evidence themselves, Kelly et al. and Savage et al. do suggest that this dichotomy of 
the therapeutic and the forensic are incompatible, and Savage et al. (1997) suggests 
that such an intractable dichotomy serves to provide an explanation for the various 
problematic interactions victims have reported in the past: police doctors, they argue, 
are too close to the police and therefore emphasise the forensic over the therapeutic. 
 Parnis and Du Mont use the “dual role” thesis but turn Savage’s finding upon 
its head: using qualitative evidence, they argue that rather than being too close to the 
police, forensic practitioners are more concerned with the therapeutic aspect and 
ensuring the dignity of the complainer.  I will present some of the evidence that 
Parnis and Du Mont use here: 
I find that… to do a proper job for the client, I have to be unbiased and I have 
to be very factual in what I say [in court], but then we go to treating them… 
you’re going from one role to the other in minutes (SANE Parnis & Du Mont 
2006: 83). 
 
So basically, because she comes in for sexual assault, I’m biased because I 
believe her.  And I mean, I’m a medical professional and, you say you’ve got 
chest pain, I don’t say “come on now, do you really?”… So you know, yeah, 
I’m expert, but I’m this completely biased schmuck….  And we go on and on 
about how… we are to be objective.  I mean the consciousness around the 
department about how we are objective (SANE Parnis & Du Mont 2006: 83). 
 
My concern with documentation is that remembering nurses and physicians 
are not investigators and… the sexual assault history form, there’s questions 
there that really are going to be repeated by the investigating officers that I 
really don’t think are the roles of nurses and physicians (SANE Parnis & Du 
Mont 2006: 83). 
 
The role-conflict hinted at by Kelly and Savage is keenly expressed in these 
quotations, with the last quotation outlining the difficulties that practitioners have 
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with performing the full examination: certain aspects may prove detrimental to the 
complainer in future (see Parnis and Du Mont 2006 for many more such quotations).  
Parnis and Du Mont argue that the forensic-medical dual role is actually inscribed 
onto the kit itself, as it contains both evidence collection and therapeutic elements.  
Practitioners, they suggest, are actively resisting the strict forensic (evidence-
gathering) meaning enshrined within the kit and are instead resituating both the kit 
and the examination of the complainer more broadly along the evidence-gathering 
and therapeutic axis. 
It appears then that, beyond the standardized practices adhered to by the 
health professionals, interpretative activity is exhibited in the forms of 
resistance to, and reconstruction of, some of the governing meanings 
circumscribed by this forensic technology (Parnis and Du Mont 2006: 85). 
 
Choosing not to collect certain samples or ask certain questions that the protocol 
notes as appropriate, therefore, constitutes an act of resistance to the inherent 
evidence collection meaning ascribed to the kit.  Deviation from the strict dictates of 
the kit out of a concern for the complainer brings the meaning of the kit closer to the 
victim-centred medical end of the forensic-medical spectrum.  Given this, Parnis and 
Du Mont do not interpret deviation from the kit as a deviant act, but rather a victim-
centred, therapeutic one. 
 Parnis and Du Mont provide a very powerful argument for why FMEs do not 
follow the instructions provided in guidance documents to the strictest extent: while 
the protocols provide a good approximation of the work that is needed during the 
forensic medical examination, they also hint at the dual role that FMEs are expected 
to negotiate.  By choosing to omit (or in certain cases add) samples and questions, 
FMEs are actively situating their own position within the therapeutic/forensic 
dichotomy.  My own fieldwork certainly provided evidence of FMEs choosing not to 
collect samples out of a duty of care for the complainer, and so Parnis and Du Mont’s 
argument could go some way towards explaining my data.  However, I find their 
argument to be too individualistic.  In the following section I will provide a more 
collectivist explanation for the FME discretion that both I and Parnis and Du Mont 
observed. 
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6.3.2 A Finitist Explanation for Evidence Collection 
Before moving on to explicate my own interpretation of my data, I should make clear 
that there is much upon which I agree with Parnis and Du Mont.  Firstly, I am highly 
sympathetic to their overarching project of improving sexual assault examinations 
for both women and men, and secondly, I am certainly of the opinion that 
technological artefacts do, in fact, have politics (Winner 1986) and as such are 
ascribed meanings by communities of practitioners via use that can ultimately be 
reconfigured (Schyfter 2009).  Thirdly, my findings certainly agree – not only with 
Parnis and Du Mont, but also with Kelly et al. and Savage et al. – that FMEs exist in 
a role-conflict between evidence-gathering and the therapeutic; Section 6.2.2 
provided many examples of practitioners explaining their omission of samples in 
terms of the best interests of the complainer.  However, I believe that the dichotomy 
is too simplistic and should be explained in a more complex manner.  Sections 6.2.3 
and 6.2.4 provided numerous examples of the omission of samples by practitioners in 
the interest of minimising the potential work of others in the investigatory process; 
such a finding does not fit neatly with the evidence-gathering/medical dichotomy, as 
it has the potential to minimise the likelihood of gathering corroboratory evidence, 
while also not necessarily being in the best interests of the complainer.  Nevertheless, 
the key consideration remains: FMEs exist in a complex of tensions which have to be 
negotiated during every medical examination.  The major point of departure between 
my analysis and Parnis and Du Mont’s lies in the act of interpretation; while I am 
unsure of the extent to which the authors would find such a reading of their work 
accurate, they appear to claim that practitioners are required to negotiate the tensions 
individually, i.e. interpret how to employ the kit (by deciding which samples and 
questions should be omitted/added) for each particular case, based upon both the 
history of the case and an unspecified quantity (as has already been mentioned, an 
FME’s decision on whether or not to base the examination upon the account is a 
judgement in itself).  Following the logic of Parnis and Du Mont’s argument, this x-
factor would appear to be the subjectivities of the practitioner themselves (their level 
of experience, their previous experience/habits, their training, their attitude to 
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complainers in general, etc.)
134
, as they determine the way in which an individual 
practitioner chooses the omissions/additions.  While I certainly agree that it is the 
individual FME, who in the final analysis, makes decisions about the conduct of an 
examination, I suggest that in doing so they are drawing upon an existing collective 
practice.  I will expand upon this statement next. 
 It is my contention that in order to negotiate the tensions already outlined, 
FMEs have developed a set of practices that are shared amongst the community and 
which determine the occasions where it is appropriate to take certain samples.  Such 
shared practices are collectively distributed to practitioners during training: the 
trainee, knowledgeable of the guideline-determined forms of work from reading 
textbooks and guidelines, observes the ways in which their trainer diverges from 
such guided practice during the early stages of shadowing, and is furthermore 
corrected by the trainer whenever unnecessary samples are taken during the second 
phase of shadowing (however, such shared practices should not be considered as 
fixed practice norms, but are instead far more fluid; I will expand upon this shortly).  
By the end of the training process, the trainee will have developed a classificatory 
schema based upon the communally-held conception of the appropriate samples to 
take for certain types of cases (genital injury, anal injury, reported within three days, 
reported within five days, when clothes have been found, when clothes have not, 
when showered, when bathed, etc.).  Having become a competent examiner, the FME 
makes use of this schema when presented with a new case, and draws an analogy 
between cases that they have previously observed (during training or afterwards) and 
the one in front of them, asking themselves which samples were taken the last time 
that they witnessed this type of case.  With this method, they classify the case as (for 
example) a vaginal-penile assault, reported within five days (such details would, of 
course, have come from the account), in which the complainer does not appear to 
have material under her fingernails or in her head or pubic hair (such details as the 
amount of material under the fingernails or in the hair would only be surmisable via 
observation and the community-accepted parameters that determine what counts as 
non-existent or insignificant material).  Having classified a case, they would then 
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 It should be noted that these bracketed subjectivities are my own inferences and not expressed by 
Parnis and Du Mont.  Some of these also appear in my explanation. 
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collect a collectively-accepted list of evidence.
135
  This brief account provides an 
explanation for the ways in which FMEs determine which samples to collect, 
questions to ask, etc. when performing a forensic medical examination; it is also 
consistent with FMEs’ own accounts of the development of best practice (for 
example, “best practice is taught from those with experience and expertise” (Dr. M, 
male, Constabulary 3)).  FMEs have developed a set of strategies for negotiating the 
therapeutic/evidence-gathering tension, including the economy of work tension, and 
these are shared by the community of practitioners.  It is these shared practices that 
determine FMEs’ decision-making when it comes to sampling.  This explanation 
rests on a number of assumptions, and so to support my explanation for the rest of 
this section I will explore these questions: 
1. Are there examples of shared practices?  This is the most obvious question, 
pertaining to a claim that FMEs have a shared practice; is there evidence of 
such collective practice? 
2. How do practices come to be shared?  I have already alluded to the training 
element, but in order to address collective practice fully without resorting to 
an overly simplistic explanation, I need to engage with this issue further, 
particularly with respect to the ways in which practices become shared 
amongst constabularies. 
3. How can practitioner/constabulary differences be explained?  There are 
examples of differences in practice amongst practitioners both inter- and 
intra- constabulary; how does the claim that FMEs are a collective sit with 
that fact? 
4. What role do guidelines, kits and protocols play if practice is determined by 
collective action?  This is more of a tangential question, but relates to the 
broader argument of how we can explain FME practice with respect to 
guidelines, and so requires an answer. 
I will start by outlining some examples of shared practice. 
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 This explanation was heavily inspired by Barry Barnes’ discussion of practice as collective action 
(2000, 2001). 
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6.3.2.1 Shared FME Practices 
At the most basic level, one way of uncovering the collective nature of FME practice 
is to focus upon the language they employ to describe their work. 
Regardless of what they’ve said, even though what the police have said, we 
ask our own questions, of medical questions of health and… any pain any 
bleeding, any injuries (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1, emphasis added). 
 
[B]ecause we examine them behind a screen, we might ask more searching 
questions as to the, what might have happened the mechanism or penetration 
or uh, the modes of penetration or whether there was ejaculation, or how the 
injuries might have occurred.  Certainly we, if we see any injuries like a 
bruise or an abrasion we’ll say “oh, there’s a bruise how do you think that 
might have happened?”  And I’ll quote and I’ll write down exactly how they 
said that had happened (Dr. F, male, Constabulary 2, emphasis added). 
 
If a complainer, normally female, the vast number are female, if she says 
quite clearly and categorically that he’s been nowhere near her back passage, 
nothing has been near her back passage, then there is no way I’m going to 
examine somebody’s back passage, because I’m not going to humiliate them 
further and I make that quite clear although it says on the pro-forma from 
forensic science anal swabs, I won’t do anal swabs unless there’s good reason 
for it, uh, some people may think that is inappropriate but I make it clear 
when I’m doing the introductory, if the complainer has been so intoxicated or 
under the influence of a drug and they don’t know what has happened to 
them, if they have no recollection whatsoever, then it is my responsibility to 
have a look just to make sure, but if they say to me “definitely not” then we’ll 
not take the samples (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 3, emphasis added). 
 
These quotations, chosen from many, demonstrate how practitioners switch between 
the first-person singular (“I”) and the first-person plural (“we”) in order to describe 
their practice.  Not only are the practitioners describing the ways in which they 
perform examinations individually, but also the way in which they are performed by 
the collective of FMEs.  These practitioners, therefore, are justifying their individual 
practice in terms of the known shared practices held by the community.  By 
themselves, these quotations are quite weak as evidence of a shared practice; 
however, when coupled with some of the evidence presented in the earlier sections 
the argument becomes more convincing.  For the sake of space, I will not describe all 
the aspects of shared practice that I mentioned earlier; instead, I will take three of the 
examples described above and demonstrate why I believe these to be shared 
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practices.  Two of the examples concern the use of clothing and the collection of 
fingernails; the third, the collection of an account.
136
 
 Section 6.2.3 addressed the economic tension FMEs face when performing 
the examination; while they are at pains to collect as much material as possible in the 
attempt to increase the likelihood of generating corroborative evidence, they are also 
acutely aware of both the financial and time limitations placed upon others in the 
criminal justice process.  To this end, they limit sample collection, not only out of a 
duty of care for the complainer, but also with the aim of efficiency (i.e. limiting 
duplication of material that will produce the same evidence – for example, saliva 
upon the upper torso).  One of the strategies to improve efficiency mentioned by 
FMEs was the retrieval of samples (by the scientists) from clothing.
137
  As clothing 
soaks up material from the body, the use of clothing for the generation of biological 
material provides the same evidence as the sampling of the upper torso, thereby, in 
the FMEs’ minds, providing unnecessary duplication of work for the laboratory.  I 
used quotations in Sections 6.2.3 from three FMEs (Dr. A, Constabulary 1 and Drs. 
B and C from Constabulary 2), providing justifications for the decision not to swab 
the upper torso, and moreover used quotations from Dr. A and Dr. B to demonstrate 
the use of clothing as a surrogate for the upper torso swabs.  What I wish to make 
clear at this stage is the shared nature of these quotations and their geographically 
diverse aspect.  Different practitioners in diverse constabularies are making the same 
decisions, based upon the same reasons.  Likewise, Drs. A and B were also in 
agreement on the decision of whether or not to collect fingernail samples, arguing 
that if the fingernails are short, or if there is no observable material (other than dirt) 
under the fingernails, or if the complainer claims not to have touched the perpetrator 
with their hands, then it is not necessary to collect fingernail samples, as this will 
provide the laboratory with work that is unlikely to be of value.  It is clear then that 
Drs. A and B, working in different constabularies, have the same practices and 
justifications for their work, but what about other FMEs? 
                                               
136 The reader is of course invited to revisit the earlier sections to look for more illustrations of 
collective practice, based upon the examples that I have provided. 
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 The FMEs themselves do not remove material from the clothing, but instead freeze the entire 
article, allowing scientists to swab areas where material is observed and perform analysis. 
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 To try and provide more conclusive evidence of a shared practice, I will turn 
to the collection of the account.  As I mentioned in Section 6.2.1, it is increasingly 
considered “best practice” for the practitioner not to attempt to gain an account from 
the complainer, as it may differ from the initial statements taken by the SOLO or 
during the formal interview with the SIO, and thereby prove detrimental to the 
complainer’s case at a later date.  Moreover, the complainer may become more 
distressed at the thought that she has been distrusted and the investigators are 
attempting to test her account, or at being forced to re-live the experience.  However, 
from their experience, FMEs are of the opinion that the accounts provided by SOLOs 
are usually partial (as the complainer has not provided the entire account to the 
SOLO), and as the account partially determines FME sampling decisions, the 
practitioners must find another way to confirm the fullness of the account.  Every 
practitioner interviewed said that they asked “quiet questions” of the complainer 
during the course of the examination (see Section 6.2.1, and also Dr. A and Dr. F 
above in this section, for some examples of quiet questions), that may (at face value) 
appear to be normal clinical medical questions that any doctor might ask during any 
form of medical, but also suffice to deduce the fullness of the account from the 
complainer.  Even Dr. G, who as I mentioned in Section 6.2.1 used the 
accompanying officer to gather more information from the complainer, said: 
If however, during the course of the examination I have to ask something, I 
try not to ask it, but if I need further clarification then I will ask.  So we try 
not to be over-intrusive in our questioning (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
Dr. G’s quotation displays the interesting relationship between the first-person 
singular and the first-person plural with which I commenced this sub-section.  Taken 
together, the linguistic evidence and the shared choices and justifications provide 
more than a hint, in my view, towards the collective nature of FME practice.  It is not 
enough, however, merely to show areas where such practice is the same; an 
explanation is also required for the process by which these practices come to be 
shared.  This is the focus of the next sub-section. 
6.3.2.2 The Sharing of Practice 
I have already alluded to the way in which a trainee observes her trainer and thereby 
becomes cognisant of some of the community-accepted diversions from the 
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guidelines, and pointed out that these are crystallised during the latter part of the 
training process when the trainee is performing examinations herself, shadowed by 
the trainer.  During this latter phase, the trainee either collects the samples and is 
latterly corrected by their trainer, or the trainee and trainer together decide (before 
the arrival of the complainer) which samples are to be collected.  Either way, it is 
through this process that trainees are taught to classify cases in the communally-
accepted manner and collect the communally-accepted samples.  It is not the case, 
however, that practitioners are just following a norm that they were taught during 
their training; the shared practice is far more fluid than that analysis would indicate.  
What the trainer is actually disseminating is the shared “best practice” of the 
community at one particular time, and it is open to change over time.  The way in 
which these practices change is the focus of this sub-section. 
The two most obvious changes to FME practice that I observed during the 
fieldwork were the introduction of kits into practice in the mid-1980s and the 
introduction of the double-swab sampling technique (Sweet et al. 1997).  It is clear 
that with both of these interventions, the community of FMEs accepted them as 
beneficial (see, for example, Rogers and Newton (2006) with regard to the double-
swab technique) and so these became part of the community’s ideas of “best 
practice”.  This process needs to be considered in more detail, however; in both cases 
an outside agency (in these cases forensic science) introduced an intervention, and 
because it does not necessarily follow that an intervention is always an innovation, 
the community of FMEs had to assess its benefits.  In both cases the adjudication 
arrived in the form of the relevant professional association making clear within the 
pages of their publications (The Police Surgeon: Rape and the Journal of Clinical 
Forensic Medicine respectively) that they supported such interventions.  As 
expressed in Chapter Three, FMEs are highly encouraged to keep up-to-date with the 
literature and so would alter their individual practice in light of these announcements.  
While these examples demonstrate the community nature of FMEs, subsumed by a 
professional association and following the communally-agreed instructions described 
in published journals, they do not necessarily address small-scale local amendments 
to practice. 
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It is clear from the data presented in both this and other chapters that 
practitioners working in the same constabulary follow a similar practice.  This is 
partly because of training, with senior practitioners in a constabulary disseminating 
their practices (themselves partially learnt from experienced practitioners) to the 
trainees.  However, as demonstrated with the classifying of injuries, it is always 
possible that new cases can problematise existing classificatory schema, and 
moreover practitioners themselves improve their techniques through performance 
(gaining further experience), and may find more efficient strategies for attaining 
certain sample types (for instance, knowing the situations in which there will not be 
useful material under the fingernails) or for asking further questions of the 
complainer without causing upset.  In what way, though, are these changes shared 
within the constabulary?  There are various interactive mechanisms by which such 
changes are passed on: some constabularies have shared offices where FMEs can 
interact and discuss their cases with one another, others have frequent peer-review 
processes where work is collectively evaluated, and as I mentioned in Chapter Three, 
some constabularies hold collective meetings to discuss the nature of work and 
potential “best practice” improvements.  Moreover, while I generally found very 
little evidence (apart from training situations) in my interviews, practitioners in some 
constabularies did express that they performed double-doctor examinations.  Most 
practitioners, even those within constabularies which allegedly performed these 
forms of examination, argued that they were only conducted in cases where the 
assault showed evidence of extreme violence. 
[I]t [double-doctoring] is very useful when you do get the, thankfully rarer, 
seriously injured, multiply injured person coming in which is very time-
consuming, and again, you don’t want to be taken up, this is a distressed 
person, you want to get the examination done.  So if someone else is scribing 
and doing everything that really speeds things along quite well (Dr. C, 
female, Constabulary 2). 
 
Although double-doctoring is generally rare, this does present another situation 
where practices can be shared amongst practitioners in the same constabulary.  While 
it is highly likely that the practice of both would be quite similar anyway, the process 
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of performing the examination would resolve any slight differences in their decision-
making and would also inform both their future practices.
138
 
 There are plenty of mechanisms by which intra-constabulary practice can 
become homogenised, but this still leaves the problem of the less interactive process 
of inter-constabulary shared practice.  This too can be explained in terms of 
interaction; while for the sake of anonymity I am unable to quote from the exact 
cases, it is certainly true that the level of FME movement in Scotland is high.  
Practitioners in most constabularies mentioned first working with or being trained by 
one particular examiner, from whom they learnt how to perform examinations.  After 
this initial time working in that one constabulary, the trained FMEs then moved on to 
conduct work in other constabularies, developing their own training programmes and 
peer-review processes based upon their previous training.  This provides an 
explanation for why the majority of FME practice in Scotland is similar: it all 
diffused from one constabulary, indeed, from the work of one practitioner.  However, 
as described previously, there is considerable scope for intra-constabulary changes in 
practice due to complex cases or minimal improvements; given this, can it still be 
argued that a shared inter-constabulary practice exists?  FMEs are very aware of the 
minutiae of the work going on in other constabularies.  In certain constabularies, it 
has become the custom that as part of peer-review, or if the police are unsure about a 
particular practitioner’s findings, a practitioner from another constabulary will be 
asked to review the report. 
[S]ometimes, in a one doctor system, and they are slightly unhappy about the 
doctor for one reason or another, what they do is get a more senior doctor to 
read the papers and to give a report (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2). 
 
On occasion the fiscal in various regions has received the report from the 
police surgeon who has perhaps been a little circumspect as to what the 
significance of the findings are and perhaps contact myself as the more 
experienced police surgeon in [cut for anonymity]… the fiscals will ask 
myself, they will ask [cut for anonymity], um I’m not sure if [cut for 
anonymity] do it but I know that [cut for anonymity] do for paediatrics but I 
know the fiscal do have a responsibility and should seek advice if the 
medical, the initial medical report is uncertain or unclear (Dr. G, male, 
Constabulary 3). 
 
                                               
138
 Martin Kusch (1999) has labelled a similar process the “way of the multiple, local consensus”. 
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In some cases, under the instruction of the fiscal, experienced FMEs from other 
constabularies will be invited to review the reports of practitioners.  As part of the 
review, details of the evidence collection process will be evaluated, providing those 
performing the review with knowledge of how evidence is collected in other 
constabularies.  A potential result of this process might be criticism of any divergent 
practices from those performed in the reviewer’s own constabulary, leading to 
alterations within the reviewed practitioner’s constabulary to become more in 
keeping with the reviewer’s practice.
139
  For example, in a slightly different context 
(that of a practitioner performing a review of a case file as an independent examiner 
introduced by the defence
140
), O’Keefe (2008) criticised an FME from another 
constabulary for not using a speculum during the examination of the complainer’s 
vagina.  While this, in itself, is not explicit evidence that practitioners are aware of 
inter-constabulary sampling decision-making, it does demonstrate that FMEs from 
various constabularies know a substantial amount about the content of each other’s 
work.  Furthermore, the O’Keefe example also exemplifies the role of the adversarial 
process in sharing the knowledge and practices of multiple FMEs, with FMEs in 
other constabularies reviewing the reports of their contemporaries elsewhere.  Such 
inter-constabulary reviews not only lead to changes in the practices of individual 
FMEs, but also make them aware of the procedures of other constabularies. Such 
knowledge is not always beneficial, however, and can lead to misconceptions. 
6.3.2.3 Evidence of Differences in Practice 
While sections in both the current chapter and the previous chapters have provided 
evidence of much similarity in practice, there has also been some evidence of 
differences.  If the argument is to be made that there exists a shared practice amongst 
FMEs, it is necessary to explain such differences in practice here.  Of the evidence 
                                               
139
 The reader may argue here that this is too unidirectional; surely the reviewer may believe that 
practices in the reviewed constabulary may also be beneficial and thus introduce them into their own 
work.  While this could certainly happen I believe it to be unlikely because of the status of those 
conducting the reviews; they are generally highly experienced practitioners reviewing case files of 
less experienced practitioners or (as Dr. B’s quotation indicates) FMEs with whom the police are 
“unhappy”.  Given this, it is likely that the reviewer will be picking up practices from the reviewed. 
140 An argument could be made that as the practitioner was working as an independent medical 
examiner (i.e. for the defence), there is little similarity between the case of a fiscal inviting an FME 
from another constabulary to review the report, and an independent examiner.  However, they are both 
reviewing the procedures and findings, and therefore I would argue that there is very little difference. 
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that I have presented, the practitioner who expressed the most anomalous discourse 
was Dr. B.  In this chapter, I have mentioned that he stated that he did not “time-bar 
the examination” in contrast to other members of his constabulary (an intra-
constabulary difference), and also claimed that in a different constabulary, accounts 
were gathered directly from the complainer (an inter-constabulary difference).  I will 
deal with each of these differences in turn.  First the intra-constabulary difference; to 
repeat the quotation in question: 
A swab costs tuppence, so we take it and throw it away if we don’t need it, so 
we tend to err on the side of caution.  If it’s a week, five days over, we’ll still 
carry out an examination and sometimes we’re surprised to find that some 
things [trace material] remained.  So we don’t time-bar the examination (Dr. 
B, male, Constabulary 2, emphasis added). 
 
It is clear that unlike his colleagues, Dr. B does not choose to time-bar his sample 
collection.  It is difficult to know the level of legitimacy with which to grant this 
statement as it does run contrary to some of Dr. B’s other statements; however, I 
should take him at his word.  If Dr. B’s practice does differ from that of others, is it 
still appropriate to argue for a shared practice?  I believe it is, not only does it help to 
explain what I actually mean by a shared practice, but it also helps to reinforce a 
broader finitist principle.  I will start with the latter: as should now be clear, the 
essence of finitism concerns the drawing of inferences from past cases to new ones.  
In the quotation above, it is clear that Dr. B previously took samples after a week had 
elapsed, and forensic scientific analysis still discovered trace material.  To this end, 
he has continued to perform this practice, as for him, his prior collection of cases 
leads him to infer that this will be beneficial.  Idiosyncratic practice such as this is a 
basic principle of finitism; practitioners, drawing upon different past 
experiences/cases and different skill levels, will each differ to some extent in their 
practice.  Furthermore (as I have already mentioned in relation to the way that 
practices change), FMEs are very aware of their colleagues’ latest practices, and 
choose which to assimilate and which to ignore; to this end, practitioners’ work does 
not necessarily need to universal in order for a collective practice to exist, and given 
a finitist understanding it is difficult to see how this universal practice could become 
a reality.  As Barnes makes clear: 
Shared practices are the accomplishments of competent members of 
collectives.  They are accomplishments readily achieved by, and routinely to 
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be expected of members acting together, but they nonetheless have to be 
generated on every occasion, by agents concerned all the time to retain 
coordination and alignment with each other to bring them about.  Although 
they are routine at the collective level, they are not routine at the individual 
level.  This is why there is point in referring to a practice as the shared 
possession of a collective. (There is a sense, of course, in which the shared 
practice imputed here is a reification, derived from performances all 
accomplished slightly differently in varying conditions and circumstances; 
but it is a useful reification and a harmless one, akin to such useful notions as 
‘skill,’ for example, at the individual level) (Barnes 2001: 24/25). 
 
It does not matter, therefore, if practices are actually identical, as long as 
practitioners’ intent is to perform examinations in a similar manner to their 
contemporaries (for which there is significant evidence; for example, the identical 
justifications given by FMEs). 
 Dr. B’s other controversial statement was: 
[T]here are two ways of getting the account of the incident, the one way we 
use in [cut for anonymity] is the police officer who has taken the interview 
will give us a blow-by-blow account of what has been said in the interview 
before the examination, so that will lead us into what areas we will want to go 
into.  In [cut for anonymity] the doctor will also take a history from the 
victim, from the complainer, a full history…. (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2) 
 
When I visited the constabulary in question I found that such a practice was not, in 
fact, in use, and that instead the FMEs in that constabulary used the account provided 
by the SOLO and asked additional “quiet questions” in a similar way to other 
constabularies.  So does this finding undermine the overall argument, given that Dr. 
B was, in fact, unaware of the practices of a neighbouring constabulary?  Again, I 
would argue that this is not the case; instead, it could potentially support the 
argument.  It is likely that at some point in the past the constabulary that Dr. B 
mentions had requested an additional account from the complainer before performing 
the examination.  Dr. B is a highly experienced examiner, who acted not only as an 
independent forensic expert, but also as a case reviewer for the fiscal office, in 
situations described by both Dr. B and Dr. G above; to this end, he regularly 
reviewed the case files of practitioners in the constabulary in question (alongside 
others) and had a strong grasp of their practices.  It may be the case that at some 
recent point, the constabulary changed their account-generating practice, bringing it 
more in line with the practices of the other constabularies.  I would argue that Dr. B 
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is perhaps yet to become aware of such a change, but, through the processes already 
described, will soon learn of it.  The important point to take away from this, 
however, is that the practice in the constabulary mentioned may have changed to a 
similar custom as that performed in the other constabularies, demonstrating that 
practices from one constabulary can extend to others. 
 It should also be noted, however, that as I mentioned above, not all 
interventions and amendments to practice are necessarily innovations, and some may 
not be considered beneficial in practice.  The processes that I have discussed (in 
terms of providing the ability to share new practices) also provide a space for the 
FME community to limit and police its collective practice.  As made clear in the 
previous chapter, FME authority can be easily put under pressure if it is thought that 
FMEs are not collecting all relevant evidence, and a decision on the part of an FME 
not to collect certain samples, ask certain questions, or (as in the O’Keefe example 
above) use the appropriate tools during observation can undermine the authority of 
the FME collective over their own discretion to discern appropriate practices 
(resulting in, for example, pressure placed on FMEs by forensic scientists to perform 
the “Total Collection Strategy” in response to repeated evidential omissions).  
During local meetings, peer-review processes or even double-doctored examinations, 
practices can be shared but also prohibited if members of the community 
(particularly authoritative members) see them as potentially damaging to either the 
complainer or the authority of the FME community.  Of course, as I discussed above, 
it is not the case that the practice of all FMEs is identical; due to their variant 
experience, slight differences will be observable, both inter and intra-constabulary.  
However, the important point to note is that all practitioners work with the 
knowledge of the appropriate practices in certain circumstances, as shared by their 
local community and the FME community in general, and endeavour to make 
decisions that they believe will be deemed appropriate by the rest of the community.  
To this end, while there is significant scope for differences in practice between FMEs 
(a result of their varied individual experiences), practices with the potential to cause 
significant harm to either the complainer or the authority and discretionary powers of 
FMEs are not likely to be conducted; this is a result of the active self-policing 
performed by the community. 
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6.3.2.4 Shared Practice and Protocols 
The previous three sections laid down the basis upon which I claim that FMEs 
perform medical examinations of penetrative sexual assault complainers by drawing 
upon a set of shared practices.  The shared practices have been developed in response 
to the tensions that both Parnis and Du Mont and I identify, but are not static, and 
new practices can emerge due to scientific research (the double-swab technique) or 
because of practitioner innovation (use of clothing, asking “quiet questions” for 
example).  As practices are not fixed, FMEs have to be aware of each other’s work, 
collectively identify the practices that constitute an improvement, and either 
introduce such practices into their own work or ignore them.
141
  Given that FMEs 
frequently incorporate aspects of some practices and ignore others, the work of two 
practitioners is never identical, if only because of the subjectivities of each case.  
However, there is significant evidence to make the claim that FMEs base their 
practice upon a very similar set of ideas or propositions.  With the basis laid for an 
argument that FME decision-making is determined by a collectively-held practice, 
the question must be raised as to the role that guidelines and kits play in clinical 
forensic medical work. 
 As was made clear in Chapter Five, the FMEK was originally introduced as a 
response to considerable criticism aimed at police doctors.  The kit was considered to 
solve these problems by containing the full complement of instruments necessary for 
performing a wide range of forensic medical examinations, and a set of guidance 
notes (including a reporting form) which were meant to inform how the examination 
was conducted, while at the same time avoiding tying the officer’s hand.  I argued in 
Chapter Five that the introduction of the kit served to resolve a “legitimation crisis” 
in forensic medicine; here, I wish to expand upon this finding, and on my other 
argument that the development of guidelines was a response to broader medico-legal 
shifts, by providing further explanations for the roles that guidelines and kits play.  
Essentially, guidance documents and artefacts serve two functions: they provide hints 
as to the work that is still to be conducted (see the various references FMEs make to 
the notion of the kit as an aide memoire); and they are a useful tool with which to 
                                               
141
 See Bloor (2002) for a discussion of how communities determine normativity. 
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describe and legitimate FME work to others.  I will elaborate upon both these points 
below. 
 Both Parnis and Du Mont’s and my own data make it clear that FMEs do not 
follow guidance documents to the letter; however, it is also the case that in many 
examinations, the work is broadly consistent with what is outlined in the guidelines 
(for example, genital samples will probably not be taken if the account suggests that 
no contact was made in that area; and certain questions are routinely asked, about 
medical history or recent alcohol intake for instance).  Hence, it is not the case that 
FMEs always deviate from or always follow the guidelines; an explanation of the 
relationship between guidelines and practice requires significantly greater nuance.  
Following my argument that there exists a pre-existing shared practice amongst 
FMEs, I suggest that the guidelines and the kit constitute a codification of that shared 
practice, outlining the full breadth of samples that it is possible to take, but with the 
proviso that not all samples will be necessary in every case, and that the individual 
FME should make decisions about each particular sample.  As Dr. D states, “[w]e 
have the guidelines to take all swabs and all the samples in each case, but it doesn’t 
make sense in each case” (Dr. D, male, Constabulary 2).  To this end, the guidelines 
and the kit serve as an approximation of the collective practice (it is important to 
remember that the professional associations were involved in compiling the kits) and 
so can help FMEs in their performance of the medical examination by reminding 
them of the samples that they have not taken.  In effect, FMEs are required to make a 
decision on whether or not any of the samples specified by the kit or the guideline 
are necessary.  This is not to say that these artefacts determine practice; on the 
contrary, this decision is based upon that which the practitioner performing the 
examination believes that her peers would consider appropriate.  But the guidelines 
do serve to make explicit the decisions made by the FME when conducting an 
examination.  So although FME practice commonly conforms with guidance 
documents, this should not be taken as evidence that the documents and kit 
determine the work; rather the guidelines set out a version of how an examination 
could be conducted, but the individual FME must always classify the case and 
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determine which samples are required based upon the needs of the complainer and 
(more importantly) the accepted practices of the community.
142
 
 On the one hand, then, guidelines represent a codification of the practices of 
the community, albeit with the acceptance that most cases will not require all the 
strict procedures set out within: the FME must interpret what is appropriate (the 
artefacts are necessarily underdetermined).  Why, then, produce them at all?  As 
discussed in Chapter Five, a major factor of the EBM movement was the push to 
make medical practice more “rational, more uniform, and more efficient” (Berg 
1997: 4), and the introduction of the kit and guidance documents in the 1980s and the 
expansion of those documents (partially under the rubric of EBM) in the late 
1990s/early 2000s could readily be seen as advancing that aim.  Both the documents 
and the kits act as a resource that practitioners can draw upon in order to explain the 
content of their work to others within the investigatory process and beyond.  For 
example, during two of my interviews, the interviewees proceeded to open up a kit 
and explain their practice in terms of the evidence collection form.  This section from 
Dr. A is typical of both those interviews. 
First you introduce yourself, tell them exactly what is involved and then, see 
that they have consented, when I ask for the consent [walks to desk] I have a 
certain way of telling them, the police will have filled them in on background, 
who I am, what I am doing, everything and then there is a certain I get 
consent for examinations, specimens, photographs, report, everything, if they 
do not consent, I haven’t done this because I have taken for granted that they 
have but if they don’t you can’t take any of this.  [Respondent points to 
section of form]  In the nature of rape examination (cut for anonymity) 
history given by the police 
                                               
142 Such an analysis is in many ways consistent with much of the work on rules conducted in STS.  
Concepts such as “workarounds” (Star 1985), “tinkering” (Timmermans and Berg 1997, 2003), or 
even “tacit knowledge” (Collins 1975, 1981, 2001) are employed to demonstrate that in cases where 
actors claim to be following rules or guidelines, their actions are always underdetermined by the rules 
or guidelines, and the actor is required to draw upon something other than the rule itself in order to 
know the correct way to follow the rule.  The gap is usually filled by recourse to the agreed practices 
of the community (Bloor 2002).  My study is somewhat different, as FMEs do not generally admit to 
being rule-followers; and in fact, as Section 6.1 demonstrated, are sometimes openly hostile to rules 
and guidelines.  Nevertheless, this study appears to result in similar findings to those introduced 
above, albeit with the factor that FMEs do not employ the rhetoric of rule-following.  On being 
introduced to a new case, the FME is required to classify it and determine which questions to ask and 
what samples to take based upon the collectively-agreed practices of the community.  This appears to 
be the same practice as those described by Timmermans and Berg and Star, although without the 
reliance upon the discourse of rules, which, in the long run, are there to legitimate whatever course of 
action the practitioner deems as appropriate: they are generally always capable of finding a rule to 
justify and legitimate their behaviour (Bloor 2002). 
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Me: That is by the police, so you do not ask the victim for an assault history, no? 
No, and I would put the address here and when I do the report it’s always care 
of the police, so the victim’s address, in my report it never appears, and um 
history given by victim or accused, and then we ask general (Dr. A, female, 
Constabulary 1 interviewer speech in italics) 
 
In this quotation, Dr. A is using the material in the kit (particularly the reporting form 
of an actual case) to explain to me how she performs the examination.  In addition to 
serving a descriptive function, however, guidelines and kits also represent a strategy 
that FMEs can make use of in order to defend themselves against critical attacks (as 
discussed in Chapter Five).  The construction of kits in the 1980s served two 
important purposes: first, the standardisation of the instruments in the kit meant that 
police doctors at least had all the materials necessary for performing an examination, 
and secondly (and more importantly), it legitimated existing police doctor practice.  
The kits did not, in themselves, ensure that practices would be changed; the police 
doctors still had to determine which samples were appropriate, and in effect the 
status quo remained.  Likewise, the development of guidance documents did not alter 
practice; rather, it legitimated FME practice against the contemporary trend for 
EBM: the existence of the documents demonstrated to others outside the community 
that their work was based on evidence and guided by decision-support tools.  It is 
clear that guidelines, protocols and kits, while of some help to FMEs as a reminder of 
the samples that have not been taken during medical examinations, have a far more 
important role: they are a resource for FMEs to legitimate themselves, and thereby 
the evidence they produce, against critical attack and within a culture that places 
great importance upon routine and objectivity. 
Summary 
This chapter has investigated FME attitudes to guidelines and the ways in which they 
are employed in FME work.  Parnis and Du Mont’s findings, as well as my own, 
showed that FMEs are highly ambivalent to guidelines and protocols, which results 
in differences between the actual work of FMEs and that outlined in guidance 
documents (although there is also notable overlap between FME work and the 
guidelines).  To this end, I follow Parnis and Du Mont’s argument that guidelines 
and protocols essentially underdetermine practice, and FMEs are therefore required 
to interpret the rules flexibly, depending on the case in question.  Where Parnis and 
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Du Mont and I differ is the issue of what FMEs draw upon in making that flexible 
interpretation.  Parnis and Du Mont argue that the individual examiner renegotiates 
the meaning of the kit, playing down the need to collect evidence and prioritising the 
need to take care of the complainer; the kit is interpreted this way out of a duty of 
care to the complainer.  While I agree with the assessment that FMEs exist in a role-
conflict between evidence-gathering and the therapeutic aspect, I am also of the 
opinion that this is only one of the conflicts that the practitioner has to negotiate; 
there is another tension between full evidence collection and efficiency.  To negotiate 
these conflicts, FMEs have developed shared strategies in the form of collectively-
held practices.  Such practices are taught to the trainee FME, and during the course 
of their career, they will encounter cases that problematise these taught practices and 
will be required to amend them.  (Of course, such innovation may also be the result 
of improvements in the skill of the examiner, or because of external influences such 
as scientific innovation or criticism.)  With time, other members of the constabulary 
become aware of the change in practice and choose, as a collective, whether or not to 
amend their practice; the same may also happen at the inter-constabulary level.  The 
important point here, though, is that the decisions made by an individual FME about 
a particular case draw upon an existing collective resource, the shared practice, in 
order to determine the appropriate samples or questions.  Taking this view, the 
protocol does not represent an externally-imposed attempt to discipline FMEs’ 
evidence collection practices.  Rather, it is a resource that not only allows the FME to 
check that they have collected all the appropriate evidence (an aide memoire) but 
also provides them with cover from attacks from outsiders, and allows them to 
explain their work. 
 If guidelines cannot fully determine practice, what function do they have?  I 
have already demonstrated that guidelines provide FMEs with a resource to explain 
their work to others, while also providing legitimacy for their actions; the notion that 
their work is guided by guidelines invests their judgements with the authority of the 
professional community, which, of course, is highly beneficial in the provision of 
expert testimony.  Moreover, the guidelines and kits remind practitioners of certain 
questions and samples that may still be required, while still allowing FMEs to decide 
whether or not they are appropriate.  The process of guideline construction is also 
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beneficial to the authority and community of FMEs; in an effort to draw up new 
guidelines, the FFLM is commissioning new research in its new publication, The 
Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine, which reports new cases, and so (from a 
finitist point of view, at least) disseminates new exemplars that practitioners can add 
to their own cognitive frameworks.  Moreover, the consensus conferences, 
commissioned to develop and evaluate new kits and guidelines, provide spaces for 
the community of FMEs to discuss and evaluate the novel practices being employed 
by practitioners, and decide which should be considered “best practice” (and added 
to the guidance documents) and which (if any) may bring the community of FMEs 
into disrepute, and should therefore be constrained. 
Guidelines and other standardised artefacts, therefore, are not only valuable 
in that they help grant authority to the work of FMEs and thereby the evidence they 
produce, but also in that they provide spaces for FMEs to develop new research 
providing new exemplars and to discuss the nature of practice.  However, they 
should not be granted too much importance; in any discipline, the following of rules 
is not a result of the rules themselves, but rather the appropriate actions determined 
by a community. 
But a move to rules or standards, however objective, is not a move away from 
people at all, but toward them; for the sense that there is a correct way of 
taking a rule on in any given case is a collective accomplishment of persons. 
(Barnes 2000: 135) 
 
In the final analysis, the guidance documents do not constrain FME practice, but 
instead present an outline of how that practice could be performed, providing FMEs 
with an aide memoire of all the potential samples and questions and prompting them 
to evaluate whether or not that evidence is required.  In making that decision, FMEs 
draw upon the community’s agreed praxis, and so their authority ultimately derives 
from the fact (as with injury interpretation) that FMEs have formed a consensus on 
the appropriate ways in which to conduct examinations.  While the guidelines serve 
the purpose of explaining FME work to other actors in the criminal justice process, it 
is FMEs’ almost complete avoidance of disagreement with one another about 
evidence collection (a result of their collective practice and policing of that practice) 
that maintains the authority of FME procedural evidence collection. 
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7. Consent and the “Neutral Report” 
 
The previous chapters have focused on the way that FMEs perform medical 
examinations, and the way that they manage their claims-making and evidence-
gathering strategies in order to improve the likelihood that their evidence will not be 
contested in court.  This chapter will present one final strategy: the framing of 
evidence by FMEs in relation to whether or not the injury evidence signifies non-
consensual intercourse.  One of the chief aims of the medical examination of rape 
and sexual assault complainers is to recover evidence that either corroborates the 
complainer’s account (Kelly and Regan 2003), or suggests that the allegation is a 
fabrication - for example, evidence resulting in an inference that the complainer is 
delusional or has invented the allegation.   
We’re also there to be independent, to say this person appears delusional, she 
claims she has been gang-raped by six people and it becomes obvious that 
they are ill and you have to make a decision about that (Dr. G, male, 
Constabulary 3). 
 
To this end, after constructing a morphological account, the FME has the option to 
draw a final inference: whether that account is consistent with or contradictory to the 
complainer’s version of events.  If the complainer is reporting a complaint of rape, 
this inference revolves chiefly around whether or not the morphological account 
constitutes evidence that sexual intercourse was consensual.  FMEs urge 
considerable caution in making such a claim, resulting in the frequent production of 
“neutral reports”.  The “neutral report” neither corroborates nor refutes the 
complainer’s allegation, and constitutes the norm in forensic medical examinations; a 
SOLO I interviewed claimed that such a report was the result in approximately nine 
out of ten cases: 
Nine times out of ten it [the FME’s report] would come back inconclusive 
[neutral].  There may be some obvious injuries externally, but you often find 
that even internally the doctor cannot say at that point in time if there has 
definitely been forced sexual intercourse (SOLO A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
This account was also backed up by FME evidence, some of which I will provide 
shortly.  In the following sections, I will explain why FMEs choose to produce 
neutral reports.  I will draw particular attention to the uncertainty surrounding 
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injuries and non-consent, and introduce the argument that the production of the 
“neutral report” is linked to FMEs’ concern for their own credibility: the neutral 
report, I will argue, is a vital tool for maintaining FME authority, as it reinforces the 
perceived unanimity of the community of FMEs.  I will also argue that the neutral 
report serves to construct boundaries between medicine and the law, which reinforce 
FME authority over areas they consider medical, while manoeuvring the concept of 
consent towards the legal field.  I will conclude by outlining a number of 
implications of the continued use of neutral reports in rape cases, most notably the 
possibility that it unintentionally undermines both FMEs’ and others’ (rape crisis 
lobbyists, for example) attempts to limit the strong mythic relationship in the minds 
of jurors and prosecutors between a “real rape” and significant signs of injury.  I will 
begin this analysis by explaining the difficulties inherent in the attempt to infer 
consent from injuries (or the lack of them). 
7.1 Constructing Neutral Reports 
While the need for evidence of “overcoming the will” of a rape victim by means of 
force, threat of force, or intoxication was removed from the law of rape by the Lord 
Advocate’s Reference (see Chapter One), jurors are still generally under the 
impression that evidence of injury and force is necessary in order to determine that 
an act of sexual intercourse constituted rape. 
I think we need to educate not just “Joe Bloggs” the public to say what rape 
usually means, [they think] you’ve been kicked, dragged into some bushes 
and you’ve got to have all these things, the woman should be crying, she 
should be beaten up black and blue and all the clothes, and you forget that 
there is someone holding a knife to your throat, or your kids are sleeping next 
door, are you just going to say “Do your business and go and leave my 
children alone” you know, that’s, and those are the women that are affected 
years down the line and people forget, and I want to convey, the public 
should realise that, just no injuries does not mean no to this thing (Dr. A, 
female, Constabulary 1). 
 
Dr. A’s account of the popular understanding of rape points to a number of “rape 
myths” that are widely embedded throughout society.  Importantly (as I will explain 
in the following section, where I will expand upon “rape myths”, particularly the idea 
of “real rape”), such beliefs represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature 
(and legal definition) of rape; they predispose juries to see injuries as evidence of 
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non-consensual sex, and the absence of injuries as evidence of consent.  Clinical 
forensic medical research and FMEs’ own experiences lead them to believe that such 
a strict dichotomy is problematic, and so they tailor their reports in order to avoid 
perpetuating such myths.  However, the way that their evidence is used in court 
means that such efforts may be self-defeating.  In this section, I will explore some of 
the literature surrounding the relationship between injuries and consent, and FMEs’ 
own accounts of the problem of rape myths. 
7.1.1 Interpreting Absence of Injury 
It is wrong to believe that all rape complainers present with injuries.  Clinical 
forensic medical studies have recently emphasised the fact that the absence of 
injuries does not signify a false allegation, and FMEs frequently repeat the slogan 
“It’s normal to be normal” (Adams et al. 1994).  Originally coined within the context 
of paediatric sexual examinations, and frequently employed in recent discussions of 
adult sexual examinations, it means that due to various reasons (for instance, the 
assault was historic, and/or other forms of force were employed such as verbal 
threats, and/or the bodily responses associated with sexual contact resulted in lack of 
injuries (Levin & Berlo 2004)
143
), injuries are not a guaranteed result of non-
consensual sex.  To this end, even if the morphological account does not signify any 
sign of assault, FMEs are loath to undermine a case by labelling it a false allegation, 
as their own experiences and research make them aware that there are many reasons 
for such findings. 
I can only say as it is, that there is no evidence of recent injuries, but that 
absence of injuries does not exclude anything.  That is what I usually say and 
that is what I can say.  So you can’t say more when there are no bruises, or no 
injuries, you cannot do any reconstruction… BUT according to experience 
there might have been threatening with a knife or something, without causing 
injures, but that’s rape as well.  That would be rape as well, but that’s a 
question to the court, that’s not a medical question, I can only draw medical 
                                               
143
 Levin and Berlo reviewed both case reports and the clinical forensic medical literature for 
examples of involuntary genital manifestations of sexual arousal (which they define as 
“vaginal/clitoral blood engorgement and vaginal lubrication for women, penile tumescence or erection 
in men” (Levin & Berlo 2004: 82)), and also gathered anecdotal reports from clinicians and a nurse 
therapist.  While very little was discovered in the case and academic literature, the anecdotal reports 
suggested that involuntary sexual arousal and even orgasm was more common than previously 
reported.  This information helps to explain why some complainers report without presenting genital 
injury, as genital injury in females is understood as being the result of a lack of lubrication.  See Infra 
148. 
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conclusions… This does not rule out that there have been other mechanisms, 





This is a preliminary reason for FMEs’ construction of neutral reports: forensic 
medical studies and FME experience have highlighted that a lack of injuries does not 
necessarily signify non-consensual sexual intercourse.  Such uncertainty over the 
significance of limited or lack of signs of injury leaves FMEs with no option but to 
avoid making a definite conclusion as to whether the morphological account supports 
or refutes the complainer’s allegation of rape, and hence produce a “neutral report”.  
However, while FMEs have become more nuanced in their awareness of what a lack 
of injuries can represent, broader cultural understandings of rape have yet to change; 
this is a result of several highly entrenched societal “rape myths” (Harris and Grace 
1999, Kelly 2005, Temkin 2005, Withey 2007, Temkin and Krahé 2008). 
 The chief “rape myth” is that of the “real rape” scenario.  The “real rape” 
involves an unsuspecting woman being attacked by a stranger, in an outdoor location 
at night, with the stranger employing force or a threat of force (with the use of a 
weapon), and the victim offering active resistance.  After the attack, the “real rape” 
myth suggests that the victim appears highly traumatised by the experience and 
reports immediately to the police (Temkin and Krahé 2008).  While this “real rape” 
scenario is widely accepted,
145
 it only represents a small proportion of reported rapes.  
Figures from the British Crime Surveys (hereafter “BCS”) of 2004/5 (Finney 2006) 
and 2005/6 (Coleman et al. 2007) demonstrated that a constant 11 per cent of the 
women who answered that they had been seriously sexually assaulted since the age 
of 16 had been the victim of a stranger rape.
146
  Findings such as this indicate that the 
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 Dr. D here raises the interesting dialectic between legal and medical questions.  This is a primary 
justification for FMEs’ construction of neutral reports, and as such, I will address this in detail shortly. 
145 See Temkin and Krahé (2008) for a survey of the wide-ranging literature concerning rape myth 
acceptance. 
146
 In the 2004/5 British Crime Survey, 59% of serious sexual assault victims had been the victim of 
an “intimate” (partner or family member), and 41% the victim of an acquaintance.  Likewise, the 
2005/6 survey discovered that 58% had been the victims of “intimates”, and 40% acquaintances 
(statistics do not add up to 100% due to multiple assaults).  It should be noted that there are some 
methodological difficulties with the collection of the BCS statistics, concerning under-reporting in 
particular; see for example Temkin (2005).  Nevertheless, even with the methodological problems, the 
BCS statistics are consistent with Harris and Grace’s (1999) earlier attrition rate study, which 
discovered that 12% of the police case files investigated constituted stranger assaults, while 43% 
constituted intimates and 45% acquaintances.  It should also be noted that both the BCS and the Harris 
and Grace studies are concerned with the English and Welsh jurisdiction.  Scotland has instituted its 
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stranger assault represents a minority of cases, and as such, assuming that form of 
attack as the paradigm obfuscates matters and, importantly, creates false 
expectations. 
The violent nature of the “real rape” provides the perfect situation for severe 
and multiple injuries.  That the victim is then meant to rush to report the assault 
would also result in the injuries being fresh, and so (with the exception of bruises) 
readily identifiable and recordable.  The “real rape” scenario, therefore, perpetuates 
the belief that violent injuries are a guaranteed result of an actual rape, while absence 
of injuries indicates that rape cannot have occurred.  To this end, juries tend to 
determine whether or not consent was offered to sexual intercourse by the 
complainer from signs of injury (MacKinnon 1989).  FMEs are well aware of this 
problem: 
Putting that [“it’s normal to be normal”] across in court is problematic 
because people still think, whether it is an adult sexual assault with no 
injuries, or a child, JURIES WANT INJURIES; for them to believe they 
really want to see something.  That is the bottom line. (Dr. C, female 
Constabulary 2) 
 
Such juror beliefs are reinforced by the criminal justice process; because cases 
concerning injury are more likely to be successful than cases without (a result of 
jurors being more likely to convict in cases displaying injuries – see also the study by 
Bright and Goodman-Delahunty mentioned in Chapter Four), procurators fiscal are 
more likely to progress cases with injuries through the criminal justice process than 
those without.  Such a finding was illustrated by one of Harris and Grace’s interview 
respondents in their attrition study conducted in England: 
I showed them [SIO] my bruises right… and do you know what they said, 
‘your bruises are not good enough’.  I went ‘well what do you mean my 
bruises are not good enough, I’ve just been raped for God’s sake, you don’t 
talk to me like that’ – ‘your bruises ain’t good enough you’ve got no case.’ 
(Complainant cited in Harris and Grace 1999: 21) 
 
There appears to be what can only be described as a “vicious circle” here: jurors 
expect “real rape” victims to report with signs of significant injury, and that 
expectation is corroborated by procurators fiscal in that cases demonstrating 
                                                                                                                                     
own crime survey, the Scottish Crime and Victimisation Survey; however, the published data is not as 
detailed for that study as for the BCS. 
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significant injury are more likely to progress to a trial than cases, like that of Harris 
and Grace’s respondent, where bruises were not considered “good enough” to merit a 
prosecution.   
The significant positive associations of documented injury with charge filing 
and conviction... is an important step in confirming the value of injury 
documentation in the forensic examination of sexual assault victims…  Our 
finding that severe injury is positively associated with conviction is also 
consistent with some of the few previous studies examining this issue.  This 
is not surprising given that more than half of the cases proceeding through the 
criminal justice system involve an assailant known previously to the victim, 
which is likely to make corroboration of nonconsent through injury 
documentation a common issue at trial (McGregor et. al 2002: 645). 
 
McGregor et al.’s (1999, 2002) findings (from their studies of the use of injury 
evidence in Canada) likewise emphasise that cases demonstrating significant 
evidence of injury are more likely to result in convictions and progress through the 
criminal justice process than cases that do not.  In an attempt to counter such rape 
mythologies, FMEs advocate that the problems with determining consent from 
injuries should be explicated to all involved within the criminal justice process 
whenever possible; for example, White and McLean (2006) suggest that FMEs 
explain to the police, prosecutors and the court that injuries are not always present 
after a sexual assault, and it should not be perceived that there is an automatic 
relationship between injuries and rape. 
This section has explained that complainers do not always present with signs 
of injury, but also that FMEs are aware that such a finding does not, in itself, 
undermine the validity of the complainer’s allegation.  In these cases, they produce a 
“neutral report” in order to make clear that lack of injuries does not signify lack of 
consent to a criminal justice process that prefers injury. 
Police it’s a bit difficult, they want all the injuries, “Ah great”, and you think 
“Oh no please don’t say that” but for them that’s great as they can do court. 
(Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1) 
 
FMEs also face problems when presented with morphological accounts that contain 
significant evidence of injury. 
7.1.2 Interpreting Injuries 
As with cases where there are few or no signs of injury, FMEs suffer from 
uncertainty as to the kinds of claims they can make when there is significant 
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evidence of injury.  Again, clinical forensic medical research (particularly Norvell et 
al. 1984, which reported that most forms of sexual intercourse may produce injury) 
and FMEs’ own experiences emphasise that although injuries signify signs of force, 
it does not follow that they also signify absence of consent.  To this end, FMEs 
choose to limit their claims-making to the inferences that make up the morphological 
account alone, even in cases of significant injury, as further inferences, such as an 
FME’s claim that a particular morphological account represents evidence of non-
consensual intercourse, could easily be contradicted by others and explained as the 
result of “vigorous consensual sex”.  This conundrum has been further problematised 
recently with the assimilation of colposcopy into forensic medical examinations. 
Some FMEs and clinical forensic medical researchers argue that the 
improved observation provided by colposcopy may have the potential to help define 
a collection of injuries that could discriminate between consensual and non-
consensual sexual intercourse. 
The facility with the colposcope that we have got there, although one of our 
number doesn’t like it very much, although I, I think it’s a fantastic machine 
and the clarity and the pictures you get are fantastic you know, and you will 
really see stuff that you probably wouldn’t have seen before.  The issue arises 
ultimately, and this is still a problem, with research into that and… but there 
is an issue about validity of these results, because what you are actually 
seeing is common, is it not common, where is your standardised group of 
consensual intercourse, all of that stuff.  Obviously, if we see an injury it is 
relevant, it corroborates that there has been penetrative sexual contact, 
whether it is consensual or not though, of course, that is up for debate (Dr. C, 
female, Constabulary 2). 
 
The research to which Dr. C is referring is found within the two controversial studies 
by Laura Slaughter: “Colposcopy to establish physical findings in rape victims” 
(Slaughter and Brown 1992), and the follow-up, “Patterns of genital injury in female 
sexual assault victims” (Slaughter et. al 1997).
147
  In the first of these studies, 
Slaughter conducted colposcopy upon 131 women who had reported rape within 48 
hours of the alleged assault.  Slaughter reported finding injuries in 87 per cent of that 
sample, in contrast to previous studies using other techniques (notably the nuclear 
stain “Toludine Blue”) which enabled injury detection in less than 60 per cent of 
cases.  Slaughter used this finding to promote the routine use of colposcopy within 
                                               
147
 Hereafter “Patterns”. 
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sexual assault examinations.  However, her recommendation was vehemently 
challenged by other medical examiners: in the first instance, for emphasising genital 
injuries, which could generate the misconception that the absence of such injury 
represented a false allegation (Patel et. al 1993, McGregor et. al 1999, McGregor et. 
al 2002); and secondly, because while it is true that colposcopy use would increase 
the number of injuries observed, there was still no way to ascertain whether or not 
those injuries signified non-consent (Bowyer and Dalton 1997, Lincoln 2001).   
Slaughter et al. attempted to address this question of the relationship between 
injuries and consent in their follow-up study, “Patterns of genital injury in female 
sexual assault victims”.  The objective of “Patterns” was to ascertain whether or not 
Slaughter et al. (using the colposcope) could identify a particular injury or collection 
of injuries specific to non-consensual sexual intercourse.  To that end, they reviewed 
the colposcopic recordings of 311 victims of sexual assault, and compared them with 
findings in 75 women who were colposcopically examined 24 hours after what was 
judged to have been consensual sexual intercourse (a problematic judgement: see 
below).  The study concluded that genital injury was only identifiable in a small 
number (11 per cent) of the consensual intercourse sample, whilst injury was 
commonplace amongst the victim sample (89 per cent).  Slaughter et al. concluded: 
“Although coital injury seems to be associated with insertion of the penis, its 
prevalence is significantly associated with a history of non-consensual intercourse” 
(Slaughter at. al 1997: 615).  The authors also believed that they had identified a 
mechanism for explaining genital injury (forceful insertion of the penis), since the 
location and type of injuries was found to be similar across the non-consensual 
cohort.  Slaughter et al. were cautious in drawing hard-and-fast conclusions about 
consent from their findings, declaring that “Further investigation is needed to 
determine whether there is a finding or group of findings that can distinguish non-
consensual and consensual activity” (Slaughter at. al 1997: 615).
148
  On the other 
                                               
148 A textbook published the same year as “Patterns”, to which Laura Slaughter was a contributing 
editor, was far more forthright with its explanation. 
The posterior fourchette, labia minora, hymen, and fossa navicularis are the most common 
sites of injury in penile vaginal penetration (Slaughter, 1997).  Injury at these sites suggests 
that the lack of the human physiological response to sexual stimulation plays a significant 
role.  In the victim, there is a lack of pelvic tilt and partner assistance with insertion, lack of 
lubrication, and relaxation.  Lack of pelvic tilt and partner assistance with insertion combined 
with forced intromission results in injury, especially at the posterior fourchette, labia minora, 
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hand, they repeated their recommendation that the colposcope should be routinely 
used as part of “best practice” for generating forensic evidence in sexual assault 
cases. 
 “Patterns” did not really achieve its aims, as it did not find a collection of 
injuries that discriminated consensual from non-consensual sexual intercourse in a 
definitive manner.  In fact, it might equally well be seen as reinforcing the findings 
of Norvell et al. that it is not unusual for there to be injuries after consensual 
intercourse,
149
 although this outcome of their work might itself be merely a result of 
their methodology.  One of the significant findings in “Patterns” is the 11 per cent of 
the group classed as having had consensual intercourse who were found to have 
injuries.  However, there is a serious difficulty with Slaughter’s methodology in this 
respect.  The final allocation of individuals to the “sexual assault” and “consensual 
sexual intercourse” group occurred only after rape complainants’ allegations had 
been corroborated (or not).  Consequently, in the case of a rape claim, if there existed 
substantiating evidence for sexual assault, the case would be added to the victim 
cohort.  But if an account was not corroborated, then the complainant (who had 
originally been colposcopically examined as a victim) would be re-categorised 
within the consensual sexual intercourse group.  All of the women who originally 
registered a complaint of rape would have received a colposcopic exam (which may 
have displayed evidence of injury), but in some cases, when the results of the exam 
                                                                                                                                     
hymen, and fossa navicularis.  Lack of increased lubrication causes abrasion or lacerations 
with the friction of the opposing forces at the labia minora and hymen, since these parts are 
pulled inward with the penetrating object.  Vaginal lacerations and ecchymosis result from 
the lack of lubrication of the penetrating force.  However lubrication alone, such as menstrual 
blood, does not protect the external nor internal genitalia from injury during non-consensual 
contact.  Lack of cooperation and relaxation creates a less flexible surface against which the 
offending object forces itself, causing more blunt force trauma such as ecchymosis and 
swelling. (Girardin et al 1997: 23) 
149
 This analysis is similar to Catherine MacKinnon’s (1989) approach to the law of rape.  MacKinnon 
points out that every penetrative sexual act involves a degree of force, and therefore the “problem 
remains what it has always been: telling the difference” (MacKinnon 1989: 174), i.e. discriminating 
between sex and rape.  My analysis differs from MacKinnon’s, however; her work stems from the 
methodological starting point that because of ongoing structural inequalities between men and 
women, all contemporary sexual practices are to some extent violent (and, therefore, there is little 
difference between sex and rape), whereas I disagree with this standpoint and believe that sexual acts 
differ significantly in meaning from acts of rape.  While I agree that both contain elements of force, 
and that rape is not necessarily always violent, in a sexual act both parties mutually agree to engage in 
intercourse; in an act of rape, this is not the case.  This difference is important, because MacKinnon’s 
conception of sexual intercourse tacitly accepts that men are dominant while women are passive, and 
that women “allow” men to have sex with them, or not in the case of rape.  Like Nicola Lacey (1998), 
I dismiss this position and understand sex as an act with joint agency between participants. 
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were coupled with the remainder of the police’s investigatory evidence, the quantity 
of evidence was deemed insufficient and the complaint was not corroborated.  As a 
result, some of the cases located within the consensual category may have been 
inappropriately classified.
150
  The implication of this is that a large proportion of the 
11 per cent of those judged to have had consensual sex could represent women who 
had, in fact, been sexually assaulted, but whose cases resulted in insufficient 
corroboratory evidence to substantiate the allegation.  On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the 11 per cent exemplify the previous findings that most forms of 
sexual intercourse can produce injuries. 
 FMEs are aware of the problematic nature of Slaughter’s findings: 
I think increasing knowledge, in particular Laura Slaughter’s paper, although 
not particularly a good one as it reintroduces people who have been re-
categorised, but I think now, it’s common sense in fact, that you will get mild 
injury in consensual [sexual] acts, particularly when using a colposcope, 
that’s really what you’d expect, so that, that’s fine.  You then get into a 
situation where the experience comes in “Well I accept what you are saying, 
that you can get minor injury after a consensual act, but this is rather more 
extensive than what you’d expect with that.”  But if you make a comment like 
that you will have to be able to justify, it is no good saying instinctively that 
is the case, you have to say this is my experience [cut for anonymity] (Dr. E, 
male, Constabulary 3). 
 
While Dr. E appears to argue that such a differentiation is not particularly difficult, 
such classifications can be easily challenged.  Consequently – as is clear from this 
discourse with an imaginary interlocutor – in the act of making such claims the FME 
would have to mobilise significant authority (for example experience) in order for 
the claim to be accepted.  It is always possible for such claims to be contradicted by 
other FMEs, or undermined during cross-examination, with the argument that the 
injuries are in fact the result of “vigorous consensual sex”. 
As a result of the continued uncertainty over the inferences that can 
legitimately be made from signs of injuries, and the potential for claims relating to 
consent to be undermined during testimony, FMEs agree that “best practice” 
                                               
150 The consensual category was made up of 19 volunteers who had replied to an advertisement, 48 
women who had originally made a complaint of rape, 6 minors and 2 who were examined at routine 
post-sexual assault follow-up visits.  It is clear that more than two-thirds of the consensual category 
were made up of women who had initially reported being raped. 
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involves limiting their claims to the morphological account, even though prosecutors 
would prefer that they make stronger claims (and indeed pressure them to do so). 
There’s pressure on them [FMEs] to over-egg the pudding, in terms of, if you 
find some evidence you are in a way pushed, and some people take the bait 
I’m afraid, pushed to say that this is of more significance than it actually is, 
that it represents consent, although in your heart of heart, hand on heart you 
cannot say it is so.  There has to be a certain amount of emotional 
detachment.  Now some people are bending under the pressure and, as I say 
over-egging the pudding, so they are pushing a bit too much, and to try and 
be helpful to the prosecution perhaps people are maybe expressing opinions 
which cannot be validated 100 per cent, maybe 90 per cent valid, pretty good 




It is clear from Dr. B’s quotation that FMEs who do draw inferences about consent 
from a particular injury or collection of injuries are considered to be “over-egging the 
pudding” and making claims that can be disputed.  Another FME was even more 
scathing about peers who made claims about consent: 
Some doctors will do the examination… and not put an opinion at all, that is 
not uncommon.  In fact that is probably more appropriate than saying the 
clinical evidence, the doctor will say, “the tear at the posterior fourchette 
indicates forceful penile-vaginal penetration.”  That in itself is not too bad, 
but then they say “the tear at the posterior fourchette, the bruises, the 
abrasions are such and such that this is an indication, or supports the 
complainer’s statement of rape.”  When you see something like that it’s 
absolutely shocking, simply as doctors it is not our remit to say whether 
someone’s been raped or not (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
The “safe” FME, therefore, does not draw conclusions about consent; it is clear from 
the quotations of Drs. B and F that FMEs, collectively, are critical of their colleagues 
who do draw conclusions (probably because, as I have demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, signs of disunity can undermine the collective authority of the FME 
community).  The norm, even in cases with significant evidence of injury, is to 
produce a neutral report: a report that neither confirms nor refutes the complainer’s 
allegation of rape.  This ensures that the FME’s evidence is not contradicted during 
the trial.  “Minimal evidence is presented, giving your opinion on the findings that 
you have.  That is all you can base your opinion on” (Dr. H, male, Constabulary 3). 
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 I will discuss the relationship between the FME and other prosecutors in relation to the “neutral 
report” shortly. 
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7.2 The Politics of Neutral Reports 
I have flagged up the way that the complex relationship between injuries and consent 
makes it difficult for FMEs to draw conclusions about the veracity of a complainer’s 
allegation, and explained how they produce neutral reports in order to ensure that 
their evidence cannot be contradicted in any future trial.  In this section, I will 
expand upon this original finding, exploring the way that FMEs use the neutral report 
to construct a medico-legal boundary and thereby ensure that their evidence is not 
undermined during the trial, as well as the way that they use the neutral report to 
position themselves as independent practitioners in the adversarial criminal justice 
process.  I will begin with the medico-legal boundary. 
7.2.1 Medico-Legal Boundary 
FMEs believe that their expertise centres on knowledge of the body, and injuries in 
particular.  When requested to make decisions about consent, they are asked to 
address the mental issue of whether or not the complainer gave her consent for 
sexual intercourse.
152
  FMEs argued that such a judgement was outwith the scope of 
their expertise, and that they were unequipped to answer such legal questions. 
Well at the end of the day, I don’t go out of my way to construct a neutral 
report, I put together a report and reflect on what is in that.  I will go over the 
pattern of injuries and if there is a suggestion that some of these injuries fit 
with the story of assault then I’ll say that these injuries are in keeping with 
the history of the assault.  When it comes to an allegation of rape, this is a 
very specific allegation isn’t it; penetration, vaginal penetration without 
consent.  It is not for me to say whether consent was given or not.  So 
basically most of our, you’ll probably find most of our reports neither 
confirm [n]or refute the allegation and assault is a very different crime to 
rape. (Dr. F, male, Constabulary 2, emphasis added) 
 
It is not up to me to say whether she opened the door, did she allow him, did 
she go on a date with him, I don’t know that, and maybe there has been 
whatever, they were together, something went wrong, that’s up to the court to 
decide. (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1) 
                                               
152 I am aware that this is an over-simplification, and that sexual intercourse with a victim who has not 
made the mental decision to offer consent does not constitute the entirety of the “wrong of rape”, only 
the actus reus.  The wrong of rape requires a “legally blameworthy state of mind”, or mens rea, in 
addition to the actus reus (Gane and Stoddart 2003: 26).  Therefore, in terms of rape, it is not enough 
for the victim to deny consent for the act; the suspect also has to be aware that the victim does not 
consent, or to be reckless to this fact.  However, as the FME has even less ability to assess whether or 
not the suspect was aware or reckless to a lack of consent than to assess whether consent was offered, 
I will not address this point here. 
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As is clear from these quotations, FMEs state that there are questions for which they 
are able to provide answers (the type of the injuries, their cause, etc.) which are 
medical, i.e. within the area of their own expertise.  In contrast, there are other 
questions that they are asked to address, concerning whether or not the injuries are 
consistent with the complainer’s allegation of rape, for which FMEs do not feel 
comfortable providing answers, and these they label as legal questions for the court 
to decide.  In producing a neutral report, FMEs limit their claims to those covered by 
their sphere of expertise.  While there is an extent to which such a dualism is legally 
enshrined, particularly in relation to the “actual issue” rule,
153
 it appears that such a 
dichotomy is more a construction of FMEs than the law of evidence.  As I made clear 
in Chapter Four, FMEs make numerous judgements about injuries, but, on the whole, 
view such inferences as sufficiently secure (by which I mean collectively agreed) for 
inclusion in the morphological account, and thereby treated as medical matters.  The 
potential for disagreement means that, according to FMEs, consent constitutes a legal 
matter and not a medical one: would this divide still exist if, for example, Slaughter 
et al. had been able to deduce a particular set of injuries that distinguished consent?  
As I have already made clear, FMEs are quite happy to make judgements about some 
controversial questions such as severity or force.  Likewise, as highlighted by Dr. B’s 
quotation earlier, prosecutors are pressuring FMEs to make stronger inferences about 
consent; would this be the case if it was prohibited by the law of evidence?  It is 
FMEs themselves who determine that it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions 
as to whether or not the morphological account is consistent with the complainer’s 
allegation, for the reasons that I explored in the previous section (i.e. it would result 
in disagreement and contradiction); this is a form of boundary-work (Gieryn 1983, 
1999). 
FMEs’ construction of the medico-legal boundary, and the related 
construction of the neutral report itself (based upon such a boundary), I label an act 
of boundary-work, as it serves an important rhetorical function.  As I have made 
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 The “actual issue” is the question that the court has been convened to answer, and as such, any 
expert evidence submitted to the court is prohibited from addressing this specifically (Chalmers 
2006); however, Chalmers accepts that Scottish courts have been quite lax in policing the “actual 
evidence” rule and frequently allow experts to present evidence on the “actual issue” or something 
very similar. 
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clear, the distinction itself appears arbitrary; however, its placement has a significant 
implication.  Dr. F’s definition of a neutral report was one that “neither confirm[ed] 
[n]or refute[ed] the allegation”; FMEs were unable to draw conclusions, as the 
question was one of consent (and therefore outside their area of expertise).  The 
construction of consent as a legal issue means that it is not the responsibility of 
FMEs to determine whether or not consent was provided, and by maintaining that 
boundary, their evidence is delimited (along with any future cross-examination) to 
aspects upon which there is general agreement within the FME community (i.e. 
issues labelled as medical by FMEs).  Limiting evidence to aspects upon which 
FMEs share a consensus, of course, serves to facilitate their appearance as credible, 
expert providers of incontrovertible evidence for the court. 
7.2.2 Boundary Between Neutral Expertise and Evidence for the 
Prosecution 
When FMEs talked about the neutral report, they used the phrase in two different but 
related ways: first, the term neutral report has the meaning that I discussed in the 
previous section (i.e. neither confirming nor denying key aspects of the complainer’s 
account); secondly, it is used by FMEs to express another set of professional 
boundaries, i.e. it is a neutral report in that it supports neither the party on whose 
behalf they may be testifying nor the opposition, and thus demarcates the FME as 
independent from said parties.  “A neutral examination neither supports the 
prosecution or the defence.  It is a neutral report” (Dr. B, male, Constabulary 2).  
While it certainly follows that the first meaning of the neutral report, discussed in the 
last section, does map onto the secondary meaning of neutral pertaining to the 
adversarial dynamics of the courtroom (if the evidence does not support or refute, it 
follows that the report is also of little benefit to either the prosecution or defence), 
there is something very different about this second use of neutral from the first.  
While the first meaning of neutral emphasised and constructed the parameters of 
forensic medical expertise, this secondary meaning represents an attempt by FMEs to 
appear independent, rather than partisan to either of the parties at trial.  FMEs are 
acutely aware of the potential for their testimony to be interpreted as prosecution- or 
conviction- minded (Jones 1994). 
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We’re there, to a certain extent, to see if there’s an, if the clinical evidence 
supports the allegation, or if the clinical evidence does not support the 
evidence, or indeed if the clinical evidence contradicts, very often it can be 
absolutely contradictory.  What, again, we go in with an open mind, we’re 
there to provide a service, we’re not there to, we’re there to assist the 
investigation, and if necessary to assist the prosecution, but we’re not there to 
assist in the process of conviction.  We’re there to provide evidence that will 
ultimately go to assist the investigation, the prosecution and perhaps even the 
court judgement, BUT WE’RE NOT THERE TO GET A CONVICTION.  So 
we’ve always got to keep an open mind, frequently the doctors can’t say 
anything… you can say that the clinical findings neither support nor refute 
the allegation, and that is entirely appropriate (Dr. G, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
This quotation includes a conflation of both meanings of neutral: in the last sentence, 
Dr. G states that it is appropriate to write an inconclusive report, but not because of 
uncertainty surrounding consent; instead, this statement is made within the context of 
the relationship between the prosecution and the FME.  FMEs, it appears, have 
extended the use of “neutral report” from meaning simply “neither supporting nor 
refuting the complainer’s account” to describing their own position and relationships 
within the adversarial dynamic of the courtroom.  As such, the production of a 
neutral report does not merely signify a boundary drawn between questions of the 
law and questions of pathology, but also one situated between FMEs and the 
prosecution.  For instance, there were numerous instances during my interviews 
where FMEs informed me of cases where the defence had put it to them during 
cross-examination (to paraphrase), “Of course you’d say that, you work for the 
prosecution.”  As these examples involved recent or ongoing cases, I have not 
transcribed the details in order to protect anonymity.  Nevertheless, it is clear that 
FMEs have cause for concern about being labelled prosecution-minded, as this could 
result in their evidence being undermined as partisan; therefore, they choose to write 
neutral reports (a report that benefits neither the prosecution nor the defence) and so 
position themselves as independent of both parties.  Here, again, the construction of 
the neutral report signifies an act of boundary-work, maintaining a boundary between 
FMEs and prosecutors, and impressing upon the court that FMEs are impartial, 
objective experts. 
 201 
7.2.3 Implications of the Neutral Report 
It is clear from both uses of the term “neutral report” that FMEs are very much aware 
of the future trial when preparing their report, and that this colours the report’s 
eventual content.  A singular focus on the pathology produces unanimity amongst 
FMEs and avoids potential deconstructive questions concerning legal matters 
(consent in particular); at the same time, a neutral report positions the FME as a 
disinterested and nonpartisan player in the adversarial arena of the courtroom.  
Neutral reports, therefore, are very useful for sustaining the expert appearance of 
FMEs.  Paradoxically, it is exactly this boundary construction that proceeds to make 
FMEs’ evidence irrelevant to certain key questions in rape cases.  The very fact that 
neutral reports are constructed in such a way as to ensure that they are 
uncontroversial also means that they do not pose problems for either the prosecution 
or defence before trial; moreover, because the evidence does not bear upon the issue 
that the court has been convened to address (the question of whether or not sexual 
intercourse was consensual), it does not aid the court in its legal fact-finding.  As the 
neutral report is not contentious (and does not address matters concerning consent), it 
is likely to be accepted by both the prosecution and the defence and hence not called 
to court under Sections 256 and 257 of The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.  
In effect, FMEs are excluding themselves and their evidence from trials.
154
 
[W]hat they say is that there is nothing much to be gained by bringing, so 
they sometimes go and ask the defence they say “well there is nothing in this, 
do you want to agree on that” so if they both agree to that then it helps neither 
of them because you could say it could have happened or it couldn’t have 
happened, so who’s it benefiting, nobody, you know, so that’s fine, so they’ll 
argue on something different, so if it’s a smart defence they’re going to say 
“okay it’s a consent issue” what can I do?  So then that’s fine, but before, but 
they have to agree to that (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
FMEs, therefore, are making a trade-off between evidential significance (the ability 
to make useful claims for the court) and the maintenance of their epistemic authority 
(ensuring that FMEs’ claims remain credible), and while it certainly lends itself to 
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 When asked, FMEs generally agreed that they were cited to court for approximately one out of 
every three cases they examined.  They were never made aware of the reason for not being cited; it is 
possible that the complainer had withdrawn the complaint, or that the case had been diverted for 
another reason, but an agreement on the part of both parties in the Preliminary Diet that there is no 
dispute over the forensic medical evidence is certainly another potential reason for the non-citation of 
FMEs.  
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the legitimisation of expert work and evidence, the neutral report diminishes the 
utility of that evidence.  As the neutral report is non-contentious and benefits neither 
party, it is of little use to legal fact-finding.  As already discussed, the current 
construction of consent as a legal question means that it lies beyond the boundaries 
of clinical forensic medicine, and so the court must rely on other forms of evidence 
in order to address whether or not an act of sexual intercourse constituted rape. 
Summary 
This chapter has focused upon the neutral report, which is the preferred response of 
FMEs to questions relating to the relationship between the morphological account in 
a case and the complainer’s allegation that she was raped.  As rape cases hinge on 
consent, FMEs are expected to address whether or not the evidence is suggestive of 
consent or non-consent.  Clinical forensic medicine and FMEs’ experience both 
make it clear that such a determination is inherently problematic and open to 
contradiction in court, and so FMEs choose to avoid drawing such a conclusion, 
instead producing a neutral report.  This bolsters FME authority in two interesting 
ways: first, it constructs boundaries between the medical aspects of FME work 
(inferences surrounding injury type, cause, and severity) and the legal aspects, where 
community agreement has yet to coalesce.  Consent, therefore, is a legal matter, 
because FMEs have not reached consensus on a way to achieve such an inference.  
However, by limiting their claims and findings to those that they consider medical, 
FMEs reinforce their authority over such issues, while also excluding legal matters.  
The second manner by which FME authority is bolstered by the neutral report is the 
avoidance of a conclusion: they support neither party in the adversarial arena, and 
can therefore claim to be independent from the prosecution (by whom FMEs are both 
paid and called to trial).  The neutral report, therefore, serves to construct a boundary 
between the FME and the prosecution, as the evidence does not benefit the latter. 
 The upshot of these strategies, however, is that FME evidence becomes 
irrelevant to courtroom fact-finding.  The facets of the neutral report that benefit 
FMEs’ expertise (the fact that the evidence is uncontroversial and cannot be 
undermined) can also result in the evidence not being called to court.  If the evidence 
neither supports nor undermines the argument of either the prosecution or defence, 
they choose to agree upon the evidence in a Preliminary Diet, and so the FME is not 
 203 
required to present evidence.  Essentially, therefore, FMEs are gaining epistemic 
authority and expertise at the cost of evidential significance, and by doing so, are 
actually excluding themselves from the trial.  However, it is doubtful that this 
situation will change: if FMEs were to make less cautious reports, then it would be 
highly likely that such evidence would be contradicted or deconstructed as partisan 
upon the stand, undermining the expert status of the FME and thereby defusing any 
potential benefit to legal fact-finding that could be produced by the bolder claims. 
Medical examiners practise self-restraint not primarily because of a higher 
professional duty, but because they know they will be hammered in court…  
[M]edical examiners tend to be conservative practitioners, anticipating 
courtroom interrogations before finalizing their report (Timmermans 2006: 
153/4) 
 
The benefit of this process to FMEs is obvious, but there may be an extent to which 
such cautious strategies could, in fact, be disadvantaging them in the long run, and 
problematising the success of rape cases.  I do not see FMEs losing their position as 
providers of expert knowledge in rape cases.  Although changes to the law of rape 
invoked by the Reference mean that FME evidence is less probative in the majority 
of cases than in the pre-Reference period (i.e. prior to the Reference, while FMEs still 
did not provide evidence upon consent, their evidence of force was relevant to legal 
decision-making on other questions; I will return to this point shortly), they are 
established within the criminal justice process and so cannot be easily removed.  
Moreover, they still have a considerable function: they produce corroborating 
evidence for a number of the “crucial facts” in a case (such as the question of 
whether there was sexual intercourse, although they cannot corroborate the 
complainer’s allegation of rape), and therefore still have relevance.  Moreover, they 
are also able to provide evidence of force, which (although it does not necessarily 
constitute a complaint of rape) has considerable persuasive power in the minds of 
jurors; and it is with this finding and some of its implications that I will conclude this 
chapter. 
 It is important to reiterate that although the Reference expanded the definition 
of rape to all cases of non-consensual sexual intercourse as opposed to only those 
with evidence of “overcoming the will”, jurors still tend to determine consent from 
evidence of force.  As a result, it is likely that prosecutors will still draw upon FME 
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evidence in cases where that evidence signifies substantial evidence of physical 
force, even though the FME themselves may have produced a neutral report, as the 
evidence of force has persuasive power (see the Bright and Goodman-Delahunty 
study I cited in Chapter Four).  However, this poses problems for the professed 
intention of FMEs (and others) to undermine the mythical relationship in the minds 
of “triers-of-fact” between injuries, force and consent.  As mentioned above, 
prosecutors still choose to progress cases with the greatest chance of success through 
the criminal justice process; with “success” appearing to connote cases that fit with 
stereotypical descriptions of rape cases.  The constant repetition of such a belief in 
trials will only serve to reinforce the belief, not undermine it.  This is coupled with 
the fact that FMEs will only be called to give evidence in cases where there are signs 
of physical force; they will not be called to give evidence in the small number of 
cases without evidence of force that do progress through the criminal justice process, 
as their evidence is irrelevant (the neutral report does not provide probative evidence 
for the court’s decision-making) to what then becomes the key issue, namely 
consent.  As such, they will not have the opportunity to present the argument that 
injuries are not a guaranteed result of non-consensual intercourse.  The result is that 
the contemporary state of affairs makes it highly difficult for FMEs to undermine 
popular assumptions about rape, and could actually reinforce them further: the way 
in which FMEs’ evidence is being employed, where they only present in cases with 
the greatest prospects of achieving a conviction (partly because there is significant 
evidence of force), could lend support to the myth that force is a prerequisite for 
“real rape”. 
 In the above paragraph, I have moved the focus of attention from FMEs 
towards prosecutors, and made the claim that prosecutorial decision-making and the 
forwarding of cases not only fit with popular attitudes about rape, but also reinforce 
such myths.  Is there anything FMEs can do about this?  As mentioned, they have 
made attempts to regain their claim-making power over consent, by conducting 
studies with the aim to uncover non-consensual sexual injuries (I have already 
discussed Slaughter’s study, and will mention others in the concluding chapter).  
Such a finding would shift the boundary of medicine and the law, as FMEs would be 
able to draw inferences about consent and so place it within the medical boundary, 
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but at what cost?  As is clear from Slaughter’s methodology, the decision as to 
whether a research subject in a study is a “victim” or not relies heavily upon legal 
decision-making, which in turn relies heavily upon prosecutor narrative construction, 
and its persuasive power (Duff 1999).  As already mentioned, such narratives are 
already formed around certain types of assaults that fit with shared public attitudes 
about rape, and so any clinical study that draws upon a legal outcome will ultimately 
reproduce the assumptions inherent in legal fact-finding.  The “rape injury”, 
therefore, would only serve to fetishise injuries and reinforce stereotypical attitudes 
towards rape.  In light of this, there is currently little that FMEs can do to undermine 
mythologies about rape, other than construct neutral reports with the inherent 
assumption that absence of consent cannot be inferred from injuries (or consent from 
an absence of injuries).  In other words, FMEs’ strategy of boundary-work, while 
limiting their own role in the criminal justice process, is probably the best thing that 
they can do for complainers. 
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8. Conclusion: Incontrovertible Evidence and its 
Consequences 
 
This thesis investigated the way that FMEs construct, manage, discipline and police 
their claims-making (at both individual practitioner and community-wide levels) in 
order to ensure that their claims, as well as the claims of others within the criminal 
justice process (particularly forensic scientists), are considered as factual, or at least 
credible and incontrovertible.  One of the most significant methods by which FME 
evidence attains credibility and authority is the limiting of claims in order to 
demonstrate unanimity amongst the community of FMEs (in turn granting the claims 
that they do make, and thereby their evidence, the status of incontrovertible fact).  In 
this concluding chapter, I will repeat the key findings of the previous chapters, 
outline the ways in which FMEs construct their evidence as credible and 
authoritative based upon the unanimity of opinion amongst the community of FMEs, 
and explain how an awareness of the types of claims and practices of their peers 
gives the individual FME the confidence to produce evidence that they consider 
unlikely to be contradicted in the courtroom.  I will conclude by providing some 
preliminary ideas that may help to address the attrition rate problem (albeit at the 
expense of the professional authority of FMEs). 
8.1 Developing, Constraining and Sustaining a Shared 
Perception and Praxis 
During a period of intense training, FMEs are taught both the way to classify cases 
and the kinds of classifications and practices considered appropriate by the 
community of FMEs.  In Chapter Three, I explored the FME training process in a 
focused study of the teaching of injury interpretation (of course, the training process 
involves other aspects of learning as well, such as the appropriate questions to ask 
and the correct samples to take).  Trainee FMEs shadow an experienced FME, who is 
considered to be a good example by the rest of the FME community.  During 
shadowing, the trainer performs actual examinations in front of the trainee, and 
points out any injuries or phenomena that the trainee has yet to experience, 
explaining the nature and significance of the injury.  The trainee accepts the trainer’s 
statement without question, constructing a mental assemblage of observed injuries 
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and the community-agreed inferences relating to those injuries.  This process is 
further reinforced by the employment of textbooks, which contain pictures of real 
cases and labels outlining the classification of injuries, providing another 
authoritative resource and further examples to add to the trainee’s cognitive 
collection.  This first part of the shadowing process lays the foundation for the 
development of a shared way of seeing, as FMEs are taught not only the community-
agreed definitions for certain injuries, but also the agreed inferences that can be made 
from those injuries. 
 During the second part of training, the roles are reversed, with the trainer 
shadowing the trainee.  During this period, the trainee can be understood to be 
performing a set of exercises, physically working through the forensic medical 
examination (collecting samples, asking questions, identifying injuries and drawing 
inferences), with the trainer correcting their practice after the examination if the 
neophyte is not performing in a manner consistent with that of the rest of the FME 
community.  A parallel can be drawn with the trainee’s use of textbook exercises: the 
textbook provides exemplar cases for the trainee to evaluate, from which they are 
required to draw conclusions and then compare their answers to those provided in the 
textbook.  A correct answer means that the trainee has provided an answer in keeping 
with that provided in the textbook.  Likewise, during shadowing, if the trainee 
conducts the examination correctly, it is because they conduct it in the same manner 
as would their trainer.  The relationship between correctness and “in keeping” with 
the remainder of the community (or, as Wittgenstein said, “as we do it” (Wittgenstein 
1968: 145)) is demonstrated by the community’s understanding of practitioner 
“competence” or “safety”.  A “safe” examiner (generally used in relation to the 
passing of the DMJ, taken three years after the FME has been considered 
“competent” by their trainer) is one who gathers evidence in the same manner as the 
rest of the community (they draw the same conclusions, ask the same questions, etc.).  
It is clear, therefore, that the act of training serves to inculcate the trainee into the 
paradigm of the FME community.  Such a process is vital for the maintenance of 
authority of FME evidence, as the assertion that all FMEs perform in a similar 
manner and would interpret injuries in the same way adds considerable credibility to 
their evidence; it allows them to claim that their judgements on injuries are not 
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merely judgements, but instead incontrovertible fact.  It is not the case, however, that 
unanimity amongst FME classification follows naturally from FMEs’ regulated 
training; the real world can significantly undermine and alter the classificatory 
schema developed during training. 
 Chapter Four focused on the way that FMEs interpret injuries during their 
independent practice.  The chapter set out a “meaning finitist” explanation for the 
way that injuries are classified by FMEs (my analysis of training was also heavily 
influenced by Kuhn and SSK), emphasising the importance of previously observed 
cases and the drawing of analogies between old cases and new ones.  As such, a 
classification of (for example) an injury consists of a generalisation from a 
previously observed injury or collection of injuries (chosen as having the greatest 
“similarity relation” with the new example), as well as the inference made about 
those earlier injuries (definition, potential cause, etc.) to the new case.  As 
classifications rely upon previously observed cases, it is always possible for new 
cases to problematise the existing schema, for example: 1) the injury could be similar 
to two previously observed injuries whose causes were classified differently; and 2) 
the new injury may not have a similarity relation with any of the practitioner’s 
previous cases.  This can cause a significant problem for an FME; if a claim is made 
in these moments of uncertainty, their evidence has the potential to be contradicted, 
and may therefore undermine the community’s claims to produce incontrovertible 
evidence.  To this end, in the situations outlined, FMEs choose either to limit their 
claims-making or invite a colleague to draw an inference about the case observed.  In 
the first case (the similarity between the new case and two previous cases), the FME 
can limit their claim to the type of injury only and avoid providing a cause, which 
lessens the potential for contradiction upon the stand and so upholds the FME’s 
claim that they are providing factual evidence for the court.  Asking a colleague to 
provide a judgement offers a similar collective response.   
 These two strategies constitute basic methods by which FMEs can maintain 
the authority of their claims.  Questions concerning cause (and to some extent injury 
type) require some interpretation, and while FMEs maintain that their claims are not 
opinion but instead fact due to their collective acceptance, such classifications are 
inferences based on their previous examples of cases.  Another example of potential 
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for a claim to be undermined concerns the step from individual bruises to a 
“morphological account”, i.e. the FME’s own version of events concerning the 
alleged attack, based upon the physical evidence.  One of the main claims that FMEs 
make with regard to the “morphological account” is the severity, or amount of force, 
necessary to produce observed injuries.  As with all of these classifications, the 
classification of severity is based upon a judgement of similarity between a previous 
case (set of cases) and the new one, and so the FME’s previous classifications will 
inform the new classification.  To this end, there may be substantial disagreement 
amongst practitioners about severity (the same is also true with regards to injury type 
and cause), as differing FMEs’ differing sets of past cases may result in divergent 
claims.  Nevertheless, FMEs have found means to generate unanimity, or at least 
limit demonstrations of disunity.  The use of the colposcope and the digital recording 
provides the defence expert with the same mediated view of the ano-genital area as 
that of her colleague performing the forensic medical examination.  This offers the 
potential for the defence expert to agree with the findings of the other FME, as the 
two practitioners view the same colposcopic pictures, and may interpret them in the 
same way given their shared ways of seeing; in addition, the viewing of the recording 
by the defence expert is already filtered through the prosecution expert’s report.  
Such “virtual witnessing” enables the potential development of consensus around the 
ano-genital findings before the trial starts.  Similarly, FMEs are currently pressuring 
the COPFS to ensure that defence experts’ reports are disclosed to prosecution FMEs 
in good time before the trial (although the defence is not required to disclose any of 
its evidence), and to precognosce prosecution FMEs.  Both strategies provide the 
prosecution FME with potential alternative interpretations of the evidence, and give 
time and space to explore these other interpretations so that they can then explain any 
divergences between prosecution and defence experts, mending the potential 
breaches to the perception of FMEs as a unanimous collective who provide 
incontrovertible evidence. 
The credibility of FME claims, therefore, derives from their ability to 
demonstrate consensus; any public shows of disunity or disagreement can result in 
the undermining of that credibility, and so FMEs are at pains to limit its potential.  In 
addition to ensuring that all practitioners are trained to see injuries in a particular 
 210 
way, resulting in a shared classificatory schema, FMEs also create ways to negotiate 
the problems thrown up by the difficulties of inferential classification.  All of these 
practices serve to ensure that FMEs’ claims regarding injuries (their morphological 
accounts) are generally unquestioned.  These strategies do not represent the only 
ways in which FMEs maintain credibility, however; there is another very important 
mechanism for generating unanimity, the “neutral report”, and I will refer to that 
shortly.  First, however, I will mention a similar analysis that can also be brought to 
bear on the introduction and use of guidelines. 
 The manner in which police doctors performed forensic medical 
examinations was highly criticised in the late 1970s and early 1980s, resulting in 
significant undermining of their evidence.  In an attempt to resurrect their credibility, 
police doctors introduced a standardised kit which, it was hoped, would add a level 
of routine into the medical examination that had not been there previously.  The kit 
and guidelines were later updated when changes to legal and medical cultures 
(particularly the appropriation of the Evidence-Based movement) meant that FMEs 
needed an evidence-base to explain their decision-making if they wished their 
evidence to remain authoritative.  While the introduction of these artefacts did have 
some influence on the way in which forensic medical examinations were performed 
(particularly the introduction of the kits in the 1980s, which undoubtedly did add 
more routine into the examination than existed previously), their usefulness did not 
derive from their potential to alter practice, but rather from the fact that they served 
as a resource that police doctors and FMEs could draw upon in order to explain and 
legitimate their work.  Guidelines and other documents, in addition to granting the 
medical examination an aura of objectivity by setting out a list of rules for 
practitioners to follow during the conduct of the examination (this is particularly 
important, given the rise in EBM and Evidence-Based Policy), also help FMEs to 
explain their work to other actors in court. 
As the kits and accompanying documents are a useful means of legitimating 
their work and communicating it to others, it follows that they must be (to some 
extent) representative of that work, although it is clear from interviews with FMEs 
that the kits do not determine their practice.  They explained to me that guidelines 
and forms served as aides memoires, leading them to question whether or not 
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gathering particular forms of evidence as yet uncollected was necessary or 
appropriate; appropriateness being a determination based upon the conventions of the 
forensic medical community.  During training, FMEs are taught such conventions, 
particularly the correct way to classify cases and the samples and questions believed 
necessary by the community of FMEs.  To this end, this determination is the 
equivalent of the correct inference to make when classifying injuries.  While 
guidelines are to some extent a codification of this shared practice (which is why 
they can constitute an aide memoire), they set out all the procedures that should be 
followed by FMEs, and therefore all the evidence that should be collected – a Total 
Collection Strategy.  Such a procedure is very rarely deemed appropriate (as this 
could harm the complainer, or be considered inefficient).  As such, FMEs interpret 
the case and gather the evidence that they believe would be considered appropriate 
by other FMEs.  It should not be taken from this, however, that FMEs base their 
decision-making upon a set of static norms disseminated during training; FMEs who 
work in the same constabulary may develop novel ways of generating evidence, and 
so FME decisions are based upon changing norms, as they evolve in constabularies 
and nationwide through the development of practice.  Some of these new practices 
may be the result of complex cases (as with the observation of a previously unseen 
injury): new cases may make it difficult to determine the necessary samples, and so 
new practices may be necessary in order to determine the appropriate evidence to 
gather.  Meanwhile, in cases where the complainer cannot provide an account of the 
alleged assault, or the account is believed to be partial by FMEs, a Total Sample 
Collection is performed, gathering all available evidence to ensure that none is 
missed; in effect, this is the equivalent of making a limited statement about an injury. 
 The collection of procedural evidence can be understood in the same manner 
as classifications of injuries: while FMEs maintain discretion over the samples 
collected, the questions asked, etc., the possibility exists that they may be criticised 
for failing to collect all relevant evidence; not only would this challenge the 
credibility of FMEs, but also, in the case of trace material, the authority of forensic 
scientific evidence.  In an attempt to limit such deconstructive claims, FMEs now 
produce kits with accompanying guidance documents that list all of the samples that 
FMEs should collect and explain when they should be collected.  These documents 
 212 
serve the rhetorical purpose of explaining and legitimating FME work to non-FMEs.  
However, FMEs do not follow these documents to the letter, but instead abide by a 
collectively agreed set of practices (which they have attempted to codify within the 
guidelines); as such, FMEs determine the appropriateness of a procedure upon the 
basis of whether or not it would be agreed upon by their peers.  The authority and 
credibility of FMEs’ evidence collection is thus assured (even though they are 
potentially missing some forms of evidence), as they are demonstrating consensus 
with each other about those collection processes.   
 There is one other method by which FMEs limit their claims-making in order 
to ensure unanimity amongst the community of practitioners, and that is the 
construction of “neutral reports”.  While FMEs are mostly happy to construct 
“morphological accounts”, they do not have enough confidence to make the next 
inferential claim that the “morphological account” corroborates a complaint of rape.  
Changes to the law of rape in Scotland have served to nullify the role of force, 
leaving sexual intercourse without consent as the actus reus of rape.  While there 
have been attempts, through clinical forensic medical research, to uncover a set of 
injuries that fit the pattern of non-consensual intercourse (Teixeira 1980, Slaughter 
and Brown 1991, Rogers 1996, Slaughter et al. 1997, Riggs et al. 2000, Lincoln 
2001, McGregor et al. 2002, Grossin et al. 2003, Palmer et al. 2004, Hilden et al. 
2005, White and McLean 2006),
155
 it is currently the case that the relationship 
between injury and consent is uncertain.  To this end, FMEs exercise caution with 
regard to conclusions about consent, as their own constructions of consent propose it 
to be a legal question, not a medical one, and also because if they were to draw a 
conclusion about whether the morphological account proved or disproved consent, it 
would be considered highly contentious and could be easily contradicted.  As such, 
any FME who does draw conclusions about a case, particularly conclusions that 
corroborate the complainer’s allegation, can be criticised by the rest of the FME 
community for over-reaching or “over-egging the pudding”.  Therefore, the norm 
within forensic medicine at the moment is to produce “neutral reports”, a report that 
focuses purely upon the pathology (the “morphological account”) that would be 
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 Whether the finding of a particular injury or collection of injuries would be beneficial or merely 
serve as an exclusory mechanism for certain claims will have to be seen (that is, if a particular kind of 
injury is ever found, which is in itself doubtful). 
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agreed on by all FMEs (thereby also maintaining both the credibility of the 
“morphological account” and FMEs’ epistemic authority over pathology), and 
neither supports nor refutes the complainer’s allegation (thus demonstrating and 
reinforcing FMEs’ disinterestedness, as they are not supporting either party). 
 While the “neutral report” is of significant benefit to FMEs’ claims to 
authority and the provision of incontrovertible evidence, it does undermine the 
usefulness of that evidence.  As the forensic medical evidence is uncontroversial and 
benefits neither side, it is likely that it will be dismissed from the trial under Sections 
256 and 257 of The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.  A problematic side-
effect of this procedure is that it may result in FMEs only providing expert evidence 
in cases where there is considerable evidence of force.  As I made clear towards the 
end of the last chapter, the prosecution tend only to progress cases that are consistent 
with stereotypes and myths regarding rape through the criminal justice process; cases 
with strong evidence of physical force are more likely to make it to trial.  To this end, 
FME evidence is led by the prosecution in cases with significant signs of physical 
force due to its persuasive power, even though the FME is likely to have produced a 
neutral report.  The fact that the majority of rape cases presented at trial demonstrate 
significant evidence of force is likely to reinforce in the minds of jurors the mythical 
relationship between rape and force.  Moreover, in the minority of cases that make it 
to trial but lack evidence of physical force, it is highly unlikely that FME evidence 
will be led, as it does not directly address the actual issue before the court, meaning 
that they are not granted the opportunity to present evidence that injuries are not a 
guaranteed result of rape.  Due to these unfortunate contemporary circumstances, it 
appears that FMEs face an uphill struggle in achieving their agenda of undermining 
the “real rape” myth.  To conclude, I will propose a number of strategies that could 
go some way towards undermining the “real rape” myth and improving the 
conviction rate; controversially, such strategies do require the ceding of significant 
professional authority from FMEs to other experts and actors in the criminal justice 
process. 
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8.2 Forensic Medical Paralysis and Some Preliminary 
Recommendations 
This thesis has investigated the way that FMEs produce incontrovertible evidence: 
they promote a shared vision and praxis, managed and maintained by training, self-
regulation, and most importantly the limiting of statements and conclusions so as to 
avoid over-reaching or demonstrating to non-FMEs any disharmony amongst 
practitioners.  Such practices maintain the assertion that FME claims are not 
judgements or opinions but rather facts, as they are agreed upon by all FMEs.  The 
“neutral report”, however, demonstrates that the cost of such authority is evidential 
significance, meaning that (more often than not) FMEs will not be called to provide 
evidence, as the forensic medical evidence does not corroborate or undermine the 
complainer’s case.  FMEs, therefore, appear to be in a state of paralysis; their 
concern with maintaining their authority and credibility limits their value to the 
criminal justice process, as they are unable to present evidence which either 
corroborates or undermines the allegation.  Moreover, I would argue that by 
continuing to employ the neutral report, FMEs are unintentionally reinforcing 
stereotypical beliefs about the relationship between injuries and “real rape”.  In this 
concluding section, I will address the provocative question of whether or not FMEs’ 
paralysis spells the end of clinical forensic medical evidence in rape cases (i.e. 
whether or not they are ceding jurisdiction around legitimate claims-making in such 
cases) by investigating some of the solutions that have been advocated in an attempt 
to improve the conviction rate in rape cases more broadly.  I will commence by 
briefly reiterating a number of topics that I mentioned earlier: bolder FME claims 
and the identification of specific “rape injuries”. 
 Given, as I have argued, that the production of “neutral reports” limits the 
evidential significance of FME claims-making to the court, and thereby also 
diminishes the FME’s potential to educate prosecutors and jurors about the 
insignificance of injury evidence, the simplest means by which this paralysis could 
be resolved would be the emboldening of their claims.  The drawing of conclusions 
about the veracity of the complainer’s allegation would mean, of course, that the 
evidence produced would support a particular side in the adversarial contest, and 
would certainly improve FMEs’ chances of being called to trial, but at what cost?  
The evidence would be contradicted or undermined upon the stand, meaning that any 
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benefit produced by stronger claims-making would be neutralised during testimony.  
As this thesis has made clear, FMEs collectively are loath to allow this.  However, 
they have not prohibited the conduct of new research in order to enable such stronger 
claims at some point in the future.  Senior members of the FFLM recently wrote: 
The dangers of over interpreting the presence or absence of genital injury are 
primarily twofold.  When over interpretation is exposed in court it can do 
serious damage to the Crown Prosecution’s case resulting in guilty persons 
going free; conversely, if unchallenged, over interpretation can also lead to 
wrongful convictions.  However, there is also the less obvious risk that the 
fear of over interpretation may either discourage doctors from giving any 
opinion evidence at all or encourage them to under interpret the evidence, 
both of which are just as likely to have an adverse influence on the outcome 
of a trial.  This unsatisfactory state of affairs is unlikely to be fully addressed 
until further good quality research, concentrating in particular on the 
comparative frequency and types of injury seen after consensual and non-
consensual intercourse, provides doctors with the confidence and knowledge 
to properly advise the courts. (Norfolk and White 2006: 160/1) 
 
The community of FMEs are actively searching for a specific rape injury or injuries 
that could adequately discriminate between consensual and non-consensual 
intercourse.  As mentioned in Chapter Seven, while such a finding would reposition 
the boundary of consent within the medical sphere and therefore allow FMEs to 
make legitimate claims about the veracity of the allegation, it would do so at 
considerable cost.  As Patel et al. (1993) made clear, investigations into the discovery 
of “rape injuries” only add further reason to dismiss allegations that do not fit the 
mould.  To this end, some members of the forensic medical community consider 
them anathema, and so the discovery of a specific discriminating injury is likely to 
cause a significant controversy amongst the community.  The strengthening of their 
claims-making via the discovery of specific types of injury, therefore, could do more 
damage to the forensic medical community than perceived good. 
 Would improved legal training provide a solution?  This is an area that 
certainly requires further investigation; while I cannot see how it would help to 
resolve the problem of neutral reports and the attrition rate per se, I do believe that 
the syllabus of the DFM, and maybe even aspects of the shadowing process, need to 
be reviewed.  Throughout the interviews it was clear that FMEs had very different 
ideas about the definition of the legal requirement of corroboration (some FMEs 
believed that they needed to be observed by a colleague or a police officer during 
 216 
examinations, when The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 section 281 makes 
special provision for forensic evidence not requiring corroboration), and this does not 
appear to be addressed in the DFM syllabus (Worshipful Society of Apothecaries 
2007a).  As FME evidence has the potential to be vital for the corroboration of the 
complainer’s account, it is surprising that FMEs’ knowledge of corroboration was so 
limited.  Further research into exactly what is taught (and, more importantly, what is 
omitted) in the DFM is required.  Similarly, little mention is made of the provision of 
courtroom testimony in the training.  While the DFM syllabus aims to provide the 
student with knowledge of the parties in the trial and the roles that they play, it does 
not provide the trainee with any firsthand experience of the courtroom and the 
provision of expert testimony.  The FFLM’s recent recommendations on training 
(Dott 2007) reiterate the importance of knowledge of the courtroom, and make clear 
that trainees should view trials during the shadowing period, but given the 
importance granted to experiential learning that I discovered to be part and parcel of 
FME training, it is intriguing to find that no mock-trial interviews are employed 
during shadowing to provide the trainee with the actual physical experience of 
undergoing cross-examination.  As I say, while I do not believe that either of these 
practices would single-handedly resolve some of the problems that I have mentioned 
during the thesis, the training processes of FMEs should be looked at again to 
investigate whether or not practices such as mock-cross examination would be of 
benefit to the provision and construction of FME evidence. 
 It would, of course, be wrong of me to say that FMEs have not been aware of 
the problems I have highlighted or made amendments to their training and practice in 
light of attrition rate studies and their own research into rape myths; in fact, as I have 
frequently mentioned, they have been at the forefront of trying to communicate to 
other parties the insignificance of injuries.  Such advocacy was a part of the 
motivation for precognition meetings.
156
  As already mentioned in Chapter Seven, 
White and McLean (2006) impressed upon FMEs that they had a duty to explain to 
prosecutors and jurors that conclusions about the veracity of a rape case could not be 
made solely upon injury evidence; in the same year, the Forensic Advisory Sub-
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evidence before the trial. 
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Group of the COPFS recommended that precognitions took place in all cases 
(whether or not the evidence was consistent with the Crown’s case).  During a 
precognition, the FME has the opportunity to explain the content and context of their 
evidence to a member of the prosecution team, and therefore a space is provided in 
order to stress the point that injury evidence is not as powerful as rape stereotypes 
suggest it to be. 
While precognitions sound like a highly useful strategy for battling the 
vicious circle that I hinted at in Chapter Seven, in that educating prosecutors about 
the significance (or lack) of the evidence provided by FMEs makes it more likely 
that cases with little or no injuries will progress through the criminal justice process, 
it still needs to be seen whether or not this will happen in practice.  According to 
Christie and Moody (1999), Precognition Agents are often brought in to conduct 
precognitions, and so those who actually make the decisions over which cases will 
progress through the courts may not be receiving the information that FMEs are 
trying to disseminate.  Likewise, it is clear that the concept of injury evidence being 
highly beneficial is deeply entrenched in the minds of prosecutors; for instance, the 
same report that advocated precognition also added the following: 
Our analysis of cases revealed that the likelihood of conviction increases 
where there is medical or forensic evidence independent of the victim.  
Accordingly we [COPFS] considered means of maximising opportunities to 
obtain expert evidence supportive of the victim’s account (COPFS 2006: 16). 
 
Such a statement leads one to question the extent to which FMEs have the ability 
during precognition to alter prosecutors’ perceptions about the significance of injury 
evidence.  Research is needed to investigate whether or not any changes have 
occurred in the types of cases that have progressed through the criminal justice 
process in Scotland since 2006.  If precognition has made any difference, there 
should be more cases proceeding to court with little or no injuries than there were 
before.  If the types of cases are still the same, then although one could not say 
precognition has failed, it could be said that the vicious circle culture is still endemic, 
with prosecutors forwarding cases that fit with rape stereotypes. 
 Would it be possible to break the stereotype, then, and change the types of 
cases that are considered “winnable”?  As I have said, it is currently the case that 
prosecutors forward cases that are consistent with rape myths as they are more likely 
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to achieve a conviction; if it were the case that more non-stereotypical cases achieved 
convictions, this could, in theory, alter the kinds of cases forwarded by prosecutors.  
One suggested way of achieving this is the presentation of “General Expert 
Evidence”.  Introduced in the (English) Home Office’s consultation paper Convicting 
Rapists and Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape, general expert evidence 
will explain to jurors and judges that… apparently problematic features of a 
person’s evidence are common and should not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the victim/witness is lying or unreliable.  The court will be 
informed of the acknowledged psychological reactions that can occur after a 
prolonged relationship of abuse and/or after a deeply traumatic event.  Such 
reactions can affect a victim’s ability to give a coherent, consistent account of 
their experiences and cause behaviour which, to an onlooker, is puzzling as it 
does not match the expectation as to how ‘genuine’ victims act or react 
(Home Office 2006: 16) 
 
Based upon generalised social science data, the general expert evidence provides 
jurors with “an accurate social and psychological context in which to evaluate 
behaviour that might otherwise be found incomprehensible or counterintuitive” 
(Ellison and Munro 2009: 365).  To use the Home Office’s own example, as 
previously mentioned, the “real rape” myth states that the complainer will report the 
rape straight away, and so jurors are often doubtful (and often persuaded by the 
defence) that the complainer is credible as it is believed that they have had time to 
invent an allegation.  The general expert evidence would inform the court that “it is 
not unusual for a rape victim to delay reporting and an expert would provide 
alternative explanations that the jury could consider” (Home Office 2006: 16).  As is 
clear in this example, the general expert evidence does not relate to the specifics of 
the case in question, but rather provides evidence about rape victims more generally; 
it is then up to the jury to determine whether or not such characteristics are relevant 
to the particulars of the case upon which they are deciding. 
 Ellison and Munro (2009) have conducted mock-jury trials to investigate the 
impact that such general expert evidence can have on jury deliberations and case 
outcomes.  Importantly, as part of their general expert evidence, they also included 
victim “freezing” (i.e. a lack of resistance on the part of the victim brought on by 
shock), and therefore the greater likelihood of little or no injuries being produced.  
While Ellison and Munro’s jurors found the general expert evidence to be of value in 
relation to questions of delayed reporting and a complainant’s calm demeanour upon 
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the witness stand, significantly altering jurors’ decision-making, it had no noticeable 
impact on decisions relating to injury and lack of resistance. 
In regard to non-resistance, and in contrast to the previous two variables, we 
were unable to identify any discernable shift in the way jurors responded to 
the complainant’s claim to have ‘frozen’ in shock after initially attempting to 
push the defendant away and telling him to leave her alone (Ellison and 
Munro 2009: 371). 
 
As an explanation for their finding they stated: 
It is possible that expectations of force, injury and resistance are just so 
deeply engrained within the popular imagination that attempts to disavow 
jurors of them through education within the rape trial are likely to meet with 
limited success (Ellison and Munro 2009: 376) 
 
Not only do Ellison and Munro’s findings question the validity of general expert 
evidence with respect to injury evidence, they also provide a further challenge to the 
perceived benefits of prosecution precognitions.  If such expectations, as mentioned 
by Ellison and Munro, are so ingrained, would conversations with prosecutors serve 
the purpose for which the Forensic Advisory Sub-Group hope?  On the other hand, 
while Ellison and Munro’s findings are somewhat pessimistic, we should not dismiss 
them altogether; the findings did demonstrate substantial changes in juror attitude 
and understanding in terms of the first two myths.  More mock-jury studies are 
needed with different scripts outlining “It’s normal to be normal” in order to 
investigate whether or not there is any means by which we can challenge the 
entrenched injury myth.  Given this, it is unfortunate that the COPFS have already 
dismissed general expert evidence as a potential strategy in Scotland. 
 In their 2006 COPFS report, it is noted that a powerful form of corroborating 
evidence is complainer distress.  Demonstrable distress, either at the time of the 
alleged incident, or sometime after, can be used to corroborate non-consensual sexual 
intercourse.  The provision of general expert evidence stating that distress on the part 
of the complainer is not guaranteed post-assault problematises distress as a form of 
corroboration, and therefore the COPFS have chosen not to incorporate it as best 
practice. 
[A] considerable body of case law has developed around findings of distress 
corroborating lack of consent, particularly in relation to rape.  Distress 
exhibited even some time after the event has been accepted by the courts… 
This has allowed convictions to be obtained in cases where there has been no 
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other independent evidence to support the victim’s account.  Since 
prosecutors in Scotland need to rely on distress evidence to provide 
corroboration of a lack of consent they are faced with a dilemma in that 
expert evidence may suggest that the absence of distress can be a normal 
reaction on the part of adult rape victims.  However, those cases in which 
some further explanation about counter-intuitive behaviours of this kind 
might be beneficial are likely to be cases where there is insufficient evidence 
to prosecute.  Unless there is an eyewitness, an admission of rape, or strong 
medical or forensic evidence, distress evidence may be pivotal in securing 
sufficient evidence.  We suspect that use of [general] expert evidence – 
particularly in relation to adult witnesses – might have wider application in 
jurisdictions where there is no requirement of corroboration.  There are 
limitations, in our view, on the use of [general] expert evidence in relation to 
adult rape victims (COPFS 2006: 135) 
 
In order to maintain distress as corroboration for an aspect of the actus reus of rape, 
the COPFS have declined the use of general expert evidence.
157
  While I applaud the 
sentiment, it is possible that this decision needs to be reviewed and more research 
conducted in order to attain a sense of the number of cases that would be damaged by 
general expert evidence. 
 Interestingly, general expert evidence could be considered an interesting 
move in the conflict over jurisdiction of claims-making in rape cases.  As already 
mentioned, general expert evidence is drawn from legal and social scientific data and 
as such could be considered part of a larger attempt to wrestle professional authority 
from the medical profession over the making of expert claims regarding the victim.  
While there is currently little data to assess such a claim, it is possible that a Light-
esque
158
 redressing of the balance is occurring, from medical dominance to a 
professional domain shared with socio-legal experts.  One way in which this appears 
to be playing out is with the calls for more specialised FMEs.  Since the criticisms of 
the late 1970s/1980s, social scientists and legal researchers (alongside victims’ 
groups) have been calling for specialist rape and sexual offence police doctors.  This 
was initially framed around the sex of the police doctor, with a desire to limit the 
conduct of examinations to female doctors (or at least provide a choice for the 
complainer).  Nowadays, with the development of specialist sexual assault police 
divisions (see for example Amethyst in Lothian and Borders) or specialist police 
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officers (SOLOs), and the increasing specialisation of prosecutors (particularly 
Solemn Legal Managers and Advocates Depute) there is a drive towards the 
establishment of specialist sexual offence FMEs who would only perform and 
provide evidence in sexual offence cases.  Such a policy is most clearly advocated in 
the development of SARCs, where there are a team of dedicated, female FMEs who 
only perform sexual assault examinations.  Only one SARC has opened in Scotland: 
the pilot project of The Arch in Glasgow, which was introduced by the Scottish 
Executive in conjunction with Greater Glasgow Police.  No research on The Arch 
has yet been published and so it is yet to be seen whether the pilot has been a 
success; however, the FMEs with whom I have discussed the project have been far 
from complimentary.  In order to maintain anonymity, I will not provide direct 
quotations, but those working within the constabulary informed me that The Arch 
was not achieving its aims.  A potential justification for such negativity could be that 
The Arch was imposed upon the FME community by outsiders, who promoted 
specialist female FMEs.  Such a position is generally anathema to FMEs, as 
demonstrated by an FME working in another constabulary who was having difficulty 
recruiting: 
“Provided it’s one evening a week”, and once thing, and once “I prefer not to 
do the weekend”, or and, “we’ll only do the rape examinations, not 
everything else”, well, these areas are not that big, it’s a, in places like 
London where there’s so many of this thing, you can afford to say, “I’ll only 
do sexual assault and nothing else.”  And the one nice thing that I like the job 
for in Scotland is you have diverse - there’s so many different things.  You 
see custodies, you see the accused, you see the victims, we see children, see 
for road traffic act, so many things, that is given.  I love the fact that the 
variety there, and that, that would keep me going so I think I would feel very 
isolated if I just did one thing.  Not isolated is the word, I think too highly 
specialised and wouldn’t be doing justice because you are only seeing one 
side of the story and you are going to get biased.  By seeing both sides, by 
seeing both these things you do get, try and encourage the same doctor to see 
both accused and victim (Dr. A, female, Constabulary 1). 
 
While Dr. A’s statement is a little hard to follow, it is made somewhat clearer if it is 
compared to the police doctor Davis’s statement made in 1985 with the first wave of 
criticism of police doctors: 
The women’s organisations have complained that the number of women 
doctors available to examine rape victims who do not wish to be examined by 
a male doctor is insufficient.  Accepting this, the Metropolitan Police are 
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recruiting women doctors solely to attend to female victims of sexual crime 
and it is said that they will receive “appropriate” training.  The Association of 
Police Surgeons has always discouraged the recruitment of women doctors 
only for this purpose, since it takes the view that doctors who may be called 
upon to examine the victims of any assault, sexual or otherwise, should have 
the benefit of full forensic training (Davis 1985: 13). 
 
Both Davis and Dr. A appear to be saying that for an FME to perform their job 
appropriately and avoid becoming biased, they need to be trained and investigate all 
aspects of forensic medical work, not only the sexual offence area.  Another 
experienced FME, Dr. E, made a similar comment in relation to the introduction of 
nurses into forensic medical work: 
Yeah I, I, I think it’s important to do that, the other worry if you have nurses 
doing things, okay it’s repetitive seeing a lot of detainees in custody where 
they are complaining about withdrawal symptoms; you go through a, you 
take a history of the complaint, you take a detailed medical history in 
particular about drug usage and you do a detailed comprehensive assessment 
with things like pulse, temperature, check the pupil size and eye movements, 
so you have all that documented there and again you’ve got to know when 
people are generally withdrawing from drugs and needed something for that, 
and of course the spin-off benefit from that is that if you are aware of the 
effects of different substances, when you are doing a sexual assault 
examination you know clinically whether the appearance whether they are 
under the influence of a drug or not.  So you should not compartmentalise, if 
it is a road traffic accident, fitness to be interviewed or sexual assault, the 
expertise you use in other areas can be easily used in the sexual assault 
examination (Dr. E, male, Constabulary 3). 
 
It is clear that FMEs believe that they should not specialise in sexual offence work 
alone as they will lose certain skills and experience, but they may not have a choice 
in future.  As I have already mentioned, the rest of the criminal justice process is 
leaning towards specialisation in order to help improve the conviction rate in rape 
cases, and so it is likely that FMEs, given that they currently find it very difficult to 
make claims about rape, will be asked to specialise in a similar manner.  The 
decision to implement The Arch, and the resulting research findings, will be highly 
enlightening as to what extent specialism and political and legal imposition will have 
on forensic medical evidence and rape cases in general. 
 In order to protect their own authority, FMEs produce neutral reports, but in 
doing so they inadvertently limit their evidential significance.  This dichotomy will, I 
suggest, limit FMEs’ jurisdiction over claims-making in rape and penetrative sexual 
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assault.  While I do not envisage a time when FMEs will not be performing medical 
examinations, it is likely that in future the aim of the medical examination will be to 
collect forensic samples, corroborate sexual intercourse, and take care of the 
therapeutic needs of the complainer.  The uncertainty surrounding injury evidence, 
and the broader cultural education of both prosecutors and the public about the 
inherent limitations of injury evidence, could (and in fact should) serve to limit the 
role of FMEs to that of the “technician”, collecting material for the scientist to 
analyse.
159
  While there is currently no silver bullet for the attrition rate problem (all 
the strategies I have mentioned having their drawbacks), it is clear that greater 
education of prosecutors and the public about the insignificance of injury evidence is 
required.  To this end, practices such as general expert evidence and precognitions 
should be taken very seriously, and require further evaluation of their 
implementation.  This should be conducted alongside projects such as Carol 
Withey’s “Schools Project” (Withey 2007), in which Withey visited schools in order 
to explain the law of rape to 14-15 year olds.  Only via education will conviction 
rates alter and the vicious circle finally come to an end.  In such a process, it is likely 
that FMEs will lose their professional dominance over legitimate expert evidence, 
with psychologists and social scientists finding that their “general evidence” holds 
more weight than the clinical forensic medical; is this necessarily a desired outcome?  
If the removal of injury evidence results in more “non-stereotypical” cases being 
forwarded to court and resulting in convictions, then undoubtedly yes. 
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Template Invitation Letter for FMEs 
 










     Email: g.rees-
3@sms.ed.ac.uk 
 
FMEs Name and Address 
 
Re: Research interviews concerning forensic evidence in cases of sexual assault 
 
Dear Dr. X, 
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh (Science Studies Unit) researching 
how forensic evidence is collected and employed by prosecution agencies (police and 
advocates depute/procurator fiscals) for sexual assault and rape cases.  Most notably 
I am interested in collection procedures and how forensic evidence is utilised in 
decision-making (for example, whether a particular prosecution continues to trial).  I 
intend to speak to numerous Forensic Medical Examiners throughout Scotland in 
different force areas and have been given your name by some of your colleagues in 
Edinburgh, notably Prof. Anthony Busuttil at the Medical School, University of 
Edinburgh. 
 




• Your experiences of conducting forensic medical examinations on sexual 
assault victims; how you decide which tests are necessary (or where to focus 
observation) and how you document the examination.   
• Your experiences of training; i.e. how it was conducted, what forms of 
specialist FME training were required etc.  This is related to the recent 
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service’ Review of the Investigation 
and Prosecution of Sexual Offences in Scotland’s finding that there is a 
necessity for increased training and accreditation of forensic examiners.  
Thus I wish to get an idea of the current provision of training for forensic 
examiners. 
• Your experiences interacting with other investigation personnel.  I am 
interested in your role as an FME in helping piece together the events and the 
case for the prosecution. 
Investigating these aspects of your role as FME will enable me to draw some 
conclusions as to the nature of forensic examinations in Scotland.  These conclusions 
will be linked to the results of other interviews and will then enable me to make 
wider comments on the role and use of forensic evidence in the criminal justice 
system.  Further information regarding the study can be found at: 
http://www.ssu.ssc.ed.ac.uk/pg/current_pgs.html#gr 
http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/s0450844/Research_Agenda.html 
Furthermore, my supervisor: Dr Ivan Crozier (icrozier@staffmail.ed.ac.uk) would be 
more than happy to answer any further queries. 
 
 























     Email: g.rees-
3@sms.ed.ac.uk 
 
Chief Constable Name and Address 
 
Re: Research interviews concerning forensic evidence in cases of sexual assault 
 
Dear Chief Constable X, 
 
I am a second year PhD student at the University of Edinburgh (Science Studies 
Unit) researching how forensic evidence is collected and employed by prosecution 
agencies (police and advocates depute/procurators fiscal) for sexual assault and rape 
cases.  Most notably I am interested in collection procedures and how forensic 
evidence is utilised in decision-making.  I am writing to ask permission to interview 
Senior Investigating Officers and Sexual Offence Liaison Officers about their 
training and the work they conduct regarding sexual assault investigations.  This is 
the second phase of my research, the first being interviewing forensic medical 
examiners (FMEs) about their work.  During the first phase I was fortunate enough to 
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speak to Dr. Hiremath who suggested I contacted you to ask permission to speak to 
officers in Fife. 
 
Essentially I am interested in talking about three elements of police work in rape and 
sexual assault investigations: 
 
• How forensic evidence is employed in the police decision-making process. 
• What training do investigators of sexual assaults receive, not only in terms of 
care of the victim but in relation to forensic medical information. 
• How the police interact with other members of the investigation process; the 
FMEs and members of the Crown Office. 
I am aware that much of what I wish to discuss has already been covered in some 
depth in the recent Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service’ Review of the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences in Scotland, however, placing 
further emphasis on forensic medicine, which was not within the remit of the Crown 
Offices investigation, should enlighten a number of the points made within that 
report. 
Further information regarding this study can be found at: 
http://www.ssu.ssc.ed.ac.uk/pg/current_pgs.html#gr 
http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/s0450844/Research_Agenda.html 
Furthermore, my supervisor: Dr Ivan Crozier (icrozier@staffmail.ed.ac.uk) would be 
more than happy to answer any further queries. 
 
 


























Crown Office,  




Re: Research interviews concerning forensic evidence in cases of sexual assault 
 
Dear X,  
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh (Science Studies Unit) researching 
the collection and employment of forensic evidence by Scottish prosecution agencies 
(police and procurators fiscal) in cases of sexual assault and rape.  I am primarily 
interested in the decision-making processes surrounding this forensic evidence (for 
example, whether a particular prosecution proceeds to trial, and the role played by 
forensic evidence in this procedure).  It is my intention to speak with a number of 
Forensic Medical Examiners and prosecutors involved in rape and sexual assault 
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cases throughout Scotland.  To this end, I am writing to you for permission to 
conduct brief interviews with advocates depute/procurators fiscal at their 
convenience about the decisions their make whilst prosecuting a case.   
 
Essentially, I am interested in talking to procurators about three elements of their 
work: 
 
• The processes by which prosecutors decide how to ‘mark’ a case 
• The involvement of forensic evidence in determining the marking of the case 
o Related to this, the sufficiency of evidence required and the preferred 
types of forensic evidence to be drawn upon. 
• Prosecutors previous experiences of forensic evidence in sexual assault cases 
and interactions with forensic medical examiners as a part of this process. 
 
Investigating these aspects of the work of prosecutors will enable me to draw 
conclusions as to the nature and use of forensic evidence in the criminal justice 
system in Scotland.  These conclusions will be linked to the results of other 
interviews with other parties involved in the investigation and prosecution of sexual 
assaults (i.e. the police and Forensic Medical Examiners).  After conducting these 
interviews I will be able to analyse the role and use of forensic evidence in the 
criminal justice system.  This subsequent analysis should then produce some 
procedural recommendations for the investigation of rape and sexual assaults, 
particularly in relation to how forensic evidence is collected and utilised.  Such 
recommendations could then be appropriated and employed alongside the recent 
recommendations produced by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences in Scotland.  
 
My position can be verified and further information about the study including further 
details on the proposed interview programme can be found at: 
http://www.ssu.ssc.ed.ac.uk/pg/current_pgs.html#gr 
 http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/s0450844/Research_Agenda.html 
and also my supervisor: Dr Ivan Crozier (University of Edinburgh) would be more 
than happy to answer any further queries about me you may have. 
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     Email: g.rees-
3@sms.ed.ac.uk 
 
Re: Research interviews concerning forensic evidence in cases of sexual assault 
 
I, Dr. X, agree that comments made during the course of the previous interview can 
be used by Mr. Gethin Rees in the course of his research and any academic 
publications that may ensue.  I understand that all identifying details will be removed 
from the transcript of the interview and that Mr. Gethin Rees alone will ever listen to 
the recording which will eventually be deleted at the close of the project. 
 
Please delete where appropriate: 
• I do/do not wish to receive a completed copy of the transcript. 
• I do/do not wish to receive an advanced copy of any documents that will be 








Signed      Signed 
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Appendix 3 The Working 
Party’s Template Artefacts: 
 
• Pro-Forma for Post-Pubertal 
Female and Male Forensic Sexual 
Assault Examinations; 







































Appendix 4 An Actual FMEK 
Used in Practice: 
 
• Photographs of Aspects of a 
Constabulary’s FMEK; 












Fig. 3 Swab Collection Module 
 
 
Fig. 4 Swabs 
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Fig. 6 Phials for holding blood or urine samples 
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